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The bank-the monster has to have profits all the time. It can't wait. It'll die.  
When the monster stops growing, it dies. It can't stay one size. 
John Steinbeck, The Grapes of Wrath 
 
In a word, moneythe circulation of moneyis the means for rendering the debt infinite.  
The infinite creditor and infinite credit have replaced the blocks of mobile and  
finite debts. There is always a monotheism on the horizon of despotism: the debt becomes a 
debt of existence, a debt of the existence of the subject themselves. A time will come when the 
creditor has not yet lent while the debtor never quits repaying,  
for repaying is a duty but lending is an option. 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus 
 
Economics is the method but the object is to change the soul. 
Margaret Thatcher 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
Narrative, Value and Finance 
 
 
 
Politics, economy, and culture converge on the field of value. While politics modulates and 
organises its objects into an (in)visible relation of value-hierarchy imbued with power, 
economy decodes, encodes, and realigns its objects into an exchange relation through which 
the actual composition and subjectivity of objects is transformed and recomposed for the 
valorisation of the dominant value system. Culture is a set of symbolic representations of 
value, and its practices can be seen as a system of signification, in that the cultural acquires 
its meaning by being objectified in the field of signification around the valuable. Culture is 
thus ―the cluster of practices and values that give a social group its sense of inclusion and 
exclusion,‖ while politics and economy perform in different ways (Coupland et al., 2005: 71). 
With the mobilisation and constitution of value signification, cultural value becomes 
entangled with economic value; this is because the capital-valorisation process ceaselessly 
intervenes in the process of signification of symbolic value. It works towards the expansion 
of the attention economy and its internalisation (Beller, 2006). Cultural construction of value 
is an inevitable process in the expansion and legitimisation of economic value. 
Value, then, is the crucial locus where politics, economy, and culture converge. 
Exploring the possibilities of a cultural theory of narrative, this thesis focuses with urgency 
upon the question of value and the actual process of value-formation that are related to 
operativity and the performativity of narrative. This thesis examines narrative as the 
cognitive operation constitutive of financial politics for value transference, which occurs in 
the discourse of financial crisis. It revisits the value theories of Simmel and Marx in order to 
articulate an economic theory of value as a cultural politics of narrative and, following 
Ricoeur and Genette, as a mechanism of value transference. This will be correlated with the 
financial doctrine of entanglement and contagion. Through narrative, in which utterances 
and statements perform as a collective operativity of information, a value is, as this thesis 
contends, represented and transferred in order to inform and motivate actors. Narrative 
structure, from which the nexuses of intentionalities of the financial system are formulated 
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and represented, is then proposed as a meta-frame of cultural valorisation of the economic. 
It valorises economic value for the (re)production of the dominant financial value, without 
which any unprecedented representation of methodology, such as a ‗shock doctrine,‘ or 
economic ‗prescription‘ for the event or crisis cannot be extrapolated and legitimised. 
This thesis in this sense proposes that, on the stage of financial capital, a systematic 
interpretation of a specific instance takes the form of a narrative, to which actors resort for 
their performance, constructing a notion of the sensible out of uncertainty. This notion is 
actualised and realised as the dominant value. This is a crucial aspect of cultural production 
under financial capitalism, valorising the uncertainty of financial flows by producing a 
signifying chain of value through the narrative process. As Spivak aptly proposes, to answer 
the ―onto-phenomenological question‖ of value, value-production in the economic sphere 
should be necessarily articulated into ―an adequate analogy to the psychoanalytic narrative‖ 
(Spivak, 1985: 82). This can illuminate how economic value acquires meaning in the 
individual mind as well as in social relations that stretch beyond the economic. If ―the 
question of value necessarily receives a textualized answer,‖ as Spivak claims, the critical 
question of how such a textualised response is actually formulated and articulated in the 
formation of economic value needs to be explained.  
With the theoretical concerns, this thesis more specifically proposes a cultural logic of 
financialisation in terms of re-presentation of information and re-configuration of 
temporalityboth of which are guided and regulated by narrative operation in finance. This 
narrative functions, following Bourdieu, as ―the sign of wealth‖ in our times (Bourdieu, 1992: 
66). It is time for cultural theorists and activists to approach finance as a set of epistemic 
cultural processes beyond the economic, which modulates epistemological and ontological 
contexts, affecting actors’ cognition and actions in value-production and realisation. 
Financialisation is supported and maintained by narrative intervention in its task of 
valorising the onto-phenomenological level of the economic. From this perspective, 
financialisation is then suggested as a disinformation campaign, through which the 
imposing risks of the financial mechanism are effectively contained, concealing its damaging 
effects and thus valorising the financial mechanism. It implements an intensification of the 
transactional orientation as the legitimate mode of value production and circulation. 
Sustaining and amplifying the transactional orientation of investment banking among actors 
in financial markets, the financial system masks any detrimental aspects through its 
operativity and its performance of narrative. It works towards the construction of a new 
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financial reality, stimulating belief and guiding actionwithout which financial integrity, 
credit relations, and transactional orientation could not be sustained. 
This thesis in this regard approaches finance through narrative, explicating that 
finance and narrative are both seen as systems of value and representation that perform 
uncertainty. They function as a frame of value-transference and a device of representation of 
events and relations in guiding and realising the dominant value. Here we suggest some 
keywords for analysing the financial system through narrative operations: uncertainty, 
value, representation, and temporality. The following chapters will elaborate each keyword 
to reveal the workings of the financial system as a cultural operation beyond the economic 
sphere. 
 
The Location of Narrative 
 
To contend that narrative is a culturally-organising principle within financial operation is to 
suggest that it can be extended beyond its usual literary terms. As such, it is important to 
define narrative, locating its implications in narrative theory. Human beings have told 
stories from the beginning. Humans are storytellers. Stories have been a fundamental way of 
describing events and relations, and of understanding the world. ―Humans in all cultures,‖ 
one theorist points out, ―come to cast their identity in some sort of narrative form. We are 
inveterate storytellers‖ (Flanagan, 1994: 198). Narrative however needs to be differentiated 
from both plot and story. Broadly speaking, narrative is a representational mode of story-
telling, while plot is more directly deployed as the logic of causation of stories. A story is a 
recounted event in (written or verbal) text. 
Narrative selects or deselects plots in order to foreground a certain type of 
representation, which works as a governing body over stories as a whole. ―Story,‖ according 
to Cobley, ―consists of all the events which are to be depicted,‖ while ―plot is the chain of 
causation which dictates that these events are somehow linked and that they are therefore to 
be depicted in relation to each other.‖ ―Narrative,‖ then ―is the showing or the telling of 
these events and the mode selected for that to take place‖ (Cobley, 2013:5). In our analysis, 
narrative is the mode of thematic re-presentation of the events through which the intention of the 
narrator is comprehended and transferred, guiding necessity of change in realising the main 
value. The thematic representation of the event guiding necessity and value is an important 
function of narrative and will be further elaborated in Chapter 2. 
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In our frame of analysis, narrative is also differentiated from discourse. Discourse, as 
Foucault points out, is a mode of power. In discourse, socio-cultural media—for instance, 
language, image, institutions, or law—operate as ―the procedure of intervention that may be 
applied to [discourse] statements‖ in identifying and exercising a set of relationships within 
the coordinates of power (Foucault, 1972: 58). Whilst discourse, in this respect, can be 
grasped as a broad epistemological entity that constitutes ―a system of conceptual formation‖ 
imbued with power (Foucault, 1972: 60), the salient feature of narrative can be found in its 
form combined with its valorising orientation, valorisation of temporality and action. 
Narrative is not a randomly disseminated rhetoric or discourse, but rather is presented as a 
form in which temporal reconfiguration and sequences of action are designed to represent 
the main event, which then becomes a source of cognition and action for contextual control; 
a certain sequence of events is thereby thematised and anticipated through the 
interpretation of the event in question, and in search of the main value, where there are clear 
intentions by the main financial narrator. In the following, particularly in Chapters 5 and 6, 
we will elucidate this narrative financial operation in terms of its formalistic attributes, 
which set narrative apart from discourse. 
Most definitions of narrative emphasise its relation to representation and events in 
temporal (dis)continuity: narrative as a representation of a certain sequence of events. Prince, 
for instance, argues that ―narrative is the representation of at least two real or fictive events 
in a time sequence, neither of which presupposes or entails the other‖ (Prince, 1982: 4). For 
Onega and Landa, ―narrative is a semiotic representation of a series of events‖ (Onega and 
Landa, 1996: 6). ―One will,‖ Genette adds, ―define narrative without difficulty as the 
representation of an event or sequence of events‖ (Genette1982: 127). Christian Metz also 
focuses on the temporal dimension of narrative, defining narrative as a ―temporal sequence‖ 
(Metz, 2000: 87). However it is not a simple sequence but a ―doubly temporal sequence,‖ 
arising from the fissure between ―the time of things told‖ and ―the time of the telling.‖ As he 
argues, for instance, ―three years of the hero‘s life summed up in two sentences of a novel or 
in a few shots of a ‗frequentative‘ montage in film, etc‖ (Metz, 2000: 87). This duality of 
temporality in narrative is what distinguishes narrative from description and image. 
These definitions, however, focus on the signifier, and the functional and structural 
dimension of narrative, limiting the possibilities of exploration of the signified (meaning 
contents) in narrative that conditions and drives the narrative structure. The definitions 
remain functional and structural. They are restricted to answering questions about driving 
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motivations, impulses, and the desires inherent in narrative reconstruction. Narrative 
theories from Russian formalism and French structuralism strive to find a universal pattern 
that rules elements of texts, and which can in turn be applied to more diverse texts. In 
pursuing a governing rule of text, they tend to ―isolate the necessary and optional 
components of textual types and to characterize the modes of their articulation‖ (Prince, 524). 
In this structuralist vein, narrative theories bracket the semantic context of meaning that is 
inexorably interrelated with the narrative structure. 
The narrative analyses of Genette and Ricoeur, however, open a new horizon. Their 
approaches to narrative, as this thesis will examine, overcome the tendency of functional 
investigations of narrative structure, thereby providing a scope for wider socio-political and 
cultural articulations of narrative. Unlike other narratologists, Genette claims that any 
narrative analysis must pay careful attention to the problems of narrative enunciating, 
because they reveal how the event and the action are interwoven and produced in the 
making of a narrative discourseas ―the study of relationships‖ in reality as well as in text. 
 
[A]nalysis of narrative discourse […] constantly implies a study of relationships: on the 
one hand the relationship between a discourse and the events that it recounts, on the 
other hand, the relationship between the same discourse and the act that produces it, 
actually or figuratively. (Genette, 1980: 26–27, emphasis added) 
 
Underscoring narrative as ―the system of relationship,‖ Genette assumes a ―narrative 
totality,‖ in which actions and situations are related in temporal succession. For Genette, the 
event of narrative is not just the event ‗recounted‘ as something static, but as an event that is 
active, and which interconnects with the act of ‗recounting‘ itself. The active event of 
recounting is the becoming event, and this is in a constant relationship with narrative 
enunciating. Therefore, ―it is just as evident that the narrative discourse depends absolutely 
on that action of telling, since the narrative discourse is produced by the action of telling in 
the same way that any statement is the product of an act of enunciating‖ (Genette, 1980: 26, 
emphasis added). Genette accentuates the existence of the narrator and the agency of the 
narrative. We will reinterpret narrative, following Genette, as a process of meaning-making 
that is associated with the intention of the narrator, which is lacking in previous attempts to 
define narrative. In Genette‘s theory, an event is embedded in a meaning-making process as 
well as being a functional entity through the action of enunciating. Rearticulating his theory, 
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this thesis will extend and correlate it with the practices of financial narration. 
Ricoeur also gives us an important insight for narrative analysis. His investigations of 
narrative structure expand the epistemological and ontological dimensions of narrative 
beyond previous functional approaches. What is at stake and distinctive is his theory of the 
role of ‗value‘ in narrative analysis, which I re-evaluate as the guiding force of narrative 
structure. He underscores that what narrative produces and transfers is, above all, 
valuewhich coordinates a multitude of actors and actions and then orients them. The 
topological syntax of narrative turns into the field of value-transference, on which colliding 
modalities of values are established and valorised, thereby circulating ―the transference of 
values‖ in narrative (Ricoeur, 1985: 50). I will reassess Ricoeur’s view of narrative to suggest 
that narrative is the cognitive operation constitutive of financial narrative politics, which 
implement value transference in the discourse of the Korean financial crisis. 
Genette and Ricoeur‘s analyses herald a new transition in narrative theorya critical 
point in which there is a shift of the object in the study of narrative. Previously, narrative 
approaches pursued a static and given set of rules that were thought to be a functional 
structure governing disparate stories and events in literary texts, as in the Russsian 
formalists Victor Shklovsky and Vladimir Propp, and later in French structuralism. With 
Genette and Ricoeur‘s emphases on narrative discourse, relations, and dynamic modes of 
representation related to meaning and value, narrative theory begins to expand and 
encompass cultural and social realities beyond written text, thus moving towards an 
analysis of wider network of relations, meanings, and representation. In this regard, 
narrative theory is broadly articulated as the study of signifying practices such as social 
processes of meaning-making and communication (Hall 1997, Bourdieu 1992, Luhmann 
2002), but also as a socio-linguistic approach (Labov 1994, Gubrium and Holstein 2012), 
including musicology, film, and the interfaces of computer software programs (Marie-Laure 
Ryan 1999). 
 
The Organisation of the Chapters 
 
To undertake this interdisciplinary project, I will first underscore the necessity of looking at 
narrative in analyses of financial systems, delving into the socio-cultural implications of 
finance capital, seen as interlinked with instances of narrative practices in the financial age. 
Chapter 2 analyses the process of value-formation in finance, and shows that finance cannot 
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be fully explicated with economic theory as such. By proposing narrative as the dynamic 
mode of value representation in finance, we can elucidate the constant and collective 
intervention of operativity, and the performativity of financial redescriptions and 
representations of the event in terms of economic effectivenessthrough this, the process of 
valorisation in finance can be more appropriately assessed. With the guiding structure of 
operativity and performativity, which works as a cognitive operation within the discourse of 
financial crisis, narrative operation constantly represents the financial master-code as 
ontological and epistemological conditions of conduct. Chapter 2 argues that narrative 
exploits uncertainty as a resource for performativity, and thus necessitates a new standard 
of main value, thereby regulating and activating heterogeneous actors in the markets. A 
financial crisis is the crucial point of narrativity in the constitution of a legitimate guiding 
structure, exploiting uncertainty in order to manage risk thus producing a narrative as a 
frame of self-reference. The narrative identifies the new main value by effectively 
performing the uncertainty of a financial crisis. 
In proposing narrative as a mode of epistemic operation in financial systems, it is 
important to substantiate how narrative works as a value system; how it can be a system of 
value transference and exchange, in which actors‘ performances are meaningfully signified 
following the narrator‘s intentions in an objectified field of narrative representation of 
economic value. This entails strong rewritings of ethical codes in foregrounding the moral 
leadership of the economic, which will be substantiated in Chapter 3. The chapter associates 
the question of value and the actual process of value-formation with narrative operation, 
revealing how economic value is signified in sequential thematic representation. As the 
chapter reveals narrative performativity, the ability to interpret and predicate value in 
accordance with narrators‘ intentions, is effectively supported with a frame of ethical 
vindication, as well as that of rational justification. 
The rise of investment banking techniquesand its temporal implications and 
effectiveness in describing the economic modelis scrutinised in Chapter 4, through 
examining the process of financialisation of Korea. Time becomes historical functional 
temporality in narrative, conditioning the narrative process as a rhythm of value in an 
effective valorisation of the sequential representation of an event. In this regard, ―pure 
[economic] convention‖ is the performativity of the economic, with which even false 
representations of reality can be described as ―effective‖ (Callon, 2007:322). In this 
intervention of the economic, which produces a new convention by guiding actions and 
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expectations, the chapter demonstrates the effectiveness of a model in setting financial flows 
rather than the appropriateness of descriptions of reality. By redefining and representing the 
reality in which the economic is located, the economic performativity of finance re-describes 
the world in terms of its effectiveness. The chapter also examines the changing role of Korea 
and the limitations in the contemporary neoliberal context of the post-2008 credit crunch 
crisis. It will then give an insight into how Korea has been transformed since the neoliberal 
financial restructuring, and how the change affects the country after the crisis in 2008.  
Chapters 5 and 6 substantiate systematic and collective narrative operations by the 
main financial narrators such as the IMF, the World Bank, other investment banks, the US 
government, and the Korean government, focusing on instances of narrative representation 
and narrative temporality respectively. Chapter 5 undertakes a linguistic analysis of 
concrete strategies of narrative interventions and representations, and this is further 
examined in Chapter 6 under the notion of narrative economy and the subsumption 
mechanism. 
The analysis in Chapter 7, on the characters that mediate and transform social 
relationships within monetary capital, is further considered in the concluding Chapter 8, 
through looking at the cultural problem of distance in the making of new economic subjects. 
Here I look at subsumption by turning to the international debt policy of the Brady Plan and 
the Korean financial crisis. The formation of economic subjectivity related to narrative 
objectification of the object is explicated, in order to shed light on the existential condition of 
the subject in financial capitalism, in the final two chapters. 
 
The Rise of Narrative and the Mode of Legitimisation 
 
Before we begin, it is worth reconsidering the context of the emergence of narrative in 
modern times. How is the tendency to recourse to narrative universally applied in science as 
well as in the humanities? What is the relationship between narrative, language, power and 
legitimacy, and between narrative and knowledge production? These are important 
questions associated with the rise of narrative. 
Narrative, according to Lyotard, is, above all, a mode of legitimisation of the system 
and the ―validity of knowledge.‖ The mode of legitimatisation is qualitatively different from 
earlier modes, as it above all ―reintroduces narrative as the validity of knowledge‖ (Lyotard, 
1984: 31). Here ―[t]he narrator must be a meta subject in the process of formulating both the 
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legitimacy of the discourse of the empirical sciences and that of the direct institutions of 
popular cultures‖ (Lyotard, 1984: 34). Narrative knowledge is, thus, a widely-used way of 
making the system function as a ―heuristic driving force,‖ in cognition, through which new 
protagonists are produced and made to perform. This, in turn, ushers in a new problematic for 
the actors. Even scientific knowledge is operated in the frame of narrative knowledge, with 
its use of discourse in legitimatising its paradigms.  
Narrative knowledge is problematised for the justification and legitimisation of main 
value around questions such as ―Who has the right to decide for society? Who is the subject 
whose prescriptions are norms for those they obligate?‖ Interestingly, Lyotard traces the 
root of this mode of narrative-problematisation to the ―resurgence‖ of the bourgeois, who 
were in search of new heroes and of liberation as ―a way of solving the problem of 
legitimatizing the new authorities‖ (Lyotard, 1984: 30, emphasis added). Politically speaking, 
this method of inquiry was a new method of extrapolating the actors, namely the bourgeois, 
as the collective subject of narration. In this sense, Lyotard insists, the legitimacy of the law 
is replaced with the procedures of narrative knowledge in modern times. 
With the emergence of narrative as the procedure for legitimatisation of knowledge, 
two important problems arise. On the one hand, the objective field in which various 
colliding narrative values are in conflict, the field in which they gradually conform to the 
meta-frame, is extended. On the other hand, the emergence of narrative makes space for 
performance of the actors without any changes in the crucial relationship of ownership. The 
state functions as the narrator, or as the meta-subject, for instance, in the name of the 
collective majority: ―resort[ing] to the narrative of freedom every time it assumes direct 
control over the training of the ―people,‖ under the name of ―nation,‖ in order to point them 
down the path of progress‖ (Lyotard, 1984: 32). The tendency to recourse to narrative is 
conspicuous in modern science, in that modern science is based on ―the rules of game of 
science‖ as ―the condition of truth,‖ which is produced and extended discursively by the 
narrators (here the experts): 
 
With modern science, two new features appear in the problematic of legitimation. To 
begin with, it leaves behind the metaphysical search for a first proof or transcendental 
authority as a response to the question: ―How do you prove the proof?‖ or, more 
generally, ―Who decides the conditions of truth?‖ It is recognized that the conditions 
of truth, in other words, the rules of the game of science, are immanent in that game, 
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that they can only be established within the bonds of a debate that is already scientific 
in nature, and that there is no other proof that the rules are good than the consensus 
extended to them by the experts. (Lyotard, 1984: 29) 
 
It is important to note that modern institutions as well the sciences and related disciplines 
are grounded on the problematisation of legitimation, in which the representation of models 
and analytics are themselves conditioned through language of performative description and 
speech with, in many cases, truth claims imbued with power. In this sense, the tendency to 
recourse to narrative is universally applied in science as well as in the humanities, mainly 
because these are disciplines inseparably intertwined with performancenamely language 
and self-legitimacyas the foundation of knowledge production. This in turn affects their 
coordinates of power. ―It is,‖ therefore, ―not inconceivable that the recourse to narrative is 
inevitable, at least to the extent that the language game of science desires its statements to be 
true that does not have the resources to legitimate their truth on its own‖ (Lyotard, 1984: 28). 
In the following chapters, I will trace how narrative is applied in the truth claims of financial 
narrators in valorising uncertainty, exemplifying multiple-layers of the Korean financial 
crisis, along with the more recent ‗credit crunch‘ in Europe, which was triggered by the 
American subprime mortgage problem. 
 
The Condition of the Subject in Financial Capitalism 
 
The inquiry into the problematisation of narrative representation is necessarily extended to 
the question of the formation of economic subjectivity and the subsumption mechanism in 
financial capitalism. This is in order to reveal how the narrative intention of the system is 
encoded and identified in the object. For this crucial issue, I will examine how the formation 
of new economic subjectivity is an activation or subjection/subjectivation of the object. The 
cultural operation of finance should be firmly probed, on the basis of financial economic 
rationales, to locate the epistemological context of finance capital and its mediating character, 
and to evaluate how it transforms the social relationship. It is therefore important to map 
out the economic necessity of capital transformation that is related to the emergence of the 
monetary system as such. 
The role of finance capital in transforming social relations and subjectivity is critical. 
To initiate the inquiry, the rationale of monetary capital is traced in the final two chapters, 
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where I propose that of monetary capital is a form of cognition associated with symbolic 
influence and value transcoding functions that transform social relationships. Money 
becomes an autonomous entity when it is accumulated as financial capital. The banking 
cultureboth as a legitimate regulatory activity and as a universal measure of the 
mobilisation of individual money for the money-capital reservefunctions, following Ernest 
Mandel, as a ―mediating link in the process of cognition” (Mandel, 1981: 29). It will be 
suggested that this gives legitimate access to the system, beyond economic procedures, and 
that it reshapes individual and social relationships. This theoretical approach is crucial for 
scrutinising how the mode of production becomes social cognition, in which an economic 
process occupies the position of a socially symbolic episteme. This regulates cognition and 
subsequent action in the actualisation and realisation of the dominant value. It is 
implemented through the mediation and transformation of social relations, opening thereby 
a narrative operation that works more effectively for the cultural representation of value. 
Envisaging that the bank as mediator becomes a universal measurer, I further suggest 
that, with the accumulation of capital, the bank also metamorphoses itself into the value-
transcoding agent, or the self-valorising sourceand against it other values are measured and 
interpreted. Financial capital becomes a store of value, reconstituting itself beyond the 
economic as a frame of meaningful action and cognition, for the (re)production of main 
value. Accumulated capital, in this sense, becomes a self-regulatory entity for the dominant 
value, for its activation is the qualification of the system of surplus value. The abstraction of 
money capital in the bank thus represents the transformed social relationship: on the one 
hand, the centralisation of money capital, of the lenders; and on the other hand, the 
centralisation of the borrowers (Marx, 1981: 528). In being accumulated, the double function 
of capital is fulfilled, and the progressive accumulation expands ―spheres of interest‖ for 
both lender and borrower. The expansion, as Rosa Luxembourg argues, becomes the 
condition for further political as well as economic expansion of bank capital (Luxembourg, 
2003: 424). These theoretical concerns necessarily lead to a reconsideration of the emergence 
and establishment of finance capital.  
Under financial capitalism, money functions as a store of value that is advanced in the 
trust and credit systemthrough which financial capitalism establishes a regime of financial 
exchange. What is at stake in the refined mode of the monetary system is the monetary form 
as the product of the active transformation of money capital: the form even presupposes and 
subsumes the latency of value that bears potential surplus value. It is an essential attribute of 
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financial capital that it appropriates the latency of a certain value in order to subsume the 
value of the object into the dominant regime of value. As one cultural theorist puts it, ―in 
speculative enterprises, profit must be imagined before it can be extracted‖ (Tsing, 2004: 84). 
The value of the object, even if it is assumed to have no value at the time of evaluation, can 
and should be ―imagined‖ if it has any potential latent value in the regime of exchange.  
With the effective engagement of interpretive politics over the object as it travels 
through fluid financial channels, meaningful action is realised in the production of value. 
There have been few attempts to probe how the latency of value is actually ―imagined‖ in 
the financial system, not least in association with the cultural implementation of economic 
rationale. By suggesting narrative as a new angle on the cultural frame of the economy, we 
can correlate the necessity of systematic imagination and its collective operation, which is 
effectively implemented through performative utterances and speeches in narrative. The 
problematisation of a financial crisis is a critical point at which the latency of value is 
appropriated for the further valorisation of forms of value production. The monetary world 
of financial capitalism is, in this regard, the appropriating machine of latent value. The 
breadth of financial transactions associated with bank capital enhances the tendency toward 
dematerialisation in value production; it thus radically opens up the field of value politics, 
making room for world financial authorities and centres to arbitrate the local economic 
structure.  
Through a re-reading of Simmel‘s notion of distance in economic value-formation, and 
also by extending my analysis of the existential conditions of the object to the coordinates of 
the objectifying field of value, narrative, I will, finally, investigate the cultural problem of 
distance in the creation of economic subjectivity. I will correlate the notion of distance in 
narrative operation with processes of formal and real subsumptionmainly by delving into 
the notion of distance in the context of the cultural question of narrative field and financial 
operation, and by revisiting Marx‘s analysis of formal and real subsumption. Modulating 
the object, for real subsumption at an international level, financial capital not only 
dominates but also allows the object direct contact with the fluctuations of the systemby 
producing a subjective effect for the object. It is the effect of power, as Foucault points out, 
that it produces a dominant reality. It does this as the condition of rationalisation, from 
which the recognition of power is discursively formulated. Financial capital codifies, and the 
condition of power produces, a new reality; at the same time, the bearers of the new reality 
make the actors participate in the process of recognition of power with heuristic force. 
15 
 
If this is the process of constituting a new reality, we see that it overlaps with the truth 
claims of the financial narrators in the name of financial reconstruction. Yet the more the 
subject is involved in the discursive process the more he actually subjects himself to power, 
even if he identifies himself as bearing and creating those new values. This is the point at 
which the object is eventually ushered in. For in order to overcome the distance, the narrator 
sets out for the object (identifying the radical imposition of new reality); he identifies the 
field of value objectification, i.e. the narrative field, as the source of cognition and action 
while he is in search of main value. Because the process of subjection (subjectivation) is also 
a process of creating the economic subject, it motivates the object to voluntarily perform, 
thus generating the subject effect. However, the performativity of the object is always 
restricted. As the concluding chapter asserts, it is this restrictedness itself that is the condition 
of subjectivity for the object to activate. With regard to the financial subject and its 
restrictedness, I will examine the Brady Plan and its conditionalities in the concluding 
chapter. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Financial Crisis, Self-Referentiality and Narrative: Performing Uncertainty in 
Finance 
 
 
 
Narrative, Finance and System of Self-Reference 
 
In 2007 a series of collapses of US subprime mortgage companies triggered financial turmoil 
in America, and later the ongoing Eurozone crisis. The events were analogous to the roots of 
the Korean financial crisis in 1997. The initial symptoms of the ‗credit crunch‘ in 2007 
proliferated globally through the financial sector. Ben Bernanke, Chairman of the US Federal 
Reserve, commented that ―the credit losses associated with subprime have come to light and 
they are fairly significant. […] Some estimates are in the order of between $50 billion and 
$100 billion of losses.‖1 In a recent report, the International Monetary Fund estimated that 
the total losses ―may rise to some $1.4 trillion.‖ 2  The prime financial and banking 
institutions, such as Lehman Brothers, that had lent a substantial amount of money to 
subprime mortgage lenders, were subsequently bankrupted. The credit crunch revealed 
how different elements of the financial capital sector are unfathomably entangled. When the 
Federal Reserve rescued the investment bank Bear Stearns with $30 billion of public money, 
Bear Stearns alone was found to have been counter-party to some $10 trillion of over-the-
counter swaps.3 The state‘s intervention proved how urgent the problem was, and how 
difficult it is to deal with a firm‘s financial problems on this enormous scale, especially given 
the degree of complications and entanglement. The doctrine of contagious entanglement, 
once considered legitimate with regard to producing surplus value, is now construed as the 
Gordian knot the state has only to cut. 
The financial crisis and its ongoing aftermath display three salient features: first, 
although the ethical status of the bankers and financiers associated with the system was once 
                                            
1 BBC, ―Timeline: Global Credit Crunch‖ (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7521250.stm).  
2 IMF, ―Global Financial Stability Report‖ (7 October, 2008). 
3 ―Wall Street Crisis,‖ Economist (19 March, 2008). 
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thought to be at the heart of the crisis, this dimension was disregarded in the official 
narrative due to the scale of the problem. Calls for the prevention of systemic crises through 
considerations of moral hazards and justice were, ironically, systematically contained, and 
thus what once seemed a deeply-rooted issue became less central.4 Compared to the Korean 
financial crisis of 1997, which was profoundly coloured with the rhetoric of ethical flaws in 
the locality itself, some crucial points have eluded the narrative of the current financial crisis. 
In this case, a wide range of structural problems and financial entanglements effectively 
conceal fundamental ethical defects in the financial system. Marx‘s prognosis is, in this sense, 
still relevant as to how complicated mutual advances in the credit economy grip society and 
how we assess the impact they cause: 
 
Everyone borrows with one hand and lends with the other, sometimes money, but far 
more frequently products. There is an incessant exchange of advances in industry, 
which combine and intersect each other in all directions. The development of credit is 
nothing more than the multiplication and growth of these mutual advances, and this is 
the true seat of its power. (Marx, 1981: 527-528)  
 
As the financial system relies on perpetual chain of credit transactions that can be performed 
by institutions or individuals, as in the case of Bear Stearns, it systematically leads to the 
possibility of speculation as the vehicle of value-production and transference that is often 
decoupled from trade. Marx continues on this point, citing J. W. Gilbart‘s The History and 
Principle of Banking: 
 
It is the object of banking to give facilities to trade, and whatever gives facilities to trade 
gives facilities to speculation. Trade and speculation are in some cases so nearly allied, 
that it is impossible to say at what precise point trade ends and speculation begins. […] 
Wherever there are banks, capital is more readily obtained, and at a cheaper rate. The 
cheapness of capital gives facilities to speculation, just in the same way as the 
cheapness of beef and of beer gives facilities to gluttony and drunkenness. (Marx, 1981: 
532)  
  
                                            
4 Paola Subacchi, ―Panic, Blame, and Crash Avoidance,‖ World Today, Chatham House, vol. 64, no. 10, 
p. 5. 
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Easy mobilisation of money produces surplus value, allowing a virtually unlimited 
entanglement of fluid capital throughout the world. What should, however, be noted here is 
that the financial mechanism of entanglement and contagion, following Marx once again, is 
reached at a point of “a self-abolishing contradiction‖(Marx, 1981: 569, emphasis added). This is 
the critical point at which the fundamental contradiction of entanglement is ironically yet 
legitimately sublated, and thus unprecedentedly and eventually guaranteed by the public 
sector. 
―A self-abolishing contradiction‖ in a financial system is crucial for valorising the 
system itself, as it becomes the point of self-reference of finance capital. It is a point at which 
the system legitimises itself with its own observation for further expansion of the system. 
This thesis begins at this critical juncture, suggesting that because of its self-refentiality the 
financial mode of legitimatisation is qualitatively different from earlier modes of production, 
as it above all introduces a narrative for the necessary revalorisation of the system. 
According to Luhman, whose analysis of semantics and language is important in 
illuminating the meaning of social processes, ―[t]he concept of self-reference designates the 
unity that an element, a process, or a system is for itself. ‗For itself‘ means independent of 
the cut of observation by others. The concept not only defines, but also contains a significant 
statement, for it maintains that unity can come about only through a relational operation, 
that it must be produced and that it does not exist in advance as an individual, a substance, 
or an idea of its own operation‖ (Luhmann, 1996: 33). As the self-referential system is based 
on a relational operation with its own self-organising logic of unity, it also functions as the 
closure of the system that provides ―broadening possible environmental contacts‖ within the 
closure (Luhmann, 1996: 37).5 
In this regard, this chapter proposes that the necessity of negating (or guaranteeing) 
the fundamental contradiction, or ―the self-abolishing contradiction,‖ bolstered by the sheer 
size of the entanglement and contagion, is authenticated and initiated by a preliminary 
cultural operation of a discursive approach to the crisis. The discourse is not a randomly 
disseminated rhetoric, but is presented as a narrative in which temporal reconfiguration and 
sequences of action are carefully guided to represent the main event as a source of cognition 
and action for contextual control; a certain sequence of events is thereby thematised and 
anticipated through the interpretation of the event in question, with clear intentions by the 
                                            
5 ―[I]n the self-referential mode of operation, closure is a form of broadening possible environmental 
contacts; closure increases, by constituting elements more capable of being determined, the 
complexity of the environment that is possible for the system‖ (Luhmann, 1996: 37). 
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main financial narrator. Narrative opens a performative field of objectification in which the 
power relationship between the main narrator and the object, the narratee, is established and 
coordinated. The narrative emphasis in a collapse, for instance, one that is yet to come, 
grounds the operativity and performativity through which actors are informed and 
motivated, while implementing and legitimising the necessary official description. 
When the American government decided to take the unprecedented measure of 
buying the shares of troubled commercial banks with tax payers‘ money on 14 October, 2008, 
Henry Paulson, the US Treasury Secretary, delivered a crucial statement entitled ―On 
Actions to Protect the US Economy,‖ in which critical necessity was introduced in a 
hermeneutic move that would lead to unprecedented therapy, while underpinning a 
sequence of events by accentuating the failure that implementing the legitimate measure 
might cause: 
Today I am announcing that the Treasury will purchase equity stakes in a wide array 
of banks and thrifts. Government owning a stake in any private U.S. company is 
objectionable to most Americansme included. Yet the alternative of leaving 
businesses and consumers without access to financing is totally unacceptable. When 
financing isn't available, consumers and businesses shrink their spending, which leads 
to businesses cutting jobs and even closing up shops. To avoid that outcome, we must 
restore confidence in our financial system. The first step in that effort is a plan to make 
capital available on attractive terms to a broad array of banks and thrifts, so they can 
provide credit to our economy. From the $700 billion financial rescue package, 
Treasury will make $250 billion in capital available to U.S. financial institutions in the 
form of preferred stock.6 
Firmly within the self-observing frame of finance, the drastic measure turns into a critical 
point, performing the uncertainty of the financial crisis and implementing thematisation and 
rehistoricisation of finance. Hence finance becomes self-referential as well as ubiquitous in 
structure, subsuming the public sector and individual actors, in that all taxpayers as well as the 
government are eventually interpellated as the performers of the financial crisis. Here is a 
total redefinition of the relationship between the narrator and the narratee. This is despite 
the fact that, as Paulson adds in the same statement, these ―actions are not what we 
                                            
6 “Statements by Paulson, Bernanke, Bair,‖ Wall Street Journal (14th October, 2008). 
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[Americans] ever wanted to do,‖ but ―the actions are,‖ he insists, ―what we must do to 
restore confidence to our financial system.‖ The financial crisis redefines the relationship 
between the narrator and the narratee, and thus conditions the relationship as a teleology of 
the system, full of purposeful actions to be taken. Here we witness the contradictions of a 
system caused by entanglement, which have effectively been negated and, in Marxian terms, 
are therefore self-abolished by the containment of other possibilities. The complexity of the 
system turns on its contradictions, or uncertainties, as the foundation of performativity for a 
new valorisation. 
With these theoretical concerns in mind, it is important to remember that narrative 
does not take an auxiliary role in finance. Financial narrative is not just a secondary device 
of domination, but is the primary mode of activation as the source of cognitive and political 
operation. Above all it aims to make a new social relationship between the subject and the 
object by realigning the power of the system to support modalities of action and cognition 
for actors; it works towards an unprecedented economic prescription through extrapolative 
financial measures through extension and regeneration of the system. The formation of the 
subject in this process relies to some degree on use of the collective pronoun, we, in the 
narrative accounta key technique of subjection (subjectivation), since the formation of a 
collective subject produces narrative inter-subjectivity between the narrator and the narratee. 
Making ―we‖ the ―transcendental subject,‖ as in Henry Paulson‘s performative utterances, is 
one of the essential imperatives of narrative operation in the constitution of the subject 
group for context regulation. This politics of grouping, which is evident in narrative 
economy, is, however, also a politics of exclusion. It marks a containment of other 
subjectivities of second- and third-person pronouns, and, thus, differentiates the performing 
subject group from the non-performing group outside of the narrative context. This politics 
of exclusion does not just exclude the second- and third-person pronoun groups, it also 
leaves out individual social positions, ushering the distinctive plural into the collective 
narrative subject we. 
As narrators of the dominant narrative persist, no alternatives can intervene in the 
conundrum of financial entanglement, mainly due to its size and complexity; it is, therefore, 
only the mechanism itself that can sublate the previous mode of production and reconfigure 
the mode with its own rationale. As such, the financial system itself, as Marx succinctly 
grasps, becomes the mechanism of ―the abolition of the capitalist mode of production within 
the capitalist mode of production itself, and hence a self-abolishing contradiction, which 
21 
 
presents itself prima facie as a mere point of transition to a new form of production. It 
presents itself as such a contradiction even in appearance. It gives rise to monopoly in 
certain spheres and hence provokes state intervention‖ (Marx, 1981: 569). A series of state 
interventions in the financial sector at the moment of the crisis should, hence, be seen as the 
expansion of financial capital‘s inner logic, abolishing its previous contradictions and 
framing a new mode of production in terms of the rationale of financial capital. This mode 
effectively contains political considerations formed from a socio-political viewpoint. For 
finance capital, involving governments, public institutions, and subsequently individual 
actors is necessary for abolishing its contradictions, and for spreading the risk to the public 
sector, and eventually for economic self-valorisationby containing the socio-political. 
Marx‘s dense analysis of the self-contradictory mechanism of financial capital is illuminating 
when he suggests that: 
[t]he true barrier to capitalist production is capital itself. It is that capital and its self-
valorization appear as the starting and finishing point, as the motive and purpose of 
production; production is production only for capital, and not the reverse, i.e. the 
means of production are not simply means for a steadily expanding pattern of life for 
the society of the producers. The barriers within which the maintenance and 
valorization of the capital-value has necessarily to moveand this in turn depends on 
the dispossession and impoverishment of the great mass of the producerstherefore 
come constantly into contradiction with the methods of production that capital must 
apply to its purpose and which set its course towards an unlimited expansion of 
production, to production as an end itself, to an unrestricted development of the social 
productive powers of labour. The meansthe unrestricted development of the forces 
of social productioncomes into persistent conflict with the restricted end, the 
valorization of the existing capital. If the capitalist mode of production is therefore a 
historical means for developing the material powers of production and for creating a 
corresponding world market, it is at the same time the constant contradiction between 
this historical task and the social relations of production corresponding to it. (Marx, 
1981: 358-359, emphasis in original) 
 
Unlike the general views that underscore the narrative emphasis of possible catastrophe and 
mayhem, the systematic contradiction of the financial mode of production leverages the 
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process of expansion by self-valorising the contradictions: they become the point of 
transition to a new mode of production. The contradictions also function as the ground of 
narrative initiation for systematic necessities, with ―strong rewriting‖ by the main financial 
narrators in critical support of the transition. Faced with constant contradictions, official 
narration of the crisis becomes ―interpretation proper,‖ and presupposes a ―mechanism of 
mystification or repression‖ to ―project various notions of the unity and the coherence of 
consciousness‖ (Jameson, 2002: 45). Thus we see further valorisation of the system through 
the interpretation. 
Defining and representing the crisis through narrative politics, supported by the 
mechanism of self-valorisation of financial capital, and corresponding to the constant 
contradictions, should be seen as the actual implementation of articulation practices of 
finance. Here, ―a number of distinct elements interact, in a moment of temporary unity‖ for 
further stabilisation of the system (Evans and Hall, 1999: 5). For financial narrators the 
―temporary unity‖ that comes from the uncertainty represented in the textuality of narrative 
is an inevitable necessary condition for encoding the signifying chain, in search of 
capitalistically reconfigured temporality, and eventually for a stable performance as the 
rhythm of a new life. This is because the temporary unity of the performative frame, with a 
newly configured time scheme, brings valorised stable actions out of the uncertainty and 
gives a legitimate view of the economic. Thus it epistemologically conceptualises the 
importance of legitimate prescription as a guiding force for action and a new valorisation, as 
in Paulson‘s performative statements, which lay the ground for serialised actions as a road 
map out of the crisis. 
With narrative operation, and by engaging with uncertainty, finance continuously 
rewrites history. Financial crises are therefore the focal point of intervention for financial 
capitalism, where it can extrapolate its narrative paradigm as the master code for rewriting 
history. Financial narrative is the proto-narrative of our times. As narrative apparatus, 
finance capital undertakes a cultural valorisation of the economic through narrative 
operation. Narrative functions as a cultural valorisation of the economic, with its symbolic 
yet practical mechanisms of representation towards the notion of the value and the valuable. 
Narrative, as an objectifying field of valorisation, foregrounds the financial narrators‘ 
intention, with which heterogeneous elements are interpreted and evaluated. As a process 
and result of itself, a set of expectations and anticipations towards a new value is eventually 
formed as a meta-frame of value-production and transference in the narrative process. 
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Revealing the necessity of articulating a cultural frame of narrative as a guiding structure of 
operativity and performativity in financial reality, two important aspects of financial 
narrative operationreconfiguration of narrative temporality and representation of 
informationwill be analysed in detail. This interdisciplinary approach will contribute to 
illuminating the cultural operation of finance by explaining how financial narrators operate 
semantic recastings of markets through observation and information in reconfigured 
temporality and representations of information that support the dominant economic value. 
In this chapter and following Chapter 3, I will first underscore the necessity of 
narrative in analyses of the financial system, delving into the socio-cultural implications of 
finance capital, interlinked with instances of narrative practices in the financial age. I want to 
show that the process of value-formation in finance cannot be fully explicated with 
economic theory as such. By proposing narrative as the dynamic mode of value 
representation in finance, we can elucidate the constant and collective intervention of 
operativity and performativity of financial re-description in terms of effectiveness, and the 
process of valorisation in finance can be then more appropriately assessed. With the guiding 
structure of operativity and performativity, which works as a cognitive operation within the 
discourse of financial crisis, narrative operation incessantly represents the financial master-
code as ontological and epistemological conditions of conduct. Narrative opens a channel of 
cognition of value, and regulates the context of performance, while providing a frame of 
reference for actors. This chapter argues that narrative exploits uncertainty as a resource for 
performativity, and necessitates a new standard, thereby regulating and activating 
heterogeneous actors in the markets. A financial crisis is the crucial point of narrativity in 
the constitution of a legitimate guiding structure, exploiting uncertainty to manage 
riskand thus producing a narrative as a frame of self-reference. The narrative identifies the 
new main value by effectively performing the uncertainty of a financial crisis. To undertake 
this project, I revisit the theories of narrative of Ricoeur, Genette, and Jameson, along with 
the economic theories of Marx, Hilferding, and Simmel, with other contemporary theorists, 
to articulate narrative as the epistemic operation of economic valorisation in finance. Here 
the notion of value associated with financial necessity passes through narrative to 
reconfigure the main events, and subsequent actions are operated and thematised to valorise 
futurity in the present.  
Descriptions and representations of value-formation and valorisation are critical in 
economics as well as cultural theory, but have been left unanswered. As such, this thesis 
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responds that this is a process of performative speech, or semantic recasting, of economic 
value, with which financial necessity is systematically represented in narrative operation. To 
substantiate the inexorable part of economic value-formation through textualisation, I will 
exemplify narrative intervention and operation of international financial narrators, such as 
the International Monetary Fund, as the preliminary cognitive operations inevitable for 
introducing subsequent radical economic policy. Furthermore, narrative intervention is 
appraised as a political action that justifies and legitimises impositions of contradictory 
economic policies onto crisis-affected countries. Without narrative operation as a 
preliminary cultural cognitive operation, and political action supporting the new financial 
arrangement as the structure of meaning-making in production and transference of 
dominant value, it is unfeasible for financial narrators to extrapolate economic policies on a 
local level. This is how the necessity of radical imposition of action and anticipation 
materialises as the cultural performativity of the economic. In this regard, I approach 
narrative as cultural operation, or cultural valorisation of the economic of the financial 
system, in a theoretical effort to articulate the seemingly separate frames of reference of 
narrative and finance.  
 
Narrative and Historicisation of the Master-Code in Finance 
 
If history is the experience of necessity, or the epistemological justification of necessity, we 
can presuppose that the operation of guiding necessity, following Jameson, always 
anticipates thematisation in the form of narrative for the ―object of representation or as one 
master code among many others‖ (Jameson, 1989:85).7 What is important in Jameson‘s 
argument is that necessity is a ―form of events‖ beyond contentthis will form a narrative 
category in our analysis: 
 
Necessity is here represented in the form of the inexorable logic involved in the 
determinate failure of all the revolutions that have taken in human history: the 
ultimate Marxian presuppositionthat socialist revolution can only be a total and 
                                            
7 For Jameson, who proposes that narrative is a socially symbolic act through which the political 
(un)conscious of the text is symptomatically expressed/evaluated, and is therefore inevitable for 
access to text or History. Narrative is an ―all-informing process‖ encompassing the ―central function 
or instance of human mind‖ (Jameson, 1989: 13, emphasis in original). Moreover, ―symbolic 
affirmation of the unity of society‖ through narrative process, ―is understood as playing a pivotal role 
in the health, survival and reproduction of the social formation in question‖ (Jameson, 1989: 293). 
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worldwide process (and that this in turn presupposes the completion of the capitalist 
―revolution‖ and of the process of commodification on a global scale) – is the 
perspective in which the failure or the blockage, the contradictory reversal or 
functional inversion, of this or that local revolutionary process is grasped as 
―inevitable,‖ and as the operation of objective limits. History is therefore the 
experience of Necessity, and it is this alone which can forestall its thematization or      
reification as a mere object of representation or as one master code among many others. 
Necessity is not in that sense a type of content, but rather the inexorable form of events; 
it is therefore a narrative category in the enlarged sense of some properly narrative 
political unconscious which has been argued here, a retextualization of History which 
does not propose the latter as some new representation or ―vision,‖ some new content, 
but as the formal effects of what Althusser, following Spinoza, calls an ―absent cause.‖ 
Conceived in this sense, History is what hurts, it is what refuses desire and sets 
inexorable limits to individual as well as collective praxis, which its ―ruses‖ turn into 
grisly and ironic reversals of their overt intention. But this History can be apprehended 
only through its effects, and never directly as some reified force. (Jameson, 1989:102, 
emphasis in original) 
 
If History, as absent cause or the Real, can only be grasped as textualisation, we also need to 
ask what formal effect can enable us to access History. How can we experience necessity as 
―the inexorable logic‖ of representation for thematisation of the necessity? At this critical 
juncture, Jameson proposes narrative as the organising logic of (re)textualisation of History; 
narrative as the socially symbolic act that enables apprehension of History and its effects. 
However, we need to develop Jameson‘s theoretical proposition further. We need to 
examine narrative and analyse it in detail by extending the study of narrative in the 
investigation of the social system. This will reveal how narrative actually functions as 
socially symbolic act.  
Suggesting that the financial master-code is thematised through the process of 
textualisation in the formulation of necessity, I seek to extend Jameson‘s theoretical interest 
in narrative to the analysis of a dominant financial narrative, that is, narrative as value system, 
or narrative as the mode of cultural valorisation of the economic, with performative illocutionary 
forces of narrative statements and utterances. In such a narrative operation, necessitation of a 
notion of value comes with two important elements: the definition of a primal event and the 
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collectively interpreted representation of it as the ground of performative knowledge 
productionthrough the continual and sequential extension of a main narrative, and 
through a temporally reconfigured narrative action and anticipation. These two narrative 
activities are crucial for the cultural valorisation of the economic. Without (re)historicisation 
of the notion of value associated with necessity through narrative reconfiguration and 
thematisation of the main event, any attempt at valorisation of the economic as such cannot 
be epistemologically foregrounded or legitimatised. 
What is at stake is the process of creating a notion of value through textual coding, and 
the role this plays in value-production. Spivak poses a crucial question in this regard by 
insisting that construction of economic value should be reconsidered, in order to explain the 
dynamic formation of value as such, which will answer the ―onto-phenomenological 
question‖ of value. This view proposes that value-production in the economic sphere should 
be necessarily articulated into ―an adequate analogy to the psychoanalytic narrative‖ 
(Spivak, 1985: 82). If ―the question of value necessarily receives a textualized answer‖ 
(Spivak, 1985: 74), to which we will return in the following chapter in more detail, narrative, 
I uphold, should be considered a collective and systematic answer of finance capital, in 
which value as a guiding force of cognition and action is necessitated, codified, and 
transferred into valorisation of economic value. From this point, I will examine narrative 
operation in the Korean financial crisis, as it symptomatically yet explicitly reveals the 
function of narrative operation in the creation of a primal event, one that might eventually 
rehistoricise financial rationale. In the financial crisis, financial narrators aggressively 
defined, evaluated, and represented the event for a process of unprecedented economic 
transformation and revalorisation. This was the extrapolation of a new economic hypothesis. 
The way in which the financial system extrapolates its economic program needs to be re-
illuminated, showing the process in which it establishes its master code of financial narrative 
with polemical statementsstatements full of modalitiesfor the implementation of the 
unprecedented in the name of financial restructuring. This is performed in association with 
the mediating function of finance capital. We will gain a clearer understanding of how 
finance capital practices narrative in order to extrapolate its main economic policy, with the 
aim of eventual subsumption of the local object in the making of new financial subjectivity. 
 
Narrative, Uncertainty, and Problematic Certainty 
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The collapse of the Bretton Woods system was a response of struggling capitalism, which 
had suffered various international setbackssuch as the European ‗68 revolution, the Arab-
Israeli war, the Vietnam war, and the oil crisis. These were symptoms of a crisis of 
accumulation that disrupted the dominant rhythm of valorisation for the stable circulation 
of (re)production. The capitalist answer was to take the initiative by means of radical 
reshaping of the Bretton Woods system, which was based on a fixed currency rate, into the 
new financial system with a variable exchange rate. The fixed exchange rate system 
balanced the needs of the economic and the socio-political. With the fixed exchange rate, 
each country could manage internal economic situations and guard against external shock. 
The ―Keynesian compromise,‖ regulating the capitalist drive because of social democratic 
concerns, however, fell under attack as the signs of the crisis became more apparent. The 
right wing campaign was, above all, aimed at reconstructing the capitalist regime as a 
monetary-oriented structure. The so-called ‗Saturday night special‘ in October 1979 by Paul 
Volcker, chairman of the US Federal Reserve Bank, heralded the radical transition, with a 
sudden hike in interest rates for the variable currency rate system. This impacted on the 
global economy, institutionalising uncertainty in financial markets. The financial system 
eventually opened up systematic ways of exploiting the uncertainty, for volatile financial 
flows continue to seek profit arising from the unstable gaps between currencies. In this sense, 
―[d]emocratization [in a financial market oriented society] is an act of subjecting all interests 
to competition [for seeking the profits], of institutionalizing uncertainty. The decisive step 
toward democracy is the devolution of power from a group of people to a set of rules‖  
(Przeworski, 1991: 14). By imposing the new financial conditions on countries as well as 
individuals, the new international financial system leverages the uncertainty of the financial 
market as the threshold ―beyond which no one can intervene to reverse the outcomes‖ 
(Przeworski, 1991: 14), by establishing and transferring the intention of the system, replacing 
the democratic process led by the people.  
With radical adjustment based on the variable interest rate heading up economic 
policy, a new form of domination has taken in shape as debt control at international level. 
Although the American economy was also affected by the transition, the greatest victims 
have been undeveloped and developing countries, since they have had to follow the lenders‘ 
policy of conditionality as a “set of rules‖ in return for the loans. The role of the IMF was 
enhanced as the mediator and enforcer, as a result of fluctuations in the ideologies of the US 
and financial capitalism. The Korean financial crisis synthetically implicates the symptoms. 
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We will begin by examining the new climate of financial capitalism after the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system, along with the roles of the main institutions who implemented the 
politics of debt as a conditionality of loans, which is inseparably linked to the narrative 
operation of the institution. Situating the narrative operations of the IMF in the creation of 
narrative knowledge in the Korean financial crisis, whereby the intention of the system is 
represented through narrative accounts, we will demonstrate the concrete strategies of 
narrative as a specific mechanism of culturalas well as economicsubsumption. An 
important aspect of this strategy is the valorisation of uncertainty, which opens up a channel 
for cognition of new value, regulates the context of performance, and reconstitutes the sense 
of the valuable by transferring the dominant value. By examining the important speeches 
and addresses of the main narrators of the institutions as collective utterances of narrative 
intervention into the crisis, the ―explanatory effect‖ (Ricoeur, 1984: 164) of narrative will be 
substantiated. We will see that it initiates and operates narrative as a device of consent, 
replacing political conflicts and procedures by necessitating and supporting macroeconomic 
integrationeventually forming a new financial architecture. As such, narrative 
intervention in the financial crisis is seen as political action, which justifies the subsequent 
imposition of political intentions through its explanatory effect, transcoding economic 
uncertainty into problematic certainty, requisite in the design of economic structure. 
According to Ricoeur, ―explanatory effect‖ is a distinctive attribute in narrative argument, 
for which plot functions as the logic of explanation. 
 
The boundary between plot and argument is no easier to trace. The argument 
designates ‗the point of it all‘ or ‗what it all adds up to,‘ in short, the thesis of a 
narrative. Aristotle included the argument in the plot under the cloak of the plot‘s 
probability and necessity. We might say, in any case, that it is history as different from 
epic, tragedy, and comedy that requires this distinction at the level of ‗explanatory 
effects.‘ It is precisely because explanation by argument can be distinguished from 
explanation by emplotment that logicians invented the covering law model. (Ricoeur, 
1984: 164) 
 
History, according to Ricoeur, is also in the field of narrative operation. The historical field is 
constructed as a verbal model with the explanatory effect of emplotment. Therefore, against 
the received notion highlighting the difference between history and literary genre, history 
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coordinates itself in the field of implication, evaluation of value, and persuasionby 
acquiring legitimacy through ―ideological preferences.‖ In this regard, Ricoeur highlights 
―the historian‘s implication in historical work, the consideration of values, and history‘s tie 
to action in the world of the present.‖ What creates historical works is in fact the process of 
articulation of narrative and analysis, whether the historian recognises this or not. 
―Ideological preferences bring in the final analysis on social change, on its desirable scope 
and its desirable rhythm, concern meta history insofar as they are incorporated into the 
explanation of the historical field and in the construction of the verbal model by which 
history orders events and processes in narratives‖ (Ricoeur, 1984: 165). By analysing the 
narrative descriptions of the IMF that conditioned the Korean financial crisis, we will 
instantiate how financial apparatuses rehistoricise the event through narrative operation. 
With this substantiation ―the verbal model‖ of financial narrators is suggested as an active 
political action, one which goes beyond a cognitive operation in its explanatory effect. 
That narrative intervention is thus political action, supporting the subsequent 
imposition of political intentions on the economic event. Thereby it opens up the possibility 
of explaining the political and cultural effects of narrative. With its explanatory effect, where 
it details the drive to design a new economic structure, narrative actually grounds the 
epistemological operation that is necessary to construct a notion of value for valorising 
external economic shock therapy. The effect of narrative recapitulation of an instance, as 
Ricoeur puts it, is beyond ―illustration‖; in that narrative representation is the act of making 
a promise, a tacit or virtual social promise, where interpersonal trust and personal 
commitment are fused to create a new set of relationships through the explanatory 
framework. This produces a ―cosmopolitan dimension of a public space‖ (Ricoeur, 1988: 
259). The ―promise‖ Ricoeur suggests can be read as narrative anticipation with which a 
certain set of probabilities is ushered in. This is the effect of the explanatory frame of 
reference, which is, as it were, narrative. Narrative is in this sense proposed as a symbolic 
mechanism of representation of the intention of the system, the socially symbolic act in 
Jameson‘s parlance, through which heterogeneous elements are allocated, organised, 
interpreted, and evaluated. It aims to ―fuse‖ a relationship between the narrator and the 
narratee, inviting participation and reciprocity into the system; eventually, a set of 
expectations and anticipations of a new value are formulated from the structure of meaning-
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making.8 Narrative thus opens a channel for cognition of value, and regulates a context of 
performance, while providing a frame of reference for actors of interpretation that is 
effectively implemented at times of uncertainty. Narrative aims to bring about ―problematic 
certainty‖ (Blum, 2007: 92) through the uncertainty, by guiding purposeful actions. It works 
as the teleology of a system by which contingent meanings and relations of a certain event 
are transformed into a stable and practical reality.  
According to Blum, ―[t]he socio-political order is the contingent cause of the narrative 
structure‖ intensifying narrative emphasis in contextual reality. For instance, the Germanic 
slogan of ―the one and the many‖ is, as he shows, the representative ideational model of 
narrative plot, recurring at all the historical points of necessity for integration. The dual 
poles of individuality and community in narrative representation have served as a principle 
of political-social reality, rather than causing identity problems. ―The encounter of the 
German community with Charlemagne and the formation of an Empire based on Roman 
Law‖ is a historical case in which the function of narrative synthesis worked as a 
explanatory frame soliciting ―personal commitment‖ and ―interpersonal trust‖ for a new 
―social promise‖: 
                                            
8 Meaning-making structure is a guiding structure of selectivity, as a meaning inevitably forces the 
next step of selection with its signification of the meaningful or the valuable. The meaningful in value 
realisation therefore becomes reference. Luhmann, in this sense, grasps that ―[r]eference actualizes 
itself as the standout point of reality‖ (Luhmann, 1996: 60): ―With each and every meaning, 
incomprehensibly great complexity (world complexity) is apprehended and kept available for the 
operations of psychic and social systems. On the one hand, meaning thereby sees to it that these 
operations cannot destroy complexity, but rather are constantly regenerated through the use of 
meaning. Carrying out operations does not make the world shrink; only in the world can one learn to 
establish oneself as a system by selecting among possible structures. On the other hand, every 
meaning reformulates the compulsion to select implied in all complexity, and every specific meaning 
qualifies itself by suggesting specific possibilities of connection and making others improbable, 
difficult, remote, or (temporarily) excluded. Meaning is consequently – in form, not in content – the 
rendering of complexity, indeed a form of rendering that, wherever it attaches, permits access at a 
given point but that simultaneously identifies every such access as a selection and, if one may say so, 
holds it responsible‖ (Luhmann, 1996: 60–61, emphasis in original).  
Meaning here has a double function. It selects ―specific possibilities‖ while ―making others 
improbable,‖ which end with meaning process as the process of reinforcement of selective possibilities. It 
is associated with intention. Because meaning is a form of rendering the complexity in narrowing down 
and locating specific possibilities, which is significant in Luhamann‘s analysis, meaning is inseparably 
interlinked with the problem of self-reference. ―Like the problem of complexity, the problem of self-
reference reappears in the form of meaning. Every intention of meaning is self-referential insofar as it 
also provides for its own reactualization by including itself in its own referential structure as one 
among many possibilities of further experience and action‖ (Luhmann, 1996: 61). However it is rather 
unclear in Luhmann‘s theory how meaning is actually produced and guided in relation to a specific 
formation of the meaningful. As we will examine throughout the chapters, in our scope of analysis, 
narrativewith teleological explanationfunctions as the epistemological tool of self-explanation, in 
which meaning and possibility is guided and organised. 
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The encounter of the separate Germanic communities with Charlemagne and the 
formation of an Empire based on Roman Law created a more conscious awareness of 
the one and the many. The encounter generated the need for a synthesis between two 
conceptions and codes of law: the Roman and the customary law of the German 
communities. Charlemagne‘s ‗personal principle‘ enabled the gradual integration of the 
two legal systems in each of the separate Germanic communities. The encounter of the 
idea of Empire and Roman Law with German community law (which in itself harbored 
a vision of the one and the many that composed a community) transmitted this 
ideational model in subsequent cultural thought. (Blum, 2007: 79) 
 
The political and cultural implications of ―one‖ are, of course, different in various contexts. 
Following Blum, we find that while in Austrian thought ―the one‖ functions as a 
―cumulative product of the many,‖ in contrast to the ―Germans‘ vision of the many,‖ it is a 
product of the ―differentiation that grew out of the multiethnic composition of an Austrian 
Empire, controlled by one family, whose pragmatic control removed the kind of political-
social autonomy that enabled the other Germanies to see the separateness of the many more 
closely.‖ Therefore ―[t]he ancient German community in its seamless shift from the one to 
the many among its members was more evident in Austrian political life that in the conflict-
ridden distance between the one and the many of the German model‖ (Blum, 2007: 79). 
Although the signification and political application of ―one‖ to ―many‖ (or vice versa) has a 
different intensity, this dual set of representations aims to bind different causes for an 
interrelated system through the linguistic use of narrative enunciation. In this sense, German 
narrative is the source of a ―cultural life‖ beyond the political campaign, given the fact that 
―German political-social history has been an arena of contested ideas, a constant address 
and redress of a population‘s cultural life‖ (Blum, 2007: 80). Suggesting that political 
narratives are a mechanism of justifying the cause of the ―imperial throne,‖ German 
authorities tried to create a cultural sense of ―just authority to one protagonist, and possibly 
his or her adherents. The justifying idea forms an arena within which the move to be hero‖ 
(Blum, 2007: 80). What is at stake here is that such narrative accounts were produced within 
a necessity of ―change,‖ integrating individual actors under the community of grand 
narrative. 
Historical examples of narrative intervention in Germany and Austria show that any 
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radical change in the political and economical domain is accompanied by narrative as an 
epistemological operation, one that justifies the necessity of change in a valorisation of 
uncertainty. In the contemporary financial era, the narrative operation is far stronger and 
more consistent, given that uncertainty as such inheres in the financial system as a whole. 
The inner demand for valorisation through context control is, thus, greater than ever. The 
IMF‘s fiscal and monetary policies for countries with liquidity problems are two important 
modes of economic intervention in local economies that have been hit by grave uncertainties, 
in which the particularities of the local systems undergo a radical epistemological break 
through a method of economic reconstitution. This functions as the point of the exchange of 
sacrifice, or as an actualisation of the dominant value, by taking the extrapolated 
prescription as a guideline for performance. However, without collective and systematic 
narrative interventions propping up the necessity of economic integration as a preliminary 
phase of valorisation, it would not be possible to prescribe and implement such a ―shock 
therapy.‖ Here the narrative function is a configurational act that activates the production of 
a narrative field, on which objective value has to be measured against dominant subjective 
value, by schematising the synthetic process, or the economic integration, as the intelligible 
presentation of circumstances. This schematism is the function of narrative intervention in 
the crisis. The imposition of conditionality is a specific process of de-individuation, where 
the particularity into the universal set of value-production and transference is transformed. 
Such economic policies are the means of materialisation of the narrative intention of the 
system, given that what they actually concretise is the necessity of constructing a conditional 
continuity of the legitimate interpretation in the making of the meta frame, or 
macroeconomic environment in the IMF‘s terms, through which the main players‘ concern, 
or ―pro-cycle‖ policy for the international capital flows, is guided and realised. The 
extremely contradictory and harmful economic policies are executable, because of the 
narrative operation through which the urgent necessity of integration is valorised as a device of 
consentwith a series of narrative enunciations. To reveal the political and cultural effects of 
narrative intervention, we must first observe how the narrative process actually engages 
with uncertainty to create a problematic certainty. Documenting the crucial statements of the 
IMF as narrative enunciations can reveal the intentions of narrative intervention. This 
theoretical attempt will show that the Korean financial crisis functions as a point of 
transition from uncertainty to problematic certainty by creating a new nexus of relationships 
for the architects of the global financial system. First, this attempt needs to examine the 
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unfolding of the event and the process of interpretation of the Korean financial crisis. 
 
Narrative Problematisation and the Korean Financial Crisis: Representing the Allodoxia9 
 
There have been several theoretical approaches to investigating the causes of the East Asian 
financial crisis of 1997. Such attempts have been dominated by orthodox economists 
focusing on economic factors. However, these analyses often disregard the highly entangled 
context of the crisis, in which a wide range of factorsfrom the economic to the political or 
the culturalare interwoven. For instance, majority representations of the Korean financial 
crisis by the main financial narrators, such as the IMF and World Bank, along with the US 
government, emphasise internal economic elements of the local as the ―root‖ of the crisis. 
They represent this as having actually invited pandemonium, even though the event was the 
product of multilayered issues of global as well as regional financial flows. The politics of 
representation of the crisis thus symptomatically show the workings of narrative politics 
through which dominant value is transferred, exploiting uncertainty by means of 
coordinated narrative intervention. Here, collective interpretations and utterances surround 
specific instances, and form a legitimate diagnosis to redesign temporary and contingent 
relations of the crisis. These are then seen to be stable and universal relations for the 
revalorisation of financial flows. It should be noted once again that the financial system is a 
mechanism of value transference backed by a principle of financial contagion, which 
inevitably accompanies narrative procedures in order to sustain the newly valorised flows 
as a meaningful operation, one that actualises the dominant value. The IMF, one of the main 
financial players, as the narrative agent of the financial system, articulates the plot of the 
core intentions of the financial architects; and it suggests that narrative intervention is the 
cognitive operation constitutive of narrative politics. Such narratives construct the notion of 
the sensible and the valuable in value-production and transference. By dissecting the 
narrative politics of the IMF, we see that the narrative information (from the IMF) intends a 
narrative juncture through which a signifying chain of dominant value is formulated. This is, 
for the purpose of inviting further interpretations to the field of legitimate narrative 
                                            
9‘Allodoxia‘ is a notion brought to the fore by Bourdieu, following Aristotle. Allodoxia is a truth claim 
on the basis of mis- or false information. Bourdieu interestingly insists that allodoxia is presented as 
the result of the distance between practice and discourse, as the lacunae is filled with a truth claim. 
―[A]llodoxia‖ is ―made possible made possible by the distance between the order of practice and the 
order of discourse, the same dispositions may be recognized in very different, sometimes opposing 
stances‖ (Bourdieu, 1992: 132–133). This notion will be analysed further in Chapter 4. 
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knowledge surrounding the event, and is thus expanded in establishing the nexus of 
intentionalities in the system. 
As many economists suggest, the root of the Korean financial crisis can be seen in the 
heavy indebtedness of Korean firms, deriving from the investment boom of the 1990s and 
subsequent insolvency before the crisis (Haggard and Mo, 2000: 200). These economic 
factors were, however, not so persuasive in explaining the ushering process of the crisis 
associated with the financial mechanism of contagion and entanglement. This saw the 
spread of toxic assets that produced regional or international uncertainties. Korea had 
relatively strong fundamentals, with high annual economic growth rates, high saving rates, 
budget surpluses, and low inflation throughout 1980s and 90s. Besides, unlike the crisis in 
Latin American countries that stemmed from the public sector‘s financial deficit of the early 
1980s, it was the private sector that brought about temporary insolvencies before the crisis. 
Theorists insisting on endogenous reasons have also accentuated certain points that reveal 
―inherent‖ aspects of the ―different‖ system, as it were, of the Asian model, which name 
internal defects, such as ―crony capitalism‖ or ―moral hazards.‖ They insist on citing the 
―weakness in the financial sectors, poorly regulated economy, and political systems that 
reward corruption and cronyism‖ (Kang, 2006: 158). However, they do not point out the 
external factors, such as entanglement with the movement of international financial capital 
that generates extreme vulnerability to liquidity, stemming from the short-term capital 
movement around the region. Another line of interpretation, however, insists upon 
―external shock‖ as the kernel of the crisis. However, even when they point out the problem 
of the ―self-fulfilling withdrawal of short-term loans,‖ they ironically justify the rationality 
of financial movement: 
 
There is no ‗fundamental‘ reason for Asia's financial calamity except financial panic 
itself. Asia's need for significant financial sector reform is real, but not a sufficient cause 
for the panic, and not a justification for harsh macroeconomic policy adjustments. 
Asia's fundamentals are adequate to forestall an economic contraction: budgets are in 
balance or surplus, inflation is low, private saving rates are high, economies are poised 
for export growth. Asia is reeling not from a crisis of fundamentals, but from a self-
fulfilling withdrawal of short-term loans, one that is fuelled by each investor's recognition 
that all other investors are withdrawing their claims. Since short-term debts exceed 
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foreign exchange reserves, it is ‗rational‟ for each investor to join in the panic.10 
(emphasis added) 
This account pays more attention to international capital movement as the undermining 
force of the economic fundamentals of the local, articulating the financial crisis with talk of 
the volatile tendency of financial capital. This is seen to have triggered its own 
―speculations.‖ However, what is at stake in this mode of narrative interpretation is that, 
though it seems to acknowledge the crisis as the product of ―financial panic‖ regardless of 
the sound fundamentals of the region, it eventually legitimises herd behaviour as ―rational‖ 
choice. ―Since short-term debts exceed foreign exchange reserves,‖ the rush to withdraw 
short-term loans is an inevitable and rational action. As such, the weakness that reward the 
crisis are ―self-fulfilling.‖ Despite the fact that this underscores the exogenous milieu 
causing the crisis, it suddenly authorises ―investors‘ claims,‖ and thus the short-term 
movement of financial capital is legitimised. This representation has two ―fundamental‖ 
implications: first, by directly linking the level of private sector short-term loans with that of 
the public foreign reserve, it eventually asks for full public responsibility for the problems of 
international private financial flows11 ; second, by authorising irrational herd behavior, 
decoupled from the index of real economy as rationality, it empowers the logic of 
international financial flows over that of local autonomy, bringing about a theoretical 
necessity of transformation. This sees the local system move into the dominant financial 
regime, however fundamentally sound the local economy may have been. Therefore the 
interpretation functions as an active factor of creation and expansion of the financial system, 
signifying that criteria of performance exist in the modulating guiding structure. It might be 
that such representation is based on the main plot of financial narrative, functioning as a 
form of narrative extension in which a dimension of conditional continuity working against 
the main plot is implemented for the purpose of making a ―new congruence‖ (Ricoeur, 1984: 
‗Preface‘ ix), in interpreting as well as organising the event. By further examining the 
narrative intervention of the IMF, we will witness the actual modes of narrative articulation 
that led to the transference of dominant value. 
                                            
10 Jeffrey Sachs, ―The IMF is a Power unto Itself,‖ Financial Times, 12 December, 1997. 
11 According to a report, ―[a]nnual private flows of capital to developing countries around the world 
are more than seven times larger than public sector flows. In 1996, more than $250 billion in private 
capital flowed to emerging markets - compared to roughly $20 billion ten years ago‖(Robert Rubin, 
―Strengthening the Architecture of the International Financial System,‖ Brookings Institution, 14 
April, 1998). 
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The implementation of the IMF conditionalities has had a wide-ranging impact on 
Korea. The transformation process saw the active engagement of subjective value over object 
contingencies, accompanying forceful, far-reaching structural reforms throughout Korean 
society. From the IMF‘s extensive programs in Korea, it can be assumed that the core aim of 
the institution is not just to reconstruct economic bases, but, more importantly, to reshape 
ways of thinking and acting in a new mode of economy. We see it casting a new sense of 
reality with which the domination of the financial capital relationship is achieved through 
the effective containment of massive resistance. The narrative procedure, with its collective 
utterances, was thus a very important strategy for facilitating the financial agency‘s laying a 
path for market fundamentalism. This was implemented by encoding the ways in which the 
object recognises its location in the regime of financial capital, thus leading the object to 
emphasise the economic as the initiative for reconstitution of a society. What is more 
problematic is that the formation of such a sense of order is achieved by inscribing the 
distance of the object from the subject. This establishes the monetary order as the inevitable 
universal value, beyond which any alternative mode of production is contained. Therefore, 
the monolithic establishment of financial capital becomes a way of life through which the 
priorities of financialisation are imposed. Stiglitz, discussing the process of imposing 
political intention and containing alternatives in implementing economic policy, was 
reminded of the experiences he had when he met ―the leaders of the Asian countries‖ at the 
time of the crisis: 
 
IMF officials there were so sure of their advice that they even asked for a change in its 
charter to allow it to put more pressure on developing countries to liberalize their 
capital markets. Meanwhile, the leaders of the Asian countries, and especially the 
finance ministers I met with, were terrified. They viewed the hot money that came with 
liberalized capital markets as the source of their problems. They knew that major 
trouble was ahead: a crisis would wreak havoc on their economies and their societies, 
and they feared that IMF policies would prevent them from taking the actions that they 
thought might stave off the crisis, at the same time that the policies they would insist 
upon should a crisis occur would worsen the impacts on their economy. They felt, 
however, powerless to resist. They even knew what could and should be done to 
prevent a crisis and minimize the damagebut knew that the IMF would condemn 
them if they undertook those actions and they feared the resulting withdrawal of 
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international capital. (Stiglitz, 2002: 93, emphasis in original) 
 
The situation reveals the mechanisms by which the institution can engineer ―a crisis‖ for the 
purpose of subsuming the local into the dominant value relation of financial capitalism. 
Unlike many Western commentators who criticize mishandlings of the financial crisis by the 
IMF, IMF officials knew exactly what the ministries ―feared‖ in establishing the new 
ordereven if the ―others‖ had their own programs to protect their economies. ―The 
absolute power‖ of the IMF over developing countries stems, thus, from its ability to create 
an official climate in terms of a pro-cycle policy regarding national autonomy, which is 
decisive for the flow of international capital. This flow is highly speculative ―hot money‖: a 
form of short-term investment rather than long-term investment supporting the local 
economy.  
It is worth noting that among the countries affected by the crisis, only Malaysia could 
―resist‖ by refuting the official prescription with which the IMF tried to guarantee even the 
speculative movement of financial capital in the name of financial liberalisation. ―In the end, 
only Malaysia was brave enough to risk the wrath of the IMF; and though Prime Minister 
Mahathir‘s policiestrying to keep interest rates low, trying to put brakes on the rapid flow 
of speculative money out of the countrywere attacked from all quarters, Malaysia‘s 
downturn was shorter and shallower than that of any of the other countries,‖ (Stiglitz, 2002: 
93). Stiglitz discusses the contrasting responses of the two countries, South Korea and 
Malaysia as they faced the crisis. He suggests a number of reasons why the former was so 
vulnerable to the ―formation‖ of the crisis and, thus, had to bear the full impact of 
extrapolation of the economic prescription, while the latter overcame the crisis effectively 
with its independent policy. Like the analysis of Ha-Joon Chang, who insists that financial 
liberalisation of the country from the early 1990s invited the crisis,12 Stiglitz points out that 
the root of the Korean financial crisis originated in forced exposure to the financial market. 
―Whereas in the early days of its [Korea‘s] transformation it had tightly controlled its 
financial market, under pressure from the United States it had reluctantly allowed its firms 
                                            
12 Ha-Joon Chang asserts that the Korean financial crisis was the product of the drive for financial 
liberalisation and economic deregulation under the Kim Young-Sam administration in the early 1990s. 
(Ha-Joon Chang, ―Korean crisis caused by financial liberalization and economic 
deregulation.‖http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/joon-cn.htm). In line with Chang‘s analysis, Stiglitz 
also points out that, rather than a lack of financial liberalization, as repeatedly suggested by the IMF, 
―Capital account liberalization was the single most important factor leading to the crisis‖ in East Asia, 
including Korea (Stiglitz, 2002: 99, emphasis in original). 
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to borrow abroad. But by borrowing abroad, the firms were exposed to the vagaries of the 
international market‖ (Stiglitz, 2002: 94). 
Such ―vagaries‖ had been observed in the form of ―rumors‖ in Korea even before the 
actual crisis began. ―In late 1997, rumors flashed through Wall Street that Korea was in 
trouble. It would not be able to roll over the loans from Western banks that were coming 
due, and it did not have the reserves to pay them off. Such rumors can be self-fulfilling 
prophecies. I heard these rumors at the World Bank well before they made the newspapers – 
and I knew what they meant. Quickly, the banks which such a short time earlier were so 
eager to lend money to Korean firms decided not to roll over their loans. When they all 
decided not to roll over their loans, their prophecies came true: Korea was in trouble‖ 
(Stiglitz, 2002: 94, emphasis added). The formation and circulation of such ―rumors,‖ as 
Rudolf Hilferding argues, are an important feature of the financial market, and are not just 
based on groundless hearsay but are normally ―manufactured‖ (Hilferding, 2006: 138) for 
the traffic of monetary flow. Hilferding argues that ―the mood and general trend‖ are 
manufactured with ―a drop of hint‖ (Hilferding, 2006: 138). Scattering rumors in the form of 
foreknowledge of an event should be considered the preliminary cognitive operation of 
successive economic measures. Insiders disseminate such ―information‖ for the purpose of 
creating a context for operativity and performativity against uncertainty. The big investors 
and power apparatuses foster a trend of ―provid[ing] the impetus for a fresh wave of 
speculation, new commitments and changes of position, and further changes in supply and 
demand‖ (Hilferding, 2006: 137). As such, ―all fluctuations of business are advantageous to 
those who are in the know‖ (Hilferding 2006: 142). 
As the rumors took concrete shape in creating a critical sense of crisis in Korea, the 
then director of the Korean financial institute, Park Young-Cheol, hurriedly met with the 
deputy minister of the Japanese Ministry for the Economy to ask for emergency funds to 
deal with the liquidities caused by short-term loan insolvency. While agreeing on the sound 
fundamentals of the Korean economy, the Japanese deputy minister rejected the demand 
resolutely, apparently because of the American policy on Korea. According to a newspaper 
report, ―the [Japanese] deputy minister strongly claimed that Korea should go for the IMF 
package. And more significantly he added that his view was in line with American government 
as both sides already finished discussion over the matter‖13 (emphasis added). The director also 
asked the then managing director of the IMF, Stanley Fischer, and the Under Secretary of the 
                                            
13 “An interview with Park Young-Cheol,‖ HankookIlbo (Hankook daily newspaper), 5 February, 2007. 
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American Treasury, Lawrence Summers, for 2~3 billion dollars to solve the problem of 
temporary insolvency, insisting that this amount ―would do‖ for the temporary illiquidity. 
However, they also refused. ―They simply disagreed with my view, pressing the thorough 
reform of Korean society for meeting the international criteria,‖ against the premise of financial 
aid (emphases added). 
The forceful implementation of the IMF‘s policies in Korea resulted from a Washington 
consensus, backed by the US Treasury, for the purpose of opening the market and setting up 
an Anglo-American form of market fundamentalism. It also aimed at a reduction of the 
influence of the local government. Stiglitz describes the internal climate: 
 
While Wall Streeters defended the principles of free markets and a limited role for 
government, they were not above asking help from government to push their agenda 
for them […] the Treasury Department responded [the demand] with force. (Stiglitz, 
2002: 102) 
 
As the Treasury and the IMF pushed high interest rates as an orthodox fiscal policy in the 
region, Korea had to raise interest rates drasticallyto 25% overnight, mainly to prevent 
financial ebb; this move eventually encouraged the opportunistic establishment of hedge-
funds, which operated at the expense of the local economy. This ushered in a new, difficult 
phase in the crisis by shrinking the Korean economy, thus leading subsequent massive 
unemployment. According to a recent report, the unemployment rate soared from 2% to 7% 
directly after the crisis. One year later it had gone up to 12%. The proportion of discouraged 
workers who gave up seeking jobs reached 19%.14 The Korean Confederation of Trade 
Unions reports that since the IMF restructuring program, temporary positions have rapidly 
superseded permanent ones, representing 54.8% of the job market as of 2006. Yet the average 
proportion of temporary positions among the OECD is 27%. The beneficiaries enjoying this 
sudden ―restructuring‖ of the local were the international financial capitalists, profiteering 
from the deregulation of the financial market as well as from the high rate of exchange. If the 
fundamentals of the Korean economy were, as Krugman and other economists insist, so 
vulnerable, bearing structural defects that naturally caused the crisis, it is difficult to explain 
how the Korean economy achieved more than 10% annual economic growth in 1999just 2 
years after the crisis (10.9% and 9.3% in 1999 and 2000 respectively). This was despite the 
                                            
14 Dong-A Ilbo (Dong-A daily newspaper), 3 June, 2007. 
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fact that Korea had suffered from ―shock therapy‖ throughout 1998. The rapid rebound was 
not because of the IMF prescription but was due to the Korean government‘s policy of using 
public funds for financial restructuring and maintaining the expansive drive by lowering the 
exchange rate. 
 
Narrative Intervention by the IMF 
 
The urgent question now is how such a contradictory prescription from an external 
institution could possibly be thoroughly implemented in the local economy? The necessity 
of managing uncertainty grounds the path to gaining legitimacy. It sees the creation of a 
macroeconomic environment that incorporates a local economy into a pro-cycle system for 
international financial flows. Narrative interventions make crucial points to transform 
uncertainty into problematic certainty. In January 1998, Stanley Fischer, the then Deputy 
Managing Director of the IMF, delivered a speech titled ―The Asian Crisis: A View from the 
IMF‖ at a bankers‘ association conference in the US. The address was very important, in that 
it was, above all, an initial intervention of the apparatus in charge of world finance. This 
intervention embodied the first impression as well as the identity of the event, regulating the 
context of performance and providing a narrative frame of reference for the actors. With the 
diagnosis, definition, and prescription of and around the primal eventthe crisisa field of 
dominant narrative regulation develops, since it is represented within the self-referentiality 
of the dominant system as the legitimate process. From this legitimate and productive 
actions about the event are recognised and actualised. As such, it is critical that we probe the 
process of making such guiding structures by evaluating the political and cultural effect of 
the institution‘s narrative intervention, given that ―[n]arrative language arises from speech 
and all speech is from a body which is the primary source of meaning‖ (Armitage, 2000: 19). 
This language modulates and motivates the heterogeneous aspects of a specific event. 
The address highlights the ―unprecedented‖ economic success of the Asian countries 
during the previous three decades, through which ―they have also been a source of 
attractive investment economies.‖ However, the economies, according to Fischer, share 
―common underlying factors‖ that were the precise reason the systems ―went wrong.‖ The 
three common factors are identified: first, there were problems owing to ―the failure to 
dampen overheating pressures‖ in financial inflows; second, fixed rates policies worsened 
the situation due to ―the maintenance of pegged exchange rate regimes for too long, which 
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encouraged external borrowing and led to excessive exposure to foreign exchange risk‖; 
finally, it was a matter of ―lax prudential rules and financial oversight, which led to a sharp 
deterioration in the quality of banks‘ loan portfolios.‖ This representation of the event shows 
how the narrator‘s intention stands in defense of international finance capital, since it 
intentionally encodes the effect of financial uncertainty in the local system as the cause of the 
crisis. The first and third factors that the address pinpoints should be considered a collateral 
effect of the sudden influx of speculative finance capital, since the economies‘ vulnerabilities 
were exposed due to the sudden influx. This is especially evident when we consider the fact 
that, right before the crisis, in the year 1996 alone, as the address admits, ―Asia attracted 
almost half of total capital inflows to the developing countriesnearly $100 billion.‖ In this 
sense, it is worth reconsidering Hilferding‘s incisive explanation of the logic of imperial 
drives in financial capital. Hilferding underscores that capital is imported or invested in 
local countries ―at the level already attained in the most advanced countries‖ (Hilferding, 
1981: 322–323). The sudden influx of new economic force, according to Hilferding, shakes 
existing social relationships in local economies, chiefly for the purpose of establishing a 
modulating structure in conjunction with the workings of a financial regime. The massive 
influx of financial capital is the contemporary version of capital export and import, 
disregarding the level of capitalistic development with the intention of an abrupt and radical 
inscription of the dominant system, in order to devalorise the autonomy of the local. In this 
sense, Hilferding is fully aware that ―the export of capital is a condition for the rapid 
expansion of capitalism. In social terms, this expansion is an essential condition for the 
perpetuation of capitalist society as a whole, while economically it is a condition for 
maintaining, and at times increasing, the rate of profit. The policy of expansion unites all strata 
of the propertied classes in the service of finance capital‖ (Hilferding, 1981: 365, emphasis added). 
The second factor underscoring the currency overvaluation, mainly because of the 
maintenance of fixed rate, might be true in the case of Thailand; however, other economies, 
such as Korea, were liberalised even before the crisis, with deregulation drivesincluding a 
flexible currency rate. Dominant financial narrative, as symptomatically witnessed in the 
address, represent the primal event, the crisis, as the result of ―excessive borrowing‖ in a 
situation of sheer ―moral hazard,‖ while it tacitly and overtly endorses a pattern of 
―excessive lending‖ by lenders in frantic search of short-term profitsalso widely 
associated with the precipitation of the event. To evaluate the politics of representation, it is 
necessary to look into the event more closely. 
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With the growing confidence in the economy throughout the 1980s, the Korean 
government implemented an expansion policy that soon revealed weaknesses in 
coordinating large scale industries, while overlooking the rush of foreign borrowing 
activities by chaebols, the Korean conglomerates, in borrowings for investment purposes 
totaling $100 billion. Seventy percent of this was in the form of short-term loans with terms 
of less than a year.15 The amount of debt, however, as many critics agree in the light of 
general economic fundamentals, was not so critical as to be defined as a crisisnamely, 
financial aid could have overcome the temporary insolvencies. However, the Korean 
government could not but take ―the only medicine,‖ and the IMF soon exercised a structural 
adjustment program that brought decisive changes in non-economical sectors as well as the 
economical sector in Korea. The prescription, or the shock therapy, of the IMF brought about 
fundamental changes in the country that eventually foregrounded the economic as the 
dominant factor over other factors. In considering the financial crisis and its aftermath, 
particularly in Korea, it is important to question how the prescriptions of external economic 
apparatuses like the IMF could be extensively and thoroughly implemented without wider 
professional considerations, despite the IMF‘s previous mismanagement in developing 
countries. Feldstein insists that ―[t]he fund [IMF] made three key mistakes,‖ which were 
―undermining the confidence of global lender, attempting unnecessary and radical changes 
in the basic economic structures of the debtor countries, and imposing excessively 
contradictory monetary and fiscal policies.‖16 The rhetoric of the IMF and Washington on 
the Korean crisis was not just auxiliary commentary but active and collective engagement as 
a preliminary cognitive operation, conveying political intention with an economic program, 
while also legitimising the economic policies in leveraging the uncertainty. 
Various efforts to define the crisis by policy makers at the IMF, World Bank, or 
Washington directly before and after the crisis contributed to a narrative field that 
emphasised otherness when re-describing the local economies. This process of defining and 
                                            
15 Ha-Joon Chang, ―Korean crisis caused by financial liberalization and economic deregulation.‖ 
(http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/joon-cn.htm) 
16 Martin Feldstein, ―What the IMF Should Do?‖Wall Street Journal (6 October, 1998). Feldstein, unlike 
the IMF, suggests the necessity of a ―collateralized credit facility‖ that ―lends foreign exchange to 
governments that are illiquid but internationally solventthat is, capable of repaying foreign debts 
through future export surpluses.‖ Although Asia‘s ―crisis countries‖ have to ―bear responsibility for 
causing their own problems,‖ the problems ―could have been solved less painfully‖ in that ―these 
economies are fundamentally sound, with remarkable long-term growth of both gross domestic 
product and exports.‖ Therefore, according to his analysis, the problem itself should be defined as 
―temporary illiquidity‖ rather than as a ―crisis.‖ 
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evaluating others through narrative intervention and representation at a time of uncertainty 
is conspicuous of financial capitalism, for it is grounded on a system of credit circulating stories 
that evaluate of virtually every factor of the local. It also valorises financial flows and tries to 
secure economic stability and lenders‘ credit. The Korean case was symptomatic of the way 
in which international capital plays a role in forecasting and creating a crisis, and of how 
narrative discourse, encompassing prescriptions for the country, also plays a crucial role in 
redefining the locality against universal economic value, while guaranteeing the free flows 
of international financial capital to the region. The local was seen as an object to be 
transformed and reincorporated into the new mode of financial regulation, in which 
financial institutions such as the IMF function as legitimate mediators. Under financial 
capitalism, the diagnosis and prescription of a crisis on a local level entail a process of 
reevaluation and reconfiguration of the locality. And this laid the path for the domination of 
the economic.  
―Economic activity,‖ as Georg Simmel argues, ―establishes distances and overcomes 
them‖ (Simmel, 1990: 75). This ―distancing‖ process is ―the objectification of subjective 
values‖ (Simmel, 1990: 65). It works through an insinuation of differences in the local, while 
―overcoming the distances‖ completes the process whereby economic value becomes a 
symbolic order into which the locality is subsumed. A remark on the countries the IMF 
should aid, made right after the crisis by the IMF‘s managing director, Michael Camdessus, 
is another example of how narrative intervention grounds ―the economic activity‖ by 
defining objectivity against subjectivity and suggesting policing of performing criteria for 
the purpose of ―overcoming the distance‖: 
 
The IMF head warned that if the improvement in the economic situation deprived the 
Fund of the ―absolute power‖ it had exercised through financial help, he still reserved 
the right to show the ―yellow card‖ with market warnings. We will show it whenever 
needed. Showing the yellow card is essentially just that. The signals we give to a 
country, those are the signals we give to the market. And countries know very well that 
the recovery in their credit standing is fragile and they cannot allow open warfare with 
the IMF.17 
 
The institution referees the entire system to maintain the dominant value. The judgment 
                                            
17 Michael Camdessus, ―IMF ready to flash the yellow card on Asian reform,‖ AFP, 19 May, 1999. 
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activity of ―showing the yellow card‖ is thus ―essential whenever it is needed‖ as the official 
warning of the mediator. It is natural for the universal hegemonic force to implement ―a set 
of forceful, far-reaching structural reforms‖18  onto any country that actually needs an 
appropriate amount of financial aid. This utterance shows that the political intention of 
maintaining and establishing an international financial system carries more weight than 
applying lending to the local, by inscribing the existence of the mediator in the dominant 
value that bestows subjectivity on the object. As such, it is no wonder the managing director 
states that ―the Asian crisis was really a blessing in disguise because it gave the IMF the 
leverage to force structural policy changes that the national governments would not 
otherwise adopt‖19 (emphasis added). In response to criticisms of the IMF that indicated 
that ―the Fund is applying traditional austerity remedies; […]it is intervening excessively in 
borrowers‘ economies, thereby making countries increasingly reluctant to request financial 
assistance from the Fund; and […] its activities bail out unwise lenders and lay the seeds for 
future excesses of private sector lending,‖ Stanly Fischer once again defends the IMF by 
emphasising that its role is not just to provide economic aid but to guide policy changes. In 
this sense, as the institution succeeded in intervening in the process of policy making in the 
crisis economies, its advice is, as the IMF aims, ―appropriate‖ for structuring the 
―macroeconomic‖ dimension. 
 
I will argue that the Fund‘s macroeconomic advice in Asia is appropriate to the 
circumstances of individual countries; that the structural changes in these economies 
supported by IMF programs are necessary for the sustainable return of growth; that 
IMF lending should be conditional on changes in policy and not too easily available 
[…]20 (emphasis added) 
 
This statement clearly reveals that the role of the institution is not simply to contribute ideas 
of microeconomic appropriateness that would be of help to local economies, but to construct 
the macroeconomic environment. As Fischer underscores in another address, this points to the 
general ―architecture of the international financial system,‖21 against which local economies 
                                            
18 Michael Camdessus, ―The IMF and its programs in Asia,‖ 6 February, 1998. 
19 Martin Feldstein, ―What the IMF Should Do?‖Wall Street Journal, 6 October, 1998. 
20 Stanley Fischer, ―The IMF and the Asian Crisis,‖ 20 March, 1998. 
21 Stanley Fischer, ―Crisis Prevention and Crisis Management: the Role of the IMF,‖ Deutsche bank 
conference on emerging market, 3 October, 1998. According to the address, recent financial crises give 
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are forced to change their economic policies. Therefore the collective narrative utterances of 
the highest officials of the institution initiate the creation of a meta-frame of dominant value-
transference, legitimising inevitability as the guiding structure that will lead out of 
uncertainty. As the priority is the transcoding of the local economy into the dominant value 
system, it can be seen, as Lenin and Hilferding argue, as an imperial financial drive, by 
which a massive financial influx to local economies ultimately seeks to reestablish the 
existing social relationships in the communities. 
Fischer‘s statements focusing on the new dominant order are fully supported by 
Camdessus‘, in another crucial address delivered at Chatham House in London in 1998. In 
his address, titled ―Toward a New Financial Architecture for a Globalized World,‖ the 
managing director of the financial apparatus clearly expressed that ―the need for change the 
Asian crisis reveals,‖ and ―the building blocks available for a new architecture‖ both 
―suggest further steps for longer term.‖ Describing the Asian crisis as a ―defining moment of 
human history‖ that is as significant for change ―the days of the Industrial Revolution,‖ the 
address specified ―three factors‖ that ―helped trigger the crisis.‖ These are i) ―the weakness 
of their public and private banking and financial structure‖; ii) ―an unsustainable 
accumulation of short-term financingparticularly of interbank lending[…], which made 
countries particularly vulnerable to a sudden shift in market sentiment‖; and iii) ―last but 
not least, deep-seated problems of governance, corruption, and what U.S. commentators call 
‗crony capitalism‘‖ (emphasis added). These factors are ―the basic justification‖ ―for calls for 
change‖ not to ―limit themselves to some plumbing and interior decorating of the old 
mansion.‖ Here, the political intention of narrative representation of the event is clearly and 
distinctively observed, full of metaphorical uses of linguistic application that are 
performative in seeding the cultural implications of otherness. As analysed, the contagious 
and entangled mechanism of international finance itself, which is suggested as factor ii), has 
caused local vulnerability to ―a sudden shift in market sentiment.‖ Even if ―the weakness of 
their public and private banking and financial structure‖ should be at least considered along 
with the volatile movement of financial capital more generally, the problem is defined as a 
matter of a decaying ―old mansion‖ that cannot be repaired without the aid of ―an 
audaciously modern architect.‖ Therefore, the factors, according to the narrative 
intervention and representation, are ―not almost exclusively macroeconomic in nature.‖ By 
                                                                                                                                       
the IMF ―the focus on the architecture of the international system,‖ through which ―crisis prevention‖ 
and ―crisis response‖ are prioritised through intervention and constant ―surveillance.‖ 
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interpreting the problem as one of the microeconomics in crisis-stricken countries, this 
rhetoric performatively opens the way to macroeconomic restructuring in those countries. 
Without any proper suggestion of, or prescription for, the international factor (ii), the 
statement, once again, represents the crisis as home-grown, stemming from a ―deep-seated‖ 
lack of governanceas it were, the synthesis of ―corruption‖ and ―crony capitalism.‖ What 
the address implies is a consistent effort to define ―otherness,‖ with an emphasis on 
―integration,‖ implying the moral leadership of our [Anglo-American] macroeconomic 
financial regime. It is thus no wonder that the new building blocks are repeatedly 
concretised using the material called ―global integration‖ for ―unifying financial markets.‖ 
The first of the ―seven building blocks‖ is ―the tremendous potential for growth and 
prosperity globalization provides countries fully integrating into the global economy.‖ The 
second is also reiterated as ―integration,‖ with which ―the poorest countries‖ can integrate 
themselves into ―the mainstream of the globalizing world economy‖ (emphasis added). The 
first two blocks are essential for the third, which is ―the universal consensus on the 
importance of an increasingly open and liberal system of capital flows in order for 
globalization to deliver on its premises.‖ While the first three blocks are the presupposition 
for a wider context of performance, giving access to the dominant value system, the 
remaining three are intended for a specific context of performance, with which the object is 
required to change its epistemological and cultural identity. It highlights matters of ―rational‖ 
behaviour,‖ ―good governance,‖ and ―emerging recognition about the global market‖ 
against the ―anarchy‖ of the local system. With these blocks, ―the multilateral approach,‖ as 
the final block for handling the problem, is eventually possible.22 By engaging the crisis as a 
point of ―leverage,‖ narrative intervention implements ethical judgment of others through 
linguistic exchange with moral portrayals, designating local cultural identity as well as the 
economic system. A nexus of intentionalities of the system forms through this mode of 
                                            
22 ―Economics is saturated with narration,‖ argues McCloskey. The narration of an economist is a 
story conveying authorial intention through ―models and metaphors,‖ as we witness in Fisher and 
Camdessus‘s narration. Here we see the clear intentions of the financial system. ―It is not 
controversial that an economist is a storyteller when telling the story of the Federal Reserve Board or 
of the industrial revolution. Plainly and routinely, ninety per cent of what economists do is such 
storytelling. Yet even in the other ten per cent, in the part more obviously dominated by models and 
metaphors, the economist tells stories. The applied economist can be viewed as a realistic novelist or a 
realistic playwright, a Thomas Hardy or a George Bernard Shaw. The theorist, too, may be viewed as 
a teller of stories, though a non-realist, whose plots and characters have the same relation to truth as 
those in Gulliver‟s Travels or A Midsummer Night‟s Dream. Economics is saturated with narration‖ 
(McCloskey, 1990: 9). 
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narrative, enunciating ethical and political keywords about others as a form of interpretation. From 
this, narrative operation, as we will closely observe in Genette‘s analysis in Chapter 5, 
constitutes a nexus of intentionalities as the primal unity for establishing a set of relationships. 
And within these relationships narrative reality is formed. 
The series of metaphorical and ethical binary oppositions, such as ―old‖ and ―new,‖ 
―corruption‖ and ―transparency,‖ ―anarchy‖ and ―national,‖ ―weakness‖ and ―strength‖ are 
examples that signify the symbolic yet political schematisation of representation of otherness. This is 
performed through the intervention of economic interpretation that necessitates and legitimises the 
radical extrapolation of economic policy at an epistemological level. Citing philosopher Max Black 
with regard to metaphorical juxtaposition in conjuring up ―insight‖ on context control in 
which ―metaphorical thought is a distinctive mode of achieving insight, not to be construed 
as an ornamental substitute for plain thought,‖ the economist McCloskey acknowledges that 
―the literal translation of an important metaphor in economics has the quality admired in a 
successful scientific theory, a capacity to astonish us with implications yet unseen‖ 
(McCloskey, 1988: 18). In this sense, a ―metaphor is not merely a verbal trick,‖ she continues, 
following literary critic, I.A. Richard, but ―a borrowing between and intercourse of thoughts, 
a transaction between contexts‖ (McCloskey, 1988: 18). For instance, ―human capital 
[…]illustrates how two sets of ideas, in this case both drawn from inside economics, can 
mutually illuminate each other by exchanging connotations‖ (McCloskey, 1988: 19). 
However, what is more important in the employment of metaphor in narrative operations is 
that metaphor functions as a modifier neutralising a political message. 
 
The metaphors of economics often carry in particular the authority of Science, and 
often carry, too, its claims of ethical neutrality… It is better, though, to admit that 
metaphors in economics can contain such a political message than to use the jargon 
innocent of its potential. A metaphor, finally, emphasizes certain respects in which the 
subject is to be compared with the modifier… A better response would be to affirm 
that we like the metaphor of, say, the selfishly economic person as a calculating 
machine on grounds of its prominence in successful economic poetry or on grounds of 
its greater congruence with introspection than alternative metaphors (of people as 
religious dervishes, say, or as sober citizens). (McCloskey, 1988: 24) 
 
The narrative production of epistemological keywords entails both metaphor and binary 
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oppositions between different value systems, which function as an indispensible transfer 
point for narrative dispatch. This is the reality of making a narrative juncture. Through this 
juncture, a set of relationships between the narrative subject (the narrator) and the narrative 
object (the narratee) is ushered onto the field of narrative regulation, which processes 
political, ethical neutrality through metaphorical linguistic trade. Here, each particular value 
is measured and configured against universal value.  
In his early major work, More Heat Than Light, Mirowski correlates nineteenth century 
neo-classical economics with physics, contending that value in economics is formulated in 
constant process/result of metaphorical operation as well. Demonstrating that neo-classical 
economics borrowed important mathematical concepts and metaphors from early physics, 
he asserts that the rise of economics as modern social science was more effectively 
legitimised by exploiting concepts from the established science of physics. However, such 
concepts were mostly a combination of ‗motion/body/value,‘ used for the justification and 
legitimisation of theoretical argument. In this sense, ―value,‖ as he proposes, ―is part of the 
metaphoric triad of motion/body/value that undergirds the energy concept‖ (Mirowski, 
1989: 140). According to him, in economics value theory is defined in a combination of three 
questions.  
 
1.  What is that renders commodities commensurable in a market system, hence 
justifying their value? 
2.  What are the conservation principles that formalize the responses to (1), permitting 
quantitative and causal analysis […]? 
3.  How are the conservation principles in (2) united with the larger metaphorical 
simplex of body/motion/value […] which provide the principles with their 
justification? 
 
What he underscores by posing these three key questions is that the formation of value in 
economics has also been at play in the field of value exchange, ―within the pyramid‖ of 
―metaphorical simplex of motion, body, and value‖ (Mirowski, 1989: 142). Economic value-
theory has been, therefore, a constant interplay, or exchange of concepts excised in a 
―metaphorical triad‖rather than between mechanical sets of disciplines. 
     This ‗metaphorical triad‘ is also applied to Marx‘s theory of value. According to 
Mirowski, ―Marx is an epoch-making economist,‖ in that ―he combined the metaphor of 
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value substance in motion with the metaphor of the body in motion in the concept of labor, 
fusing them both with historical and sociological elaborations of power and hierarchy in the 
workplace‖ (Mirowski, 1989: 179). 
Following McCloskey and Mirowski, we see a certain pattern of mainstream narrative 
articulation can thus take place for the narrative expansion of a dominant value as a 
legitimate field of knowledge production through the exchange of metaphor. The final 
comment in the address further substantiates the dissemination of the intention of the 
narrator in organising and actualising the process of ―adoption,‖ as it were, or the process of 
subsumption into the main system, as Fischer insists: 
 
The central role [is] to be played by the IMF in crisis prevention through its surveillance 
and its role in encouraging members to strengthen their macroeconomic policies and 
financial sectors. We will also consider how to disseminate such standards to member 
countries through our surveillance and encourage their adoption.23 (emphasis added) 
 
Richard Gephardt, the Democratic leader of the US House of Representatives, explicitly 
associates the role of the IMF with a ―new internationalism,‖ in which American national 
interests are incorporated through the policies of the IMF, producing a nexus that moves 
towards financial globalism. In a crucial address during the Asian financial crisis, he 
strongly urged ―the representatives of our [US] business community to redouble their effort 
to help pass IMF funding,‖ mainly because ―IMF replenishment is simply insurance against 
future global economic crises, and I believe is in our deep national self-interest‖ since ―from crisis 
comes opportunity‖24 (emphasis added). The policy-maker clearly reveals the intentions of 
the system, insisting that what the Asian crisis signifies in making ―new internationalism‖ is 
a question: ―How do we move forward on further trade integration‖ in the region? The full 
support of the IMF is thus essential for rebuilding the ―pro-trade coalition,‖ for the 
institution can promote ―standards in recipient countries.‖ This is why ―the Democratic 
coalition in the Congress is prepared to work aggressively with the President and the 
Treasury to replenish the IMF, to strengthen its foundations.‖ 
According to Ricoeur‘s analysis, narrative coding of the event entails, above all, an 
                                            
23 Stanley Fischer, ―Crisis Prevention and Crisis Management: the Role of the IMF,‖ Deutsche bank 
conference on emerging market, 3 October, 1998. 
24 Richard A. Gephardt, ―The New Internationalism: The Nexus between American National Interests 
and Globalism,‖ Remarks at the Economic Strategy Institute, 5 May, 1998. 
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―epistemological break which distances historical explanation with generalizations in the 
form of laws, from simple narrative understanding‖ (Ricoeur, 1984: 228). What we should 
note here is that, by dispatching the narrative ―understanding‖ of the narrator, the rationale 
of the specific event becomes generalisation as a form of universal and legitimate law; it 
distances and objectifies the colliding values. As narrative interpretation inevitably portrays 
a gap between the antagonist (or the deuteragonist) and the protagonist, the antagonist must 
overcome the ―break‖ if he or she wants to be a performer of meaningful value, by taking 
the generalisations, or the laws, as a set of performances. This way he transforms himself, 
and thus actualises the dominant value. This is what Ricoeur proposes, following Husserl, as 
a process of filiation; for narrative understanding reactivates phases of derivation by 
establishing a relationship of filiation as a transitional structure by means of a plot. With its 
significant implications of patriarchal order, ―filiation‖ can be the inner bond of the system that 
replaces a hierarchical structure with a new modulating field. Now the dominant value is 
sensed not just as a contentious entity but as a standard of performance. This is the dual 
implication of filiation for the object, since the context of performance of subjective value 
becomes the ontological and epistemological substratum of the object as the form of its 
adoption. The object has to identify itself on the power-field of the subject in a concretisation 
of the ―ontological building-brick‖ (Ricoeur, 1984: 133). He is the performer of the new 
architecture, or a member of the macroeconomic meta-frame of value transference. 
Along with the IMF senior officials‘ narrative enunciations, Robert Rubin, the US 
Treasury Secretary, operates the cooperated narrative intervention of the event. From here 
the conditional continuity of the event is further implemented to create new congruence in 
understanding and performing the context. In the address delivered at the Brookings 
Institution in April 1998, Rubin, mirroring the core statements of the IMF, first of all 
emphasises the urgency for an ―architecture‖ of a new international financial system, 
locating the Asian crisis in an ―historical context.‖ According to him, the Asian crisis is the 
necessary byproduct of a mixture of ―unsound macroeconomic, financial and other policies in 
emerging economies‖ (emphasis added). Since ―the unsound policies in these countries can 
harm economies throughout the global economy,‖ ―[t]he Asian crisis has demonstrated how 
badly flawed financial sectors in a few developing countries […] can have significant impact 
in countries around the globe‖ (emphasis added). Although he admits there had been an 
issue of ―inadequate risk assessment by international creditors and investors,‖ it is difficult 
to find any specific demand for ―surveillance‖ of international private financial flows that 
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rushed into the region, at level of ―more than $250 billion‖ in 1996, tantamount to 10 times 
the ―official‖ flows. As such, rather than regulating volatile flows of international short-term 
speculative money, which caused ―vulnerability‖ across the region, the priority is once again 
to construct ―international surveillance of countries‘ financial regulatory and supervisory 
system, just as the IMF now carries out surveillance of macroeconomic policies‖ (emphasis added). 
He even warns of ―drawbacks‖ in limiting inflows of international capital into the locala 
policy actually implemented by some governments, such as that of Chile, and favored by 
progressive criticson the grounds that ―it is key that this sort of approach not distract 
policy makers from implementing the underlying sound policies that are the real foundation 
for stability and growth‖ (emphasis added). Through a series of performative utterances and 
speeches from financial narrators we can identify collective narrative intervention and 
representation that transform a conditional continuity of legitimate interpretations into 
stable universal criteria of performance. Coordinating such collective utterances and 
statements to produce a narrative knowledge constituting the narrative reality of the event, 
the extrapolation of the economic is eventually guided and legitimated. 
To articulate the literary and cultural frame of reference of narrative into the analysis 
of finance, in Chapter 3 I will undertake a close scrutiny of the relationship between value 
and narrative. I suggest that value is the crucial locus where politics, economy, and culture 
converge. The chapter first explores the possibilities of a cultural theory of narrative, 
focusing upon the question of value and the actual process of value-formation. This will be 
related, in particular, to operativity and performativity of narrative as the cognitive 
operation constitutive of financial narrative politics, which implement value transference in 
the discourse of financial crisis. I examine the value theories of Simmel and Marx to 
articulate an economic theory of value as a cultural politics of narrative. I argue that this 
forms a mechanism of value transference, which will be correlated with the financial 
doctrines of entanglement and contagion. Through a narrative in which utterances and 
statements perform as a collective operativity of information, a value is constructed and 
transferred to inform and motivate actors. Chapter 3 asserts that a value is plotted and 
conveyed through the narrative process as an operation in creating a notion of the valuable. 
Examining the practice of articulation within the system, and its employment of 
capitalistically reconfigured temporality, as well as its representation of information that it 
takes into narrative, Chapter 3 suggests that narrative forms an objectifying field of value-
transference in which the textuality of everyday narrative is produced, and in which it sees 
52 
 
actors as the ushering force of value. Proposing value as a guiding force of cognition and 
action, the chapter closely inquires into the value-forming process, arguing that narrative is 
an inevitable operation in creating new notions of the valuable. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Towards a Cultural Theory of Narrative: Narrative Operation and Value-
Formation 
 
 
 
Defining Value and Crisis: Asian Value and the Korean Financial Crisis 
 
In April 2009, the G20 summit in London tried to construct a ―global plan for recovery and 
reform,‖ amidst widespread fear of global recession that had been triggered by the collapse 
of the subprime financial industry in the US. The summit consented to stimulate the national 
and international economy, using $1.1 trillion for restoring credit, employment, and growth. 
In addition, its agenda was concerned with reshaping the global financial regulatory frame. 
One key agreement for this aim was the expansion and empowering of the role and function 
of the IMF, since it made it possible ―to treble resources available to the IMF to $750 billion, 
to support a new SDR (special drawing right) allocation of $250 billion, to support at least 
$100 billion of additional lending by the MDBs (multiple development banks), to ensure 
$250 billion of support for trade finance, and to use the additional resources from the agreed 
IMF gold sales for concessional finance […]‖25  
According to the statement, in order to reshape regulatory systems, the IMF should be 
the legitimate mediator and regulator and provide ―early warning of macroeconomic and 
financial risks and the actions needed to address them.‖ Unifying access to macroeconomic 
prescription and action in the form of the IMF, the summit reinforced the institution‘s recent 
loss of place as the sole international financial arbitrator. Although for the ―reform,‖ the 
unilateral influence on the IMF from the Washington consensus is relatively moderated, the 
―voices‖ of the main players, such as the US, Europe, and Japan, would have more power in 
making decisions through the institution. It became basically a ―quota and voice‖ reform, 
based on funding for IMF resources. The major donors would thus be the biggest influence 
in constructing macroeconomic programs, rather than in distributing resources to poorer 
countries. As an Oxfam report puts it, ―[t]here are still 172 countries left outside, and the 
                                            
25  The G-20 Statement, 2 April, 2009. (http://www.londonsummit.gov.uk/en/summit-
aims/summit-communique) 
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issue of their representation, especially of Africa, is vital.‖26 According to the Third World 
Network analysis of the G20 summit, ―by greatly empowering the IMF and other 
international financial institutions while allowing them to continue with their pro-cyclical 
policies, the G20 Summit may actually worsen the situation facing crisis-hit developing 
countries as the G20 did not set up alternative sources for them to obtain crisis-related 
funding, and thus they may have to return to the IMF for loans that tie them to policies that 
worsen their economic situation.‖27 
In contrast to the heavy-handed tactics taken during the Asian crisis, when ―it used its 
financial leverage to impose the Washington consensus recipe of financial liberalisation, 
privatisation and tight budgets‖ that brought ―catastrophic results,‖28 the IMF started to use 
a new scheme called the Flexible Credit Line in 2009, to lend to countries suffering from the 
liquidity problem of the ―credit crunch.‖ From October 2008 to April 2009, five countries 
(Iceland, Hungary, Pakistan, Latvia, and Mexico) received loans from the IMF under the 
new scheme. However, departing from the rhetoric of the IMF, insisting on ―flexible 
application,‖ the conditions of the loan package continued to aggravate conditions in these 
crisis-stricken countries, since spending cuts and interest rate rises are two vehicles that 
stimulate the pro-cycle for international capital flows rather than the national economies. 
Iceland hiked interest rates to 18% right after a $2.1 billion loan from the IMF; Hungary had 
to pledge public spending cuts in return for $25 billion, exacerbating the recession. 
According to the Bretton Woods Project monitoring the IMF and World Bank, ―despite 
promising IMF rhetoric about greater flexibility in fiscal and monetary policies because of 
the current crisis, IMF loans in Romania, Latvia and Armenia show that practice are not in 
line. The Fund is still pushing tight fiscal policy and single-digit inflation.‖29 An analysis, 
undertaken by the Third World Network, of nine IMF loans to developing countries hit by 
the economic crisis from September 2008, reveals that ―fiscal and monetary tightening [as 
the conditionality of the IMF loan package] is still being prescribed. The loan conditions 
typically reduce or limit government spending and reduce or limit the budget deficit. Fiscal 
deficit reduction targets are to be achieved by cutting public expenditure, involving 
reductions in public sector wages, caps on pension payments, postponement of social 
                                            
26 Oxfam, ―What Happened at the G20?‖ 3 April, 2009. 
27 Bhumika Muchhala, ―A Development-Blind G20 Outcome That Empowers an Unreformed IMF,‖ 
Third World Network, 8 April, 2009. 
28 Heather Stewart, ―Can the IMF Now Feed the World?‖ Observe, 26 April, 2009. 
29 The Bretton Woods Project, ―IMF Emergency Loans; Greater Flexibility to Overcome the Crisis?‖ 17 
April, 2009. 
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benefits and minimum wage increase, elimination of energy subsidies and in the case of 
Pakistan, by raising electricity tariffs by 18% and reducing tax exemptions.‖30 
Throughout the Asian financial crisis of 1997, the credit crunch in 2007 and thereafter, 
the IMF implemented a process of restructuring the macroeconomic environment for 
international financial capital. Though the prescriptions of the IMF were proved wrong, and 
criticised as inappropriate management in local contexts, as have been other moves 
undertaken by the institution, Korea was, it was insisted by the IMF, ―successful‖ in 
implementing the measuresin the sense that they were incorporated into the meta-frame 
of new value transference. The ―progress‖ that was praised as a model case of the IMF 
structural adjustment was the result of a narrative operation as well as the economic 
performance of the IMF, which redefined the value-production system through a forceful re-
inscription of the monolithic financial reality as the symbolic order. What the institution 
achieved in Korea was actually the reconfiguration of a new economic order, by which the 
local is constantly in an emergency state of monitoring itself or self-surveillance through the 
standards that have to be incorporated. It was, on the epistemological as well as economic 
level, a new governmentalityunder which the object had to readjust itself to a new 
rationale of domination. As Paul Krugman reveals, the real intention of the IMF is, above all, 
to recreate the value systems of others: 
                                            
30 Bhumika Muchhala, ―A Development-Blind G20 Outcome That Empowers an Unreformed IMF,‖ 
Third World Network, 8 April, 2009. Recent important examples of fiscal regulation by the IMF are, in 
another TWN report, detailed as follows: ―In Pakistan the Fund advises a reduction in the fiscal 
deficit from 7.4% of GDP to 4.2% through lowering public expenditure, gradually eliminating energy 
subsidies, raising electricity tariffs by 18% and eliminating tax exemptions; In Hungary, the IMF has 
targeted fiscal deficit reductions from 3.4% of GDP to 2.5% through a fiscal consolidation plan which 
involves freezing public sector wages, placing a cap on pension payments and postponing social 
benefits; Ukraine‘s fiscal deficit is targeted at a zero overall balance as a binding conditionality in its 
loan agreement. Public savings are to be generated through freezing public wages, pensions and 
other social transfers, postponing for a minimum of 2 years any increase in the minimum wage and 
cancelling tax cuts that were previously scheduled for FY 2009‖ Third World Network, ―The IMF‘s 
Financial Crisis Loans: No Change in Conditionalities,‖ (11 March, 2009). While the fiscal policies are 
characterised as radically curtailing the fiscal deficit in the short term, as well as public spending cuts 
that directly affected the people of the countries, such monetary policies are heavily focused on 
raising the official interest rates that attract foreign capital rather than achieving low inflation. 
Following the same report by TWN, some cases pointed to this tendency: ―In Latvia, the IMF has 
advised raising the official interest rate by 600 basis points in 2008. According to the IMF, a reduction 
in domestic demand is the mechanism through which wage and price inflation are to be lowered; In 
Iceland, the interest rate was increased by 600 basis points to 18% in October 2008. The IMF stated 
that a tightened monetary policy in Iceland would help stabilise the Krona; Pakistan‘s interest rate 
was advised by the Fund to increase by 200 basis points, to 15%, with the provision that any 
additional increases that may be necessarily will also be implemented. The IMF also advised Pakistan 
to establish an ‗interest rate corridor‘ which would protect international reserves and enable domestic 
financing of the government to be achieved through market placements of government securities.‖ 
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The crisis […] has tempered the dangerous belief that ―Asian values‖ somehow made 
the region‘s economies invulnerable. […] It has also softened free-market 
fundamentalism: countries are less likely to be pressured to throwing open their 
financial markets before they are ready.‖31 (emphasis added)  
 
The flood of criticism of IMF ―mismanagement‖ has barely dealt with this new 
incorporation strategy, in which a crisis is appropriated as a new field of domination. In this 
sense, the institution has achieved its goals, through powerful performance in terms of value 
politics with iterative narrative enunciations conditioning successive economic measures. 
While, for instance, witnessing the symbolic event of the IMF summoning the presidential 
candidates and forcing them to accept the conditionality of the program, Koreans could not 
but accept the transition in governance. The IMF‘s role was to ―temper,‖ and thus to enforce 
the invisibility of the local, such as dangerous ―Asian values,‖ even if the attempt increased 
the vulnerability of the region. The real ―danger‖ to be eliminated was the system of value. 
What is at stake is that under financial capitalism, unlike under former modes of capitalistic 
production, the inscription of ―free-market fundamentalism‖ is established locally, as the 
financial institution has universal hegemony that forces transformation of local value. The 
newly-transformed value system is constantly supervised using a mechanism of credit 
systems interlinked with international loan conditionality. 
Remarks on the cause of the Korean and Asian financial crises of 1997, for instance, 
made by the then deputy Treasury Secretary, Lawrence Summers, explicitly support this 
position on the necessity of narrative intervention for systemic valorisation in extrapolating 
the new economic drive. He first finds that the ―Asian model‖ holds the ―systemic roots of 
the crisis,‖ without even considering ―the enormous differences between the economies of 
the region.‖32 He sees the same features in the local ―model‖ as can be found on the 
factsheet (January 1999) of the IMF right after the Korean financial crisis. This identifies that 
the ―Asian model‖ is largely based on an inefficient financial economic system, in which the 
economic ―approach favored centralized coordination of activity over decentralized market 
incentives.‖ The crisis is, thus, not one of economics but, more generally, of governance of the 
local as such, because ―the governments targeted particular industries, promoted selected 
                                            
31 BBC News, 1 July, 1999. 
32 Lawrence Summers, ―Opportunities Out of Crises: Lessons from Asia,‖ 19 March, 1998. 
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exports, and protected domestic industries.‖ The Asian model, according to this 
interpretation, shares an ―element with almost all financial crises: money borrowed in excess 
and used badly” (emphasis added). Therefore ―fundamental change is expected in what 
government is to do,‖ not to mention in the micro- and macroeconomic reforms of the 
region. Notwithstanding that ―the Asian model was built on the fundamentals,‖ such as 
―high savings, high levels of education and hard work,‖ the factsheet adds that ―the 
miraculous growth of Asia might owe rather little to sustained growth in productivity and a 
great deal more to rapid accumulation of capital.‖ Such statements basically reject the 
industrial fundamentals that Asian countries had maintained for their economic progress, 
instead representing the endogenous systematic weakness in financial structures of the local 
as the root of the crisis, and at the same time invoking the crucial factor of exogenous flows 
of international capital. The unified voices of ―official‖ representations of local economies, 
given the varying economic circumstances of the countries, are an active engagement of 
financial narrative operation, which performs a subsumption of the local through the 
legitimisation of extrapolation of an economic revalorisation yet to come. What the collective 
utterances presuppose is that implementation of new models of dominant value-production 
is necessary, and that a far-reaching transformation of the Asian value system is required.  
Extrapolating the new economic program with polemical statements full of 
performative modalities, which take the form of narrative representation and contain ethical 
judgment, financial capital re-describes the ‗old‘ value regime as politically and morally 
inferior. It does this in order to contain the globally entangled financial problem of 
contagion at the local level. The politics of representation implemented by core financial 
narrators is, therefore, an operative mode of financial capital that reconstitutes the cultural 
identity of the object beyond economic restructuring, as it is more fundamentally associated 
with the intention to transform the value systems of others. We can assume that the financial 
system operates two-tier strategies in revalorising the system: one is the subsumption 
operation of the (semi) periphery in the expansion of the macro-financial 
environmentthrough the strong rewriting of ethical codes over economiesthe other is 
the revisionist approach to core-developed economies, which demands the readjustment of 
economic policy without ethical judgment, both of which are cultural in the sense of being a 
ceaseless employment of systematic narrative operations for furthering the financialisation 
of the system as a whole. While the former procedure more explicitly employs ethical 
judgment of the objectas in the case of Korean financial crisisin order to transform Asian 
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values, the latter‘s ethical dimension is not central, as visible in the ongoing European 
financial crisis since 2008, in which the ethical flaws of the system, as well as of the object, 
have hardly been thematised by the main financial narrators. Here, the goal is not to change 
the main value system. 
All narratives ground the ethical dimension by insinuating the polemical categories of 
subject group and anti-subject group, as we will examine in detail by rereading Ricoeur‘s 
narrative theory, along with Simmel‘s value theory. Without the support of a polemical 
category that foregrounds the performing actor (a subject), ahead of non-performing actors 
(anti-subjects), in producing and transferring value, narrative cannot found a performative 
series. This series takes the form of a unit of value-production with purposeful actions by the 
actors. By engaging uncertainty as the point of leverage, the narrative intervention operates 
not just as an economic discourse but also as an interpretive cultural code with a strong 
ethical judgment of Otherness. This otherness takes the form of anti-subject, through the 
linguistic use of moral portrayals, designating the local cultural identity as something 
beyond the economic system, which we will instantiate in Chapters 5 and 6. Inscribing 
ethical and political keywords upon others as a form of interpretation through narrative 
operation, the financial system constitutes a nexus of intentionalities as the primal unity 
around the event. This establishes a set of relationships that help formulate new financial 
realities. For instance, the series of binary oppositions, as briefly observed in the 
introduction, representing the cause of the financial crisis in Korea run against Western 
standards, such as ―old‖ and ―new,‖ ―corruption‖ and ―transparency,‖ ―anarchy‖ and 
―rational,‖ ―weakness‖ and ―strength‖ 33 these are the ―ontological building-bricks‖ 
(Ricoeur, 1984: 133) signifying the cultural yet political schematisation of representations of 
otherness. This happens through the intervention of economic interpretation that 
necessitates and validates the radical extrapolation of the economic policy, which produces 
the new system of value and enacts transference. With regard to this, as Jameson emphasises, 
interpretation is the active ―rewriting of the ethical codes.‖It can be weak yet allegorical, and 
from it ―mystification or repression‖ further projects a ―latent meaning behind a manifest 
one.‖ He goes on: 
 
Interpretation properwhat we have called ‗strong‘ rewriting in distinction from the 
                                            
33 Michael Camdessus, ―Toward a New Financial Architecture for a Globalized World,‖ Chatham 
House, 1998. 
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weak rewriting of ethical codes, which all in one way or another project various 
notions of the unity and the coherence of consciousnessalways presupposes, if not a 
conception of the unconscious itself, then at least some mechanism of mystification or 
repression in terms of which it would make sense to seek a latent meaning behind a 
manifest one, or to rewrite the surface categories of a text in the stronger language of a 
more fundamental interpretive code. (Jameson, 1989: 60) 
 
Describing ethical evaluation and interpretation, the system performs strong rewriting from 
which latent meanings of otherness (behind the manifest one) are imposed. For effective 
extrapolation of financial programs, polemical statements full of performative modalities (in 
the meta-frame of narrative representation), and with ethical judgments, are heavily applied. 
These subsume the local object into the dominant system. 
Employing the political and cultural force of ethical evaluation, the narrator performs 
something beyond linguistic conventions and rules. Such ethical descriptions are actively 
transcoded as ―descriptions of a system of constraints‖ on the object (Smith, 1988: 109, emphasis 
added). Through this ―particular contingencies of which the value of the objects of that kind 
appear to be a function for people of that kind‖ (Smith, 1988: 103). Here it is important to 
note that the narrator, with his or her illocutionary force of description, indoctrinates ―a 
system of constraints‖ on the object, against which conditions of possibility for valorisation 
of the subjective value create foundationsthrough the contingencies of crisis. In this regard, 
the financial narrators‘ descriptions are performative interventions that induce successive 
actions, embedding the ethical and cultural identity of the object. The new mode of 
hermeneutics paves the way for activating the object, which can then undergo real 
subsumption and effective systematic integration into the financial regime. 
From the perspective of Marxian analysis, an economic crisis is characterised as a 
―crisis of accumulation‖ deriving mainly from over-production of a material commodity, 
leading to the disruption of capital circulation. As the redundant accumulates beyond the 
level of demand, a sharp decline in profit rate comprehensively affects the division of labour, 
leading to a crisis. However, the monetary form of capital ―accelerates the course of 
accumulation in terms of value,‖ overcoming the contradiction of overproduction of 
material products (Marx, 1981: 358). Here ―production is production only for capital to 
maintain the existing capital value and to valorize it to the utmost extent possible‖ (Marx, 
1981: 358). It exists without intermediaries by making concrete products immaterial in the 
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exchange-value relationship. The value of an article was, under industrial capitalism, 
understood as the average time invested in its production. However, under financial 
capitalism, the value of an article is embodied once it can be appropriated as exchange-value, 
as the IMF term ―recovery in credit‖ shows. As financial capitalism is generally maintained 
as a system of credit in which monetary capital is guaranteed by legitimate legal and 
political institutions as well as economic ones, the credit system that underpins the financial 
mechanism is given enormous room for fluctuation or a crisis of credit. This is because it has 
many elements that can be used for the purpose of fixing credit status. The credit system 
forms the regime of the dominant value. Strong local government that has the initiative in 
economic planning for regulating foreign capital flow can be a crucial factor, and it is 
designated as an element of crisis, causing disruption of capital flows. The IMF and US 
Treasury‘s intention, to inscribe the rationale of financial capital over other value systems, 
thus leads to reduction of local government‘s influence: it cannot reach beyond 
recommendation of adjustment to the economic program. The recurrent process of 
formation of problematic certainty through the uncertainty of a crisis, and through the 
implementation of economic policy valorised by narrative operation, makes this clear. Thus 
we see a kind of value struggle between narrator and narratee. 
 
Narrative, Aesthetic Function and Semantic Meaning 
 
In proposing narrative as a cultural organising principle beyond its usual literary terms, it is 
important that we explain narrative as a form of a priori experience beyond a literary tool of 
organising eventsfrom which actors gain a notion of the sensible. Although this is 
basically an aesthetic experience, narrative is a form of politics too, since it conveys the 
intention of the operatorthe narratorto (re)define relations, thus producing an effect in 
reality, and distributing the notion of the sensible. As such, narrative becomes the 
foundation of ethical and political correctness through the creation of relationships with 
serialised performances, which take the form of experience or a way of life beyond aesthetic 
function.  
Narrative, as an artistic function in literary criticism, is explored in depth in 
Shklovsky‘s important article ‗Art as Technique.‘ He contends that artistic tension is created 
through the weaving of stories into plot, which then impedes the automatisation of 
perception. In this sense, ―art exists that one may recover the sensation of life; it exists to 
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make one feel things […] to make object ‗unfamiliar‘, to make forms difficult, to increase the 
length and difficulty of perception because the process of perception is an aesthetic end in 
itself and must be prolonged. Art is a way of experiencing the artfulness of an object; the 
object is not important‖ (Shklovsky, 1998: 778). To experience ―the artfulness of an object,‖ 
he proposes that: 
 
A work is created ―artistically‖ so that its perception is impede and the greatest 
possible effect is produced the slowness of perception. As a result of this lingering, the 
object is perceived not in its extension in space, but, so to speak, in its continuity. Thus, 
―poetic language‖ gives satisfaction. (Shklovski, 1998: 783) 
 
This artistic technique of ―defamilization‖ is made possible through ―plot construction,‖ 
which later important concepts of narrative representation and semantic modification 
underlie. Shklovsky goes on to say that ―the perception of disharmony in a harmonious 
context is important in parallelism. The purpose of parallelism, like the general purpose of 
imagery, is to transfer the unusual perception of an object into the sphere of a new 
perceptionthat is, to make a unique semantic modification‖ (Shklovsky, 1998: 783). 
In this explication of a formalistic approach to text, we can draw out three important 
features of plot in this approach to narrative: first, plot is the specific use of stories to 
―prolong‖ experience of the (artistic) object; second, plot construction is based on parallelism 
between colliding poles of harmony and disharmony in order to create new perception and 
new cognition; third, the modality of (re)presentation is realised in sequential temporal 
continuity. Through these conditions, the aesthetic function of defamilization becomes a 
mode of presentation, as ―the law of expenditure and economy‖ in poetic language 
(Shklovsky, 1998: 778). Although the understanding of defamilization and plot construction 
is generally limited to the aesthetic function in the static origin of a text, it is no doubt a 
critical threshold in the study of narrative, given that Shklovsky‘s tenet imparts ontological 
and epistemological explanations of plot applications in relation to meaning and temporality. 
As Prince also acknowledges, the object of narrative analysis is a set of already 
recounted elements (events, stories) in order to answer the question of what, rather than why. 
 
The narratologist should therefore be able to examine the narrated, the story presented, 
independently not only of the medium used but also of the narrating, the discourse, 
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the way in which the medium is used to present the what. (Prince, 1994: 524) 
 
To overcome setbacks, recent narrative theorists propose a ‗transmedial narratology,‘ which 
focuses on ―the side of the signified‖ to try to tackle the question of why in analysis of 
narrative construction. Marie-Laure Ryan, for example, seeks to define the ―cognitive 
template constitutive of narrative‖ through which the epistemological edifice of narrative 
can be made visible. This is a bold enterprise, which aims to delineate the epistemology of 
narrative. Ryan on this point goes on: 
 
If the transmedial identity of narrative lies on the side of the signified, this means that 
narrative is a certain type of mental image, or cognitive template which can be isolated 
from the stimuli that trigger its construction. I propose to define the cognitive template 
constitutive of narrative through the following features. 
 
1. Narrative involves the construction of the mental image of a world populated with 
individuated agents (character) and object (spatial dimension). 
2. This world must undergo not fully predictable changes of state that are caused by 
non-habitual physical events: either accidents (happenings) or deliberate actions by 
intelligent agents (temporal dimension). 
3. In addition to being linked to physical states by causal relations, the physical events 
must be associated with mental states and events (goals, plans, emotions). This 
network of connections gives events coherence, motivation, closure, and intelligibility 
and turns them into a plot (logical, mental and formal dimension). (Ryan, 2005: 5) 
 
This is an interesting attempt to map out a framework for the epistemology of narrative as 
―the cognitive template constitutive of narrative.‖ Her reasoning is based on the idea that 
―narrative is a certain type of mental image,‖ rather than limited rule-binding functional 
reconstruction of plot (the signifier)as in Russian formalism and other early projects. From 
this perspective, physical states (actions, events) must be mirrored in mental states (goals, 
plans, emotions) to formulate any kind of coherence for a plot. Within the process, narrative 
s a mental construction of the world can be supposed.  
This is an important step forward, in that the view tries to correlate the functional 
modality of narrative with a corresponding semantic context, thereby providing a scope for 
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wider socio-political and cultural articulations of narrative. However, the critical question of 
how remains unanswered. How can narrative impart coherence between functional modality 
and the semantic drives that underlie it? Although mental states such as goals and plans are 
proposed as the guiding force pairing the two, the method of correspondence can vary in 
each narrative. Instead, if we propose narrative as a mechanism of value-transferenceas in 
our analysiswe can ground a more balanced frame of reference for narrative analysis. As 
analysed in Chapter 2, the notion of value can be the mediating category, combining 
functional modality and its meaningful dimensions. 
Narrative as the objectifying field of value-transference sets the coordinates of the 
narrator and the narratee as the field of power in search of the main value. Value in 
narrative operation then becomes the force of cognition and source of motivation for the 
actors. Here, individual actions and events do not remain separate in terms of value 
transference. They become meaningful by being incorporated as a nodal unit into an actual 
sequence. This produces a frame of reference as a general form, or a unity of mental process. 
The sequential process orients unspecific disseminated actions into a framenot just to force 
them but also to motivate them as purposeful actions. In this way they create meaning in 
value transference. Purposefulness subsumes disparate actions alien to teleology and then 
(re)appropriates them as means of transferring, as well as producing, meaning and value, 
because ―a value is a purpose from a practical-volitional point of view‖ (Simmel, 2004: 229). 
It is the volitional, or in other words, voluntary participation that is at stake, considering that 
purposefulness causes transformation within an object. This, then, catalyses a series of 
meaningful actions in value transference. That Simmel and Ricoeur underscore value from 
the perspective of its sequence in the value transference mechanisms allows room for 
articulating narrative theory as a framework of valorisation of the culturalas well as the 
economic, thereby laying the ground for interpretation and anticipation as a synchronic 
series. It also highlights the existence of purposeful actions, combined with a diachronic 
reconfiguration of temporality, in the performance of the subjectjust as in Ricoeur‘s 
analysis.  
By emphasising narrative as a fundamental category of metaphorical reference, 
Ricoeur, following Aristotle, suggests three senses of mimesis with which the sense of a 
relationship is formulated in narrative process: this imparts a ―poetic refiguring of the pre-
understood order of action.‖ There are, according to Ricoeur, ―three senses of this term 
mimesis: a reference back to the familiar pre-understanding we have of the order of action; 
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an entry into the realm of poetic composition; and finally a new configuration by means of 
this poetic refiguring of the pre-understood order of action. It is through this last sense that 
the mimetic function of the plot rejoins metaphorical reference. And whereas metaphorical 
redescription reigns in the field of sensory, emotional, aesthetic, and axiological values, 
which make the world a habitable world, the mimetic function of plots takes place by 
reference in the field of action and of its temporal values‖ (Ricoeur, 1984: xi). These claims 
foreground narrative as a form of a priori, yet social, experience, through which cognitive 
operation towards a set of relationship is anticipated and recognised with ―mimetic function 
of plots.‖ This is a primary operation that aims to ―make the world a habitable world,‖ by 
guiding value, action and temporality out of uncertainty. 
In locating the relationship between value and narrative, and in extending narrative 
analysis into financial operation, it is essential to understand that value as a guiding force 
of cognition and actionis plotted and conveyed through a narrative process. Narrative is 
the mechanism of representation of the intentions of the system, through which seemingly 
disseminated elements are interpellated, interpreted, and evaluated. Eventually a set of 
expectations and anticipations of a new value are formed as a meta-frame of cognition and 
action for the actors. Narrative opens a channel of cognition of a value and regulates a 
context of performance, while providing a frame of reference for the actors, allowing 
interpretation with heuristic force beyond functional tool of aesthetic effect. Narrative as the 
heuristic force, or the thematic mode of representation, is effectively implemented at a time 
of uncertainty. Producing a narrative of an object or an event is a distinctive feature of the 
financial era, in which any legitimate interpretation of and forecast about financial centres 
and global financial institutions becomes crucial knowledge concerning the flows of 
financial capital. Narrative exploits uncertainty and ushers in a new standard, influencing 
heterogeneous actors in the markets. A financial crisis is the crucial point of narrativity in 
the making of a legitimate guiding structure that overcomes uncertainty to manage risk, 
producing a narrative as a frame of socially symbolic acts. These modulate the invisible 
boundary within which any rational and productive act is informed and performed. In this 
respect, ―[n]arratives are indeed performative speech acts […] They not only connote certain 
kinds of meanings […] but they also perform identities and rehearse, enact and change 
social realities and norms‖ as ―political statement and literary utterance produce effects in 
reality‖ (Threadgold, 2005: 265). ―[M]odels of speech and action‖ that eventually formulate 
―regimes of sensible intensity‖ can be more specifically identified as narrative frames, 
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considering that political statements and literary locutions are operated within certain 
frames of value to ―produce effects in reality.‖ 
 
Political statements and literary locutions produce effects in reality. They define 
models of speech or action but also regimes of sensible intensity. They draft maps of 
the visible, trajectories between the visible and the sayable, relationship between 
models of being, modes of saying, and modes of doing and making. They define 
variations of sensible intensities, perceptions, and the abilities of bodies. They thereby 
take hold of unspecified groups of people, they widen gaps, open up space for 
deviations, modify the speeds, the trajectories, and the ways in which groups of people 
adhere to condition, react to situations, recognise their images. They reconfigure the 
map of the sensible by interfering with the functionality of gestures and rhythms 
adapted to the natural cycles of production, reproduction and submission. Man is a 
political animal who lets himself be diverted from his ‗natural‘ purpose by the power 
of words. This literarity is at once the condition and the effect of the circulation of 
―actual‖ literary locutions. (Rancière, 2004: 39) 
 
Rancière‘s analysis shows the effect of political statements and literary locutions. However, 
we still need to understand the specific way in which such utterances are collectively 
represented, and how they produce cultural performativity. We also need to identify how 
they guide, cognition and action in order to access the dominant value and establish a 
―relationship between models of being, modes of saying, and modes of doing and making.‖ 
Ricoeur‘s dense analysis of the relationship between narrative emplotment and its effects in 
reality can be examined in more detailed. For him ―[c]onceptualization, the search for 
objectivity, and critical reexamination thus mark the three steps in making explanation in 
history autonomous in relation to the ‗self-explanatory‘ character of narrative‖ (Ricoeur, 
1984: 177). The three narrativist theses form the underlying principles that organise narrative, 
for which emplotment is central to operation of temporality. In this way they locate the 
power relationship between narrator34 and narratee, and impart meaning into descriptions 
                                            
34 According to Genette, there are five functions of the narrator: i) narrative function: which no 
narrator can turn away from without at the same time losing his status as narrator, and to which he 
can quite well try; ii) narrative text: which the narrator can refer to in a discourse that is to some 
extent metalinguistic (metanarrative in this case) to mark its articulations, connections, 
interrelationships, in short, its internal organization; iii) narrating situation: whose two protagonists 
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of action and rhythm, along with the intentions of the system: 
 
The [three] narrativist theses, in my opinion, are basically correct on two points. First, 
the narrativists have successfully demonstrated that to narrate is already to explain […] 
This basic thesis has a number of corollaries. If every narrative brings about a causal 
connection merely by reason of the operation of emplotment, this construction is 
already a victory over simple chronology and makes possible the distinction between 
history and chronicle. What is more, if plot construction is the work of judgment, it 
links narration to a narrator, and therefore allows the ‗point of view‘ of the latter to be 
disassociated from the understanding that the agents or the characters of the story may 
have of their contribution to the progress of the plot. Contrary to the classical objection, 
a narrative is in no way bound to the confused and limited perspective of the agents 
and the eye-witnesses of the events. On the contrary, the putting at a distance that 
constitutes a ‗point of view‘ makes possible the passage from the narrator to the 
historian. Finally, if emplotment integrates into a meaningful unity component as 
heterogeneous as circumstances, calculations, actions, aids and obstacles, and, lastly, 
results, then it is equally possible for history to take into account the unintended 
results of action and to produce descriptions of action distinct from its description in 
purely intentional terms. (Ricoeur, 1984: 178–179) 
 
Ricoeur‘s analysis is significant. It analyses the financial narrators‘ intentions and coding 
operations over a specific event. The process of emplotment is a process of implication of 
operativity and performativity with the aim of establishing a ―point of view,‖ thereby 
creating a distance between the narrator and the narratee, and historicisation beyond 
fictional representation. It moves toward the necessity, and these moves effectively replace 
political procedures through narrative operation and regulation. ―The true goal of the 
[capitalistic] system,‖ Lyotard argues, ―is the optimisation of the global relationship between 
input and outputin other words, performativity‖ (Lyotard, 1984: 11). In postindustrial 
                                                                                                                                       
are the narrateepresent, absent, or impliedand the narrator. The function that concerns the 
narrator‘s orientation toward the narratee recalls both Jakobson‘s ―phatic‖ and his ―conative‖ 
functions (function of communication); iv) testimonial function or function of attestation; v) 
ideological function: explanatory and justificatory discourse. A vehicle of realistic motivation (Genette, 
1980: 255-256). With the functions, ―[t]he narrator is present as source, guarantor, and organizer of the 
narrative, as analyst and commentator, as stylist as producer of ‗metaphors,‘‖ (167) which we will 
return to in Chapters 4 and 5 in more detail. 
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societies, according to Lyotard‘s diagnosis, the normativity of laws is replaced by the 
performativity of procedure. This performativity is a kind of context control, in which 
performance improvement wins at the expense of the partner or partners constituting that 
context. Through the process, performativity acquires ―legislation.‖ To elucidate the rules of 
the game, Lyotard uses the example of the relationship between ―an utterance‖ and ―the 
operativity of information‖: 
 
The performativity of an utterance, be it denotative or prescriptive, increases 
proportionally to the amount of information about its referent one has at one‘s 
disposal. Thus the growth of power and its self-legitimization are now taking the route 
of data storage and accessibility, and the operativity of information. The relationship 
between science and technology is reversed. The complexity of the argumentation 
becomes relevant, especially because it necessitates greater sophistication in the means 
of obtaining proof, and that in turn benefits performativity. (Lyotard, 1984: 47) 
 
Each utterance, especially those by the main players, acts as a condition of performativity in 
proportion to collective information. And the performativity embodies its function with the 
communication of an utterance because ―every utterance should be thought of as a ‗move‘ in 
a game‖ (Lyotard, 1984: 10). This form of participation (through performativity), in order to 
optimise the system, is symptomatic of financial capitalism, in that financial capitalism 
interpellates every individual as a form of the credit system. Here an individual can access 
the system only if he or she agrees to enter it as a player or a performer. In the system, any 
fluctuation is registered, monitored, and evaluated as a ―move‖ in an endless game; and the 
moves accumulated become data, which is stored and provides a probability forecast. Thus, 
it contributes to the stability of the system and allows it to produce effects in reality. The 
performativity of the credit system thus foregrounds the economic as a protagonist, 
reinterpreting other values as deuteragonists that are tolerated within the boundaries of the 
system. Like the money-form as mediator of exchange relations, the credit system, therefore, 
presupposes the transformation of the object, which is to be subsumed in the ceaseless chain 
of exchange relations in the financial market. ―Marketization of social relations and the 
dominance of credit money,‖ as Peterson puts it, ―are significant because they reconfigure 
both the players and how the game is played‖ (Peterson, 2003: 115, emphasis added). 
Through narrative, in which utterances perform as collective operativity of 
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information, a value is constructed and conveyed to inform and motivate actors. Narrative 
structure should be approached as a mechanism of cultural valorisation of the economic, in 
that on the stage of financial capital, a systematic interpretation of a specific instance takes 
the form of narrative to which actors resort to perform. This is a crucial aspect of cultural 
production under financial capitalism, which valorises the uncertainty of financial flows by 
signifying a plane on which to construct a value. The narrative process is the onto-
psychological dimension of economic value, supporting the process of valorisation in the 
main value system. Threadgold tells us that: 
 
Narrative structures are recognized and then interpreted as having particular kinds of 
social function in very specific contexts or locations. Narrative here seems to be 
identified as the denotative level of analysis while the interpretations of social function 
are connotative readings: a meta language in each case whose ‗plane of contents is itself 
constituted by a signifying system,‘ in this case ‗narrative.‘ (Threadgold, 2005: 262) 
 
In undertaking the theoretical project associated with value and its cultural implications in a 
political economy of financial capital, we are first of all required to define value associated 
with narrative. Here, value is a guiding force of cognition, while action is plotted and 
conveyed through a narrative process. I will highlight the value theories of Simmel and 
Marx here, based on which some definitions and possibilities of a cultural theory of 
narrative can be articulated with narrative as a mechanism of value transference. This is later 
associated with the financial doctrine of entanglement and contagion. Then I will correlate 
value with narrativity, which is here proposed as an important operational method of 
creating a meta-frame of cognition and performance for value transference. The narrative 
theories of Ricoeur and Jameson are revisited for the purpose of this interdisciplinary 
articulation. To substantiate the thesis, I will also exemplify critical remarks and 
interpretations by financial narrators and international financial regulators at times of 
financial crisis. This is a point where narrative operations are collectively and systematically 
exercised by manipulating uncertainty in the formation of narrative. 35  Narrative re-
                                            
35  ―The world of economy,‖ as Esposito argues following Shackles, ―feeds on 
uncertainty.‖―Uncertainty is the basic resource of economic behaviour and of the possibility for 
obtaining profits […] It is an unavoidable and uncontrollable uncertainty, one that is produced by the 
very behavior of operators. Without uncertainty, the economy could not function or exist‖ (Esposito, 
2013: 110). Uncertainty is, therefore, the key term that is inseparably related to economic 
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designates contingent relations of the crisis as stable and universal relations. Reinterpreting 
Ricoeur‘s notion of narrative process and his narrative model, we will grasp how value can 
be produced and transferred by the narrative procedure.36 
 
Narrative, Meaning, Symbol, and Rhythm: Narrative and the Objectifying Field of Value 
Formation and Transference 
 
Georg Simmel focuses upon value and its economic and cultural implications in reality in 
his path-breaking The Philosophy of Money. For Simmel, value is ―a [critical] category through 
which our perceptions become images of the world‖ (Simmel, 2004: 59). His theoretical 
concern is to investigate how osmosis between value and reality is activated and operated. 
Simmel asserts that ―a value is determined by its usefulness and scarcity‖ (Simmel, 2004: 
505). However, this determination presumes a process of valuation in the objectifying field. 
Value, in principle, presupposes two principles:hierarchy and sequence (or 
chain)because what creates the economic value of an object is not an individual demand 
but ―a comparison of demands, i.e. the exchangeability of its objects‖ (Simmel, 2004: 92). A 
value can be formed in proportion to utility and scarcity, but the economic value of an object 
can only be acquired through the exchangeability of an object, according to which the value 
can be measured, evaluated, and ranked. Only through the formation of an objectifying field 
of ―comparison,‖ where each value is measured and evaluated, can objective valuation arise. 
Here Simmel elaborates: 
 
Two value-formations are interwoven; a value has to be offered in order to acquire a 
                                                                                                                                       
performativity, in that ―[t]he entire economy, therefore is performative because it is based on 
uncertainty which is exploited in order to produce possibilities.‖As such, ―[t]he distinction between 
theory and economic action, then, must be far more subtle, and cannot rely only on the performativity 
of theory, given that performativity is everywhere. Not only economics, but all economic transaction, 
observe the economy and produce information.‖ With regards to this, ―[w]hat must be studies is 
observation and its forms [in economics], as well as theory as a particular modality of observation‖ 
(Esposito, 2013: 115). 
36 According to Ricoeur, what narrative transfers and produces is, above all, value. As narrative 
presupposes ―performative series,‖ correlating a multitude of actors and actions and thus orienting 
them, ―if we consider just the value objects, acquired or transferred by doing something, the 
topological syntax [of narrative] can represent the ordered series of operations on the semiotic square 
along the lines of contradiction, contrariety, and presupposition as a circular transmitting of values. If 
we next consider not just the operations but the operators, that is, within the schema of exchange, the 
senders and the receivers of the transferences, the topological syntax governs the transformations 
affecting the capacity to do something, hence the bringing about of the transference of values‖ 
(Ricoeur, 1985: 50). 
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value. Thus it appears that there is a reciprocal determination of value by the objects. By 
being exchanged, each object acquires a practical realization and measure of its value 
through other object. This is the most important consequence and expression of the 
distance established between the objects and the subject. (Simmel, 2004: 78, emphasis in 
original) 
 
He explains that through exchange, value is transformed into supra-subjective or supra-
individual property, which grounds the abstracted relations of exchange-value, replacing 
human contacts. This is the existential condition of the subject, because ―exchange brings 
about socialization; for exchange is a form of socialization‖ (Simmel, 2004: 175). As 
―exchange achieves a level of objectivity‖ (Simmel, 2004: 318), it becomes a form of life. 
Money then becomes the medium of this exchange, because it is ―an abstract representation 
of interaction‖ that brings ―a mental unity of values,‖ like a teleological chain among 
disparate actors (Simmel, 2004: 198). In capitalist society, the establishment of exchange 
relations is crucial, since it becomes ―the first means for combining justice with changes in 
ownership‖ (Simmel, 2004: 291). This is the political economy of exchange, in Simmel‘s 
theory, revealing how accumulation of wealth, through exchange, affects social relations on 
its own terms. It is, however, also the point at which cultural analysis can intervene in the 
making of economic value; and its widespread establishment as the initiator of anonymous 
culture becomes entangled with exchange relations in the money economy. This is especially 
evident considering that ―it [money] tends to be identified with the holder‘s generic, hidden 
capacities for action‖ (Graeber, 2001: 95). 
Here an anthropological approach to value can be considered with regard to cognition 
and action in the formation of value. While reconsidering ―qualitative‖ relations of the gift 
economy, which is located opposite the ―quantitative‖ relation of commodity, Graeber poses 
a fundamental critique of Western capitalistic society: 
 
Gift economies tend to personify objects. Commodity economies, like our own, do 
the opposite: they tend to treat human beings, or at least, aspects of human beings, 
like objects. The most obvious example is human labor: in modern economics we 
talk of ‗goods and services‘ as if human activity itself were something analogous to 
an object, which can be bought and sold in the same way as cheese, or tire-irons. 
(Graeber, 2001: 36) 
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According to him, ―[t]he classic distinction between commodities and gifts is that while 
commodity exchange is concerned with establishing equivalencies between the value of 
objects, ‗gifts‘ are primarily about relations between people‖ (Graeber, 2001: 32). 
Reinterpreting Strathern‘s neo-Maussian approach, Graeber suggests that ―[g]ifts are 
transactions that are meant to create or effect ‗qualitative‘ relations between persons […] 
Commodity exchange, on the other hand, is meant to establish a ‗quantitative‘ equivalence 
of value between objects‖ (Graeber, 2001: 36). Gift economy has gradually been replaced as 
capitalistic commodity and money economy, through the emergence of the medium of 
exchange: money. Money economy is a system of anonymity, replacing human relations 
with relations of things. By revisiting Mauss‘ project to overcome the basic rationale of 
modern economy, which strictly limits human motives as self-interest based on 
individualism, Graeber tries to illuminate ―a system of total reciprocities‖ (Graeber, 2001: 
159). In this system the gift economy functions as a system of generosity. From this 
perspective, the reciprocity, for instance, of the Maori can be reinterpreted as a new system 
of value, in that the Maori exchange is a way of creating the generic value of community 
without immediate individual reward or interest. It is thus based on voluntary dissipation of 
gifts rather than on accumulation, for constructing a community value that presupposes 
reciprocity and equality.  
 
Maori systems of value, then, were based not only on a remarkably strong emphasis 
on invisible, creative powers, and very little on exterior display, but also on a peculiar 
cosmology that saw powers of creativityeven those hidden with humansas 
partaking of the divine, and in which the most characteristically human forms of 
action instead of consisted of one or another sort of appropriation, consumption, or 
destruction. It was through the latterespecially, through transgressive exploits of 
one sort or anotherthat one made oneself an individual and left one‘s mark on 
history. (Graeber, 2001: 187–188) 
 
This totally different way of activation in constructing and consolidating the value of the 
community is important, because the value-system presupposes a constructive totality of the 
community. In gift exchange, every actor‘s action acquires meaning as an exchange of 
performance, and it is thus is realised in the public sphere in writing the narrative of the 
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community. As gift economy presumes a system of giving-away gifts, even to enemy, as 
generosity and reciprocity in producing value. Thus it can ironically motivate every actor to 
participate and create value system. This can be an antidote to the closed totality of 
capitalistic accumulation, in which every actor is viewed as a potential performer according 
to the simple possession of money. 
     Reinterpreting Strathern‘s notion of value, Graeber correlates value with a cognitive 
concept of meaning, in that ―the value of an object, or a person, is the meaning they take on 
by being assigned a place in some larger system of categories‖ (Graeber, 2001: 41). Meaning 
ushers action in creating value. ―Value […] is the way people represent the importance of 
their own actions to themselves‖ (Graeber, 2001: 45). According to his analysis with regard 
to value theories of Strathern and Munn, ―Strathern sees value as a matter of ‗making 
visible‘: social relations take on value in the process of being recognized by someone else. 
According to Munn‘s approach, the value in question is ultimately the power to create social 
relations; the ‗making visible‘ is simply an act of recognition of a value that already exists in 
potential. Hence where Strathern stresses visibility, Munn‘s language is all about ‗potencies,‘ 
‗transformative potential,‘ human capacities that are ultimately generic and invisible‖ 
(Graeber, 2001: 47). ―Value as the importance of actions‖ in social process of creation of 
meaning, is ―something that mobilizes the desires of those who recognize it, and moves 
them to action‖ (Graeber, 2001: 105).37 
In Simmel‘s analysis, value is basically economic, because a value can only be realised 
through exchange, which functions as the medium of representation of exchangeability 
through the medium of money. To maximise its exchangeability, each subject performs to 
overcome the distance the evaluation mechanism has set, measuring performativity against 
                                            
37 Graeber categorises approaches to value in ―three large streams of thought‖: ―1. ‗value‘ in the 
sociological sense: conceptions of what is ultimately good, proper, or desirable in human life, 2. ‗value‘ 
in the economic sense: the degree to which objects are desired, particularly, as measured by how 
much others are willing to give up to get them, 3 ‗value‘ in the linguistic sense, which goes back to the 
structural linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure, and might be most simply glossed as ‗meaningful 
difference‘‖ (Graeber, 2001: 1–2). 
These different approaches are intertwined and intersected in the formation of value, as presenting 
unrelated motives, actions, and meanings as the operational constitution of the value itself. Under our 
scope of analysis, this is an all-encompassing narrative process, narrativisation, in the contruction of 
value under our theoretical concerns. Ricoeur points out that with regard to the organising principle 
of unrelated events on the level of manifestation of stable relations: ―[T]o account for the unstable 
character of the narrative process at the level of manifestation‖―is so important to put the structure 
into motion. We may ask, however, whether it is not the competence gained through a long 
acquaintance with traditional narratives that allow us, through anticipation, to call ‗narrativization‘ 
the simple reformulating of the taxonomy in terms of operations, and that also requires us to proceed 
from stable relations to unstable operations‖(Ricoeur, 1985: 49). 
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the axiom of money. Here it begins to engage with the symbolic field of value representation, 
which is linked with cultural trends. Simmel continues on this point: 
 
Money passes from the form of directness and substantiality in which it first carried 
out these functions to the ideal form; that is, it exercises its effects merely as an idea 
which is embodied in a representative symbol. The development of money seems to be 
an element in a profound cultural trend. The different levels of culture may be 
distinguished by the extent to which, and at what points, they have a direct 
relationship with the objects that concern them, and on the other hand by the extent to 
which they use symbols. (Simmel, 2004: 148) 
 
The role of the symbol and its significance in economic value is crucial, given that ―the 
multitude of factorsof powers, substances and eventsthat operate in modern life 
demands a concentration in comprehensive symbols which can be manipulated with the 
assurance that they will lead to the same result as if all the details had been taken into 
account, so that the result will be applicable and valid for all particulars‖ (Simmel, 2004: 150). 
Although it seems that a highly developed society can free from ―symbols in the realm of 
cognition,‖ symbols, actually ―makes us more dependent on them in practical matters‖ with 
its representativeness in guiding interests: 
 
[In symbolic relationship of money] the relation between reality and symbol fluctuates 
in narrower as well as in more general areas. One is almost inclined to think – though 
such generalities cannot be demonstrated – that either every stage of culture (and 
finally every nation, every group and every individual) displays a specific proportion 
between the symbolic and the directly realistic treatment of its interests, or else that 
this proportion is generally stable and only the objects that are affected by it are subject 
to change. But perhaps it may be stated more specifically that a conspicuous 
prevalence of symbolism is as much part of primitive and naïve as of very highly 
developed and complicated stages of cultural development. It may be that the 
progressive development frees us from symbols in the realm of cognition, but makes 
us more dependent on them in practical matters. (Simmel, 2004: 149) 
 
In this regard, the symbolic significance of economic value produces system functions as a 
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mechanism of (pseudo) belief. This way it generates economic credit that, according to 
Simmel, occupies the position of religion in modern capitalist society. He goes on: 
 
Economic credit does contain an element of this supra-theoretical belief, and so does 
the confidence that the community will assure the validity of the tokens for which we 
have exchanged the products of our labour in an exchange against material goods […] 
it contains a further element of social-psychological quasi-religious faith. (Simmel, 2004: 
179) 
 
Just as religion, an economic system functions as a system of social integration through the 
symbolic as well as through the actual influence of money. Just as a person with religious 
piety understands the world as a teleological chain of God‘s schema, and therefore acts with 
a series of purposeful actions, the symbolic importance of money in producing value 
triggers a series of purposeful actions from the subject. It is this stage, at which value as a 
symbolic distinction creates a chain of purposeful actions, that it projects the subject‘s energy 
into the objectively valid field. Here, the actor participates in the working field of the system 
as a performer of meaningful action, on the one hand by interpreting the value relation of the 
reality of the moment and, on the other hand, by anticipating the reality yet to come in terms 
of the teleology of the system.38 Therefore, according to Simmel, purposefulness as the 
                                            
38 Ricoeur also explains that the teleology is formed through the narrative description conveying the 
intentions of the system. Articulating narrative intention into a ―teleological explanation,‖ through 
which the unity of the system is initiated with certain modalities of behaviour, Ricoeur also contends 
that ―[t]eleological explanation bears on actionlike forms of behaviour. The phases of an action, in its 
outer aspect, are not tied together here by a causal bond. Their unity is constituted by their being 
subsumed under the same intention, defined by what the agent intends to do (or to abstain from 
doing, or to neglect to do)‖ (Ricoeur, 1984: 138). Whilst the intentional description ushers in 
teleological foundations of action and cognition, once the teleology sets up, it does not need any 
further logic for the actor, as the narrative teleology itself functions as the tool of self-reference, as we 
observed in Chapter 1. ―On one side, therefore, the intentional description only constitutes the 
rudimentary form of a teleological explanation. Only the practical inference brings about the passage 
from the intentional description to the teleological explanation properly speaking. On the other side, 
there would be no need for a logic of the practical syllogism if an immediate apprehension of the 
meaning bearing on the intentional character of the action did not give rise to it‖ (Ricoeur, 1984: 138). 
With its ―intentional description,‖ narrative with teleological explanation functions as the 
epistemological tool of self-explanation and self-observation, through which subsequent actions are 
guided. Ricoeur, in this sense, terms it the ‗followability‘ of narrative. It is the source of cognition and 
action: ―Here the notion of followability offers another face. Every story, we have said, in principle 
explains itself. In other words, narrative answers the question ‗Why?‘ at the same time that it answers 
the question ‗What?‘ To tell what has happened is to tell why it happened‖(Ricoeur, 1984: 152). In a 
financial system, this kind of teleological contagion and action (with its self-referentiality) becomes 
more apparent.  
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psychological transcoding of quantity into quality is the mechanism of value transference in 
the chain of teleology of the system. He states: 
 
This value transference on the basis of purely external connections arranges itself in a 
very general form of our mental processes which one might call the psychological 
expansion of qualities. If an actual sequence of objects, forces or events contains a link 
that brings about certain subjective reactions in us, e.g. pleasure and displeasure, love 
or hate, positive or negative value sentiments, then not only do these values seem 
attached to their immediate representatives, but we also allow the other unspecified 
mental links of the series to participate in them. (Simmel, 2004: 228, emphasis added) 
 
Individual action does not remain separate in value transference. It becomes meaningful by 
being incorporated as a nodal unit into an actual sequence. This produces a frame of 
reference as a general form, or a unity of mental process. The sequential process orients 
unspecific disseminated actions into a framenot just to force them but also to motivate 
them as purposeful actions. In this way they create meaning in value transference. 
Purposefulness subsumes disparate actions alien to teleology and then (re)appropriates 
them as means of transferring, as well as producing, meaning and value, because ―a value is 
a purpose from a practical-volitional point of view‖ (Simmel, 2004: 229). The volitional, or in 
other words, voluntary participation is at stake, considering that purposefulness causes 
transformation within an object. This then catalyses a series of meaningful actions in value 
transference.  
But, then, what operation ushers the sequential process into the system of valorisation? 
This is the critical question that may reveal the conjuncture of value and its sequential 
                                                                                                                                       
As Orléan argues, ―[a] market in which everyone tries to foresee the average opinion corresponds 
to a particular formal structure: self-reference. Self-reference may be contrasted to hetero-reference. 
The latter designates a system where an external and transcendent norm is the referent in relation to 
which the position of the different elements of the system is evaluated. This external norm stands 
apart from the action of the elements within the system. In a self-referential system, on the other hand, 
the value in relation to which the elements‘ positions are measured itself the product of the 
interaction of the elements. This value can only be defined in a circular manner, for it is both the 
origin of the elementary actions and their result. The average opinion formed on a speculative market 
provides a perfect example of such a situation, because it is nothing but the result of individual 
expectations, yet each and every one of these expectations has only the average opinion as its object‖ 
(Orléan, 1989: 69). Therefore, in relation to a self-referential system of finance, what is at stake is ―a 
matter of the members of the collectivity setting up a common point of reference, a collective 
representation […] that makes the coordination of their actions possible. This common, externalized 
meaning making coordination possible is […] a [economic] convention‖ (Orléan, 1989: 75). 
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representation as a teleological system of value. As such, narrative should be considered a 
process of initiation and concretisation of the psychological operation of motivation necessitating 
teleology as a form of experience. With heuristic force in search of a main value, narrative 
becomes fundamental practice for facing uncertainty, out of which a new set of a 
relationships is constructed through rhetorical intervention. This means managing risk on 
epistemological level, ―which involve(s) the individual or collaborative telling (sometimes 
seen as the performing and usually as the constructing) of stories in order to understand 
how these practices function to construct selves and realities and to manage ‗crises‘ in the 
daily living of those selves and realities‖ (Threadgold, 2005: 262). That Simmel underscores 
value from the perspective of its sequence of the value transference mechanisms allows  
room for articulating narrative theory as a framework of valorisation of the culturalas well 
as the economicthereby laying the ground for interpretation and anticipation as a 
synchronic series. It also highlights the existence of purposeful actions, combined with 
diachronic reconfiguration of temporality, in the performance of the subject.  
     While reviewing Greimas‘s article, ―The Interaction of Semiotic Constraints,‖ Ricoeur 
suggests how narrativity transforms unoriented relations among heterogeneous factors into 
a dynamic representation of narrative operation. The conditions of narrativity he introduces 
are ―the three relations of contradiction, contrariety, and presupposition‖ that ―appear as 
transformations by means of which one content is negated and another one is affirmed‖39 
(Ricoeur, 1988: 49). With the arrangement of these three premises of ―contradiction, 
contrariety and presupposition,‖ narrative functions as the cultural operation of inclusion 
and exclusion, and works through affirmation and negation of the contents. In structuring a 
narrative, there are two levels of statements: the narrative statement and the program 
statement. The role of the former is to instantiate the constitutional model in the order of 
―doing something,‖ by operating the three relations. Through this the value relation 
eventually takes place. The role of the latter is more critical, since it actually allows the 
emerging value relationship to be operated by providing different modalities in the frame of 
narrative intention. 
 
To turn this [the narrative statement] into a ―program statement,‖ we must add to it 
                                            
39 According to Ricoeur, the three relations can be explained, for example, by the word ―white‖: 
―‘White‘ means something because we can articulate it in terms of three relations, one of contradiction 
(white vs. not-white), one of contrariety (white vs. black), and one of presupposition (not-white vs. 
black)‖ (Ricoeur, 1985: 49). 
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various modalities that give it different potentialities: wanting to do something, 
wanting to have (something), wanting to be (a value), wanting to know (something), 
wanting to be able (to do something). (Ricoeur, 1985: 49) 
 
While the narrative statement constitutes patterns of actions formed on the basis of 
contrasting positions, and this is often expressed as binary opposition by comparing the 
different values, the program statement encodes the desire of the actor by setting up 
modalities from which the actor can, following Simmel‘s term, overcome a form of distance. 
He overcomes the value producing program by transforming him/herself into the subject of 
desire, who wants to be a bearer of value. Yet he must hold the four modalities of 
recognising, having, being, and doing. In a narrative, an actor can remain a bearer of the 
narrative statement, but he or she may not acquire meaning as the signifier of value. Only by 
taking the program statement of the narrative the actor can access the signifying chain of 
value. Ricoeur‘s analysis might be an appropriate explanation of how Simmel‘s teleological 
chain or sequence can arrange heterogeneous actors and thus motivate them to participate in 
the system of value transference.  
More significant in Ricoeur‘s narrative analysis is the introduction of the polemical 
category, which is inevitable in the transference of value. The two statements in narrative, 
according to Ricoeur, need an additional coding task, which is the introduction of the 
polemical relation, to reach the level of narrativity: 
 
The constituting of the narrative model ends with the addition to the polemical 
category of transference, borrowed from the structure of exchange. Reformulated in 
terms of exchange, the attribution of an object/value, the last of the three narrative 
statements constitutive of the performance, signifies that one subject acquires 
something which another subject is deprived of. Attribution can thus be decomposed 
into two operations: a privation, equivalent to a disjunction, and an attribution 
properly speaking, equivalent to a conjunction. Together they constitute the transfer 
expressed by two ‗translative‘ statements. This reformulation leads to the concept of a 
‗performative series.‘ And it is in such a series that we are to see the formal skeleton of 
every narrative. (Ricoeur, 1985: 50, emphasis in original) 
 
Articulating Ricoeur, Simmel, and Jameson‘s theses into narrative operation of finance, and 
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in the reformulation of disseminated events into a ―performative series‖ of teleological 
action in setting up a polemical relationship, it is, I contend, important to bear in mind some 
significant points. Namely, we must understand narrative as a value system with purposeful 
action, more particularly, narrative is the system of transference or exchange of value, in which 
the actor‘s performance can be signified through the intervention of the polemical category 
as a ground of justification of exchange and attribution of value. Through this a narrative is 
strongly supported as the frame of ethical vindication, as well as that of rational justification in 
contrasting and thus transferring the value of the main character (protagonist, subject) to 
other characters (deuteragonists, anti-protagonists). The polemical category divides 
characters into two groups: subject group and anti-subject group. In this sense Ricoeur 
insists that all narratives have an ethical dimension, for which evaluative standards of binary 
opposition are usually employed in narrative operation. Without the support of a polemical 
category that foregrounds the performing actor (a subject) from non-performing actors (anti-
subjects) in producing and transferring value, narrative cannot associate a performative 
series with value-production as an operational mode of predication of value.  
     While a narrative reaches the level of narrativity at which the actors are motivated and 
activated, we need to consider the two actual orgainising principles of narrative, which I 
have specified as ‗reconfiguration of temporality‘ and ‗representation of information.‘ Time 
above all becomes historical, or becomes a functional temporality in narrative, conditioning 
the narrative process as the rhythm of the value regime. Simmel argues this rhythm functions 
as a temporal factor by making sequences that bring about a ―leveling effect‖ in valorising 
the system. This is because ―[a]ll sequences of our life are regulated by upward and 
downward rhythm; the undulation that we immediately recognize in nature and as the basic 
form of so many phenomena also holds sway over the soul. The alteration of day and night 
which determines our whole form of life indicates as a general scheme‖ (Simmel, 2004: 485). 
Therefore: 
 
Rhythm satisfies the basic needs for both diversity and regularity, for change and 
stability […] Simplicity or complication of rhythm, the length or brevity of its 
individual periods, its regularity and its interruptions provide, as it were, the abstract 
scheme for individual and social, objective and historical life-sequences. (Simmel, 2004: 
486) 
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Rhythm provides a temporal ground on which uncertainty is eventually valorised. Rhythm 
functions ―as symmetry in time, just as symmetry is rhythm in space‖ (Simmel, 2004: 488). 
Unlike the natural rhythm, the rhythm in a monetary economy can be construed as the 
―rational-systematic principle,‖ since ―money is the most decisive and completely 
indifferent means for transposing the supra-individual rhythm in the conditions of life into the 
harmony and stability that allow a freer, more individual and more objective confirmation of 
our personal energies and interests‖ (Simmel, 2004: 495, emphasis in original).This statement 
is significant because, in serialised capitalist society, money as the ultimate value transposes 
its ―supra-individual rhythm‖ as the condition of stable performance. This gives purposeful 
action meaning in valorised time. The rhythm in fluid financial capital is even more crucial, 
since ―a change in monetary circumstances brings about a change in the pace of life‖ (Simmel, 
2004: 498, emphasis in original). ―The fluctuations in exchange prices frequently indicate 
subjective-psychological motivations, which, in their crudeness and independent 
movements, are totally out of proportion in relation to objective factors. It would certainly 
be superficial, however, to explain this by pointing out that price fluctuations correspond 
only rarely to real changes in the quality that the stock represents‖ (Simmel, 2004: 325). 
The concept of value-transfer through rhythmic performative series in narrative 
should therefore be the entry point for understanding how a value can be recognised, 
formed, circulated, and thus performed through the logic of narrativea narrative that 
orients disparate actors, necessitates performances, and (re)produces value relations with 
modulation of rhythm in society. With regard to generic formation of value in a genre in 
which narrative is employed as the mode of mediation,40 Jameson also finds a correlation 
between Marxism and narrative, in that Marxism is basically a theoretical and practical 
                                            
40 Mediation, in Jameson‘s theory, is considered alongside the notion of totality, for which mediation 
functions as an encompassing category for the analysis of social unity: the totality. ―Mediations are 
thus a device of the analyst, whereby the fragmentation and autonomization, the 
compartmentalization and specialization of the various regions of social life (the separation, in other 
words, of the ideological from the political, the religious from the economic, the gap between daily 
life and the practice of the academic disciplines) is at least locally overcome, on the occasion of a 
particular analysis‖ (Jameson, 1989: 40).Reinterpreting Althusser‘s ―structural causality,‖ for the 
analysis of semi-autonomy or ―the relative autonomy of the various structural levels‖ (Jameson, 1989: 
44), as the fundamental ―practice of mediation‖ (Jameson, 1989: 41), Jameson articulates the practice 
of mediation. He sees this as a practice of transcoding, which is the domain of interpretation and 
identification. ―Mediation undertakes to establish this initial identity, against which then […] local 
identification or differentiation can be registered‖ (Jameson, 1989: 42). ―[I]t (mediation) is an 
identificatory transcoding which requires you at one and the same time to maintain these three ‗levels‘ 
at some absolute structural distance from one another‖ (Jameson, 1989: 43). 
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methodology with a strategic value of generic concepts of the dialectic transformation of 
use-value and exchange-value. In addition, it can be reinterpreted as the mechanism of value 
exchange and transference. As Marxism focuses on the generic production of value through 
the mediation of exchange relations in society, narrative likewise achieves generic 
conceptual operation by mediating heterogeneous elements to produce a history-effect that 
fills the void and unconscious of the text (Jameson, 1989). Therefore, for Jameson, what 
dominant narrative contains is the actual aspects of societal fragmentation for the 
universalisation of the ideal of the dominant value. Narrative produces social fantasy, but 
the fantasy is not a virtual but a real form of ideology. Through it economic libidinal energy 
flows for the circulation of value. In this sense, narrative constructs meanings about value, 
while mediating actions as a series of performances that conceal and, at the same time, 
reveal the political (un)conscious of narrative itself. In this system―[a] story will link 
together all the protagonists, events, descriptions, and other textual elements, and, as such, 
narrative, is the place in fiction most directly to express the ‗unconscious‘ totality (or linked-
togetherness) of real life‖ (Roberts, 2000: 81).The narrative model communicates with reality 
as a way of filling the lacunae of ideology. However, the way in which narrative 
corresponds to reality seems heuristic for actors, as it orients, rather than enforces, opening 
up possibilities for performance in proportion to the distance actors keep from the narrative 
program and from their roles in transferring value. If the fulfillment of these possibilities for 
performance can be subservient to the dominant value politics, the only real possibility for 
alternative narrative is in an implosion of the political unconscious of the value system 
represented in dominant narrative. 
While Simmel epistemologically emphasises value and value-formation related to 
exchange, as well as a series of purposeful actions and exchange causes, Marx considers 
material labour the essential value-forming substance. For Marx, ―values are the objective 
expressions of homogeneous labour‖ (Marx, 1990: 134). Here labour is not labour in general; 
it is labour power as a quantified unit that can be bought and sold as a commodity by wage-
price since, as Marx puts it, ―[p]rice is the money-name of the labour objectified in a 
commodity‖ (Marx, 1990: 195–196). By distinguishing labour power from labour, Marx 
asserts that labour is a unity of two values: use-value and value (exchange-value). ―Just as 
the commodity itself is a unity formed of use-value and value, so the process of production 
must be a unity, composed of the labour process and the process of creating value‖ (Marx, 
1990: 293). Here, value of labour is nothing less than exchange-value of labour power, 
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through which capitalistic production constructs the labour process as the foundation of 
value-valorisation. As such, in Marxian value theory, exchange-value is independent from 
the particular use-value from which it is borne. Although Marx acknowledges that a use-
value of some kind can be a value, it remains a use-value if it does not undergo any form of 
exchange. If, for instance, someone who cannot play the guitar bids at an auction for the 
guitar that belonged to Jimmy Hendrix at the price of ￡280,000, for him, the value of the 
guitar is not use-value but rather exchange-value. It is the symbolic importance of the item 
functioning as potential exchangeability in value-production. The bidder might sell it in 
future for a large surplus value. Here, the labour of the bidder becomes labour power as a 
unit of exchange-value, and it is mediated in the value-creating process. From the 
perspective of value, what is important in this case is that, in the unity of use-value and 
exchange-value of labour, exchange-value becomes the main composition of labour for the 
mechanism of valorisation of exchange-value. Labour power, in which its own use-value is 
sublated for exchange-value, is, thus, an essential substance. It is socially necessary for the 
capitalistic mode of production. 
Unlike Marx, Simmel regards labour power as one of various factors that are 
exchanged for producing value. For Simmel, it is, as I have suggested, the possibility or 
exchangeability of labour power, rather than labour itself, that constitutes labour power as a 
value-producing agent. As exchange can also take place without labour power, taking 
labour power as the crucial substance of value is, Simmel insists, insufficient for the purpose 
of answering ―the question of how labour power itself becomes a value.‖ He explains: 
 
The idea, for instance, that the essential feature of value is the socially necessary labour 
time objectified it has been used in both these senses to provide a measure of the 
deviation of value from price. But the concept of this uniform standard of value does 
not answer the question of how labour power itself became a value. This could not 
have happened unless the activity of labour in producing all kinds of goods had given 
rise to the possibility of exchange, and the exertion of labour had been experienced as a 
sacrifice offered in return for its products. Labour power, too, enters the category of 
value only through the possibility and reality of exchange, regardless of the fact that 
subsequently it may provide a standard for measuring other values within this 
category. Even if labour power is the content of every value, it receives its form as 
value only by entering into a relation of sacrifice and gain or price or value. According 
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to this theory, if price and value diverge, one contracting party exchanges a quantity of 
objectified labour power against a smaller quantity; but this exchange is affected by 
other circumstances which do not involve labour power, such as the need to satisfy 
urgent wants, whims, fraud, monopoly, etc. In a broader and subjective sense, the 
equivalence of the values exchanged is maintained here, whereas the uniform norm of 
labour power, which makes possible the discrepancy, does not originate in exchange. 
(Simmel, 2004: 96)  
 
This criticism is persuasive because the composition of use-value and exchange-value in 
labour can be disproportionate according to, for instance, different levels of development. 
However, we should also note that the function of exchange is central to Marx‘s analysis, 
since what Marx proposes capitalism to be, namely the exchange relation of commodities, 
means we must investigate the actual method of transformation of disparate use-value for 
the valorisation of the system. Marx‘s theory should thus be looked at with regard to how 
economic value as exchange-value becomes the foundation of capitalistic social relations 
through exchange, because ―[e]xchange does not create the differences between spheres of 
production but it does bring the different spheres into a relation, thus converting them into 
more or less interdependent branches of the collective production of a whole society‖ (Marx, 
1990: 472). When Marx analyses how money, as an autonomous medium representing 
exchange relations, is the fluid monetary form of the self-valorisation of capitalist society, it 
is particularly vivid how use-value, separated and alienated from concrete contexts, is 
abstracted. As a consequence it vanishes as the result of the circulation of money: 
 
The independent form, i.e. the monetary form, which the value of commodities 
assumes in simple circulation, does nothing but mediate the exchange of commodities, 
and it vanishes in the final result of the movement. (Marx, 1990: 255)  
 
Thus, the monetary form as the automatic subject becomes both the starting point and 
conclusion of every valorization process through which exchange-value (as the form of 
dematerialised use-value) mediates and vanishes. For Marx, exchange-value is a form of 
alienation of use-value, which transforms the actual composition of, not just labour, but also 
the value relation itself. The full-blown establishment of exchange-value relations finds its 
expression in financial capitalism, under which use-value is assumed, advanced, and thus 
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totally alienated in terms of exchange-value or financial commensurability in the markets.  
 
The Dynamic Formation of Value and the Question of Representation of Value 
 
In this context it is worth recalling Spivak‘s criticism of Marx, where she tries to reveal the 
political unconscious of use-value. Spivak raises doubts about Marx‘s value theory, above all 
about the place of use-value, which she suggests is the alienated portion of value in the 
circuit of value-production. Diverging from mainstream Marxian explanations, Spivak 
considers use-value the main host of value, from which exchange-valuea ―superfluity‖ or 
a ―parasite of use-value‖is first decomposed. It is from here that it is eventually 
(re)composed as the dominant foundation of value: 
 
The parasitic part (exchange-value) is also the species term of the whole, thus allowing 
use-value the normative inside place of the host as well as banishing it as that which 
must be subtracted so that Value can be defined. Further, since one case of use-value 
can be that of the worker wishing to consume the (affect of the) work itself, that 
necessary possibility renders indeterminate the ‗materialist‘ predication of the subject 
as labor-power or super-equation as calibrated and organized by the logic of capital. In 
terms of that necessarily possible ‗special case,‘ this predication can no longer be seen 
as the excess of surplus labor over socially necessary labor. The question of affectively 
necessary labor brings in the attendant question of desire and thus questions in yet 
another way the mere philosophical justice of capital logic without necessarily shifting 
into utopian idealism. (Spivak, 1985: 80) 
 
A value can be both in and outside of the circuit of exchange, as Marx acknowledges. 
However, according to Spivak, while keeping the possibility of value realisation outside the 
circulation, which is necessarily associated with the fabric of representation of value, Marx 
simplifies the wide context of economic value-formation. However, this inevitably entails 
cultural representation of economic value, for which Spivak proposes textuality as the 
construction process of value on the psychological level. She argues that this is inexorably 
intertwined with the emergence of economic value. The process of making a notion of value 
through textual coding, which has been overlooked by mainstream economists as well as 
cultural theorists, is an essential part of value-production. As such, Spivak diagnoses that 
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the two separated parts, relations of use- and exchange-value, should be realigned in order 
to explain the dynamic formation of value. Without retextualising use-value in the chain of 
value-formation, the representation scheme of exchange-value (value -> money -> capital -> 
value) is superficial, as she insists that ―[i]n my reading, on the other hand, it is use-value 
that puts the entire textual chain of value into question and thus allows us a glimpse of the 
possibility that even textualization (which is already an advance upon the control implicit in 
linguistic or semiotic reductionism) may be no more than a way of holding randomness at 
bay‖ (Spivak, 1985: 80, emphasis added).Therefore, in this regard, to answer the ―onto-
phenomenological question‖ of value, value-production in the economic sphere is 
necessarily articulated into ―an adequate analogy to the psychoanalytic narrative,‖ and this 
explains how economic value can have meaning as value in the individual mind as well as 
in society. Spivak goes on: 
 
The consideration of the textuality of Value in Marx, predicated upon the subject as 
labor-power, does not answer the onto-phenomenological question ―What is Value?‖ 
although it gives us a sense of the complexity of the mechanics of evaluation and value- 
formation. It shows us that the Value-form in the general sense and in the narrowthe 
economic sphere as commonly understood being the latterare irreducibly 
complicitous. It implies the vanity of dismissing considerations of the economic as 
‗reductionism.‘ I have already indicated various proposed formulations that have the 
effect of neutralizing these suggestions: to find in the development of the money-form 
an adequate analogy to the psychoanalytic narrative; to see in it an analogy to 
metaphor or language; to subsume domestic or intellectual labor into a notion of the 
production of value expanded within capital logic. What narratives of value-formation 
emerge when consciousness itself is subsumed under the ‗materialist‘ predication of 
the subject? (Spivak, 1985: 82) 
 
It is at this juncture that she raises the critical question: if ―the question of value necessarily 
receives a textualized answer‖ (Spivak, 1985: 74), ―[w]hat narratives of value-formation 
emerge when consciousness itself is subsumed under the ―materialist‖ predication of the 
subject?‖ Any consideration of narrative instances of value-formation, which are ―onto-
phenomenological question[s] of value,‖ should, I want to argue, begin with narrative as 
value system, in which cultural valorisation of the economic is introduced and concretised 
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through the production of the notion of the valuable. Narrative in this sense needs to be 
reconsidered as a subsumption mechanism, through which a notion or consciousness of 
value is accompanied in the construction of valueand for which a value is collectively and 
systematically represented in support of capitalistically reconfigured temporality around the 
notion of the valuable in narrative processes. By analysing actual instances of narrativity in 
the financial mechanisms that function as context controland which also channel the 
possibility of performance for actors in necessitating new value valorisationwe can 
concretely reveal how financial narrative is the operational mode of value predication. It is 
the mode of transference through which a notion and consciousness of value is valorised 
and supported in the construction of the dominant economic value.  
     Throughout the following chapter, we will examine the organising principles of 
narrative, temporal reconfiguration, and representation of information as a set of epistemic 
operations. This will be the basis on which the ground of narrative operation in our 
contemporary financial climate will be closely explicated. Without dense scrutiny of 
financial workings themselves, any effort to articulate narrative theory in the financial 
system will not be substantiated. In exemplification of the activities of the investment banks 
in the Korean financial crisis, we will clearly witness the process of financialisation and the 
cultural operations associated with temporality and representation. These were used in the 
making of a teleological chain of value-production and transference, or the new value 
system, and given to the local people. 
Substantiating the narrative operation as a value system, Chapter 4 analyses the 
cultural logic of financialisation that is associated with the emergence of investment banking. 
This is exemplified in the Korean financial crisis and its aftermath, in order to reveal not just 
the economic restructuring of this society but the actual aspects of cognitive dissonance of 
the financial system. I will portray this as a disinformation campaign of finance capital, and 
show the operation of overcoming this cognitive dissonance by means of the cultural 
operationin terms of financial rationale. Demonstrating that financialisation, which is 
critically motivated and generated through the engine of the investment banking model and 
technique, is detrimental to the growth of the nation’s economy, I contend more importantly 
that the transactional orientation of investment banking is the system of temporal articulation of 
human relationships. Here, a series of transient combinations of human resources, 
experience, knowledge, and information is encoded and implemented for a transaction from 
the perspective of cultural performativity; this transaction thus incorporates other forms of 
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value-production into its rhythm and temporal reconfigurations. This will be further 
examined in Chapters 5 and 6, especially concerning temporal reconfiguration and narrative 
representation. By instantiating the process of widespread establishment of investment 
banking in commercial banking, non-financial corporations, and individual actors through 
major financial shake-ups after the Korean financial crisis, the next chapter shows how the 
master code of investment banking became the symbolic as well as material code by 
necessitating this process of financialisation in Korea. With the accentuation of 
financialisation as a process accompanying transactional orientation and mechanisms, seen 
as legitimate processes of the realisation of dominant value, I further suggest that financial 
capitalism is a set of epistemic operations that transcodes cognitive dissonance with an 
operativity of information. The collective information produced by financial narrators, 
transcodes the dissonance into consonance grounds in the field of cognitive operation, as the 
cultural logic of financialisation beyond economic diagnosis; it thus functions as the source 
of cognition and action for the actors. 
As for my theoretical concerns, I propose the cultural logic of financialisation should 
be seen in terms of the(re)configuration of temporality and (re)presentation of information, both of 
which have been critically undertaken and maintained by the operativity of investment 
banking. This functions, following Bourdieu, as ―the sign of wealth‖ (Bourdieu, 1992: 66), or 
a proto-narrative, in what follows. It is time for cultural theorists and practitioners to 
approach finance as a set of epistemic cultural processes that modulate the epistemological 
and ontological context. These affect actors‘ cognition and behaviour in value-production 
and realisation. Financialisation is, in this regard, viewed as a disinformation campaign, 
through which the cognitive dissonance of the financial system is effectively contained; 
financialisation conceals the damaging effects of this transactional mechanism and thus 
valorises the short-term speculative mechanism as the legitimate rhythm of value-
production and circulation. Throughout instances of the Korean financial crisis, the financial 
centres collectively and systematically intervened with narrative operations to sustain and 
amplify the ultra-speedy transactional orientation of investment banking among actors in 
the financial markets. Through this cultural campaign the financial system ceaselessly 
conceals the cognitive dissonance, and the contradictions in the system, with operativity of 
information for construction of financial reality. It stimulates beliefs and guides actions, 
without which financial integrity, credit relations, and transactional orientation could not be 
sustained. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Cultural Logic of Financialisation and the Korean financial Crisis: 
(Dis)information, Temporality and Representation in Neoliberal Paradox 
 
 
 
Financialisation, according to Epstein, is one of the ―three keywords of the last thirty years‘ 
change,‖ along with neoliberalism and globalisation41 (Epstein, 2005: 3). Financialisation is 
at the center of socio-economic concerns, with its widespread influence over the various 
sectors of society. However, until now, theoretical analyses of the phenomenon have mainly 
focused on the economic field, although ―distributional implications‖ (Epstein, 2005: 3) of 
financialisation overlap onto diverse milieus outside the economic. Financialisation should 
also be approached, then, as the process of establishment of ―epistemic culture‖ (Knorr 
Cetina, 1999). It works towards the legitimatisation of new economic methodology, 
producing and transferring new rationality for cognition and action in value-realisation. 
While reviewing the economic literature on the implications of the new economic tendency, 
this chapter aims to reveal what sort of economic process is actually applied in 
financialisation, and what cultural connotations it has. To do so, it first examines a process of 
qualification of the economic: a tendency toward diversification from commercial banking to 
investment banking. Observing the change in the banking structure in the Korean economy 
after the Korean financial crisis, this chapter suggests that financialisation specifically entails 
a transformation in the nature of banking, which leads to the dominance of investment 
banking over commercial banking. From this temporal consciousness and behaviour toward 
the main value is reconfigured, with its cognitive operation involved in redesigning social 
relationships, so that, above all, investment banking pursues extremely short-term profits 
                                            
41 Questions can be asked about relationship and interactions between the three processes. Gérard 
Duménil and Dominique Lévy explain that ―[n]eoliberalism is the ideological expression of the 
reasserted power of finance‖ (Duménil and Lévy, 2005: 17), since ―[n]eoliberalism is‖ above all ―the 
expression of the new hegemony of finance‖ (Duménil and Lévy, 2005: 40). It can be thus inferred 
that finance is the main engine that defines new political and social arrangements and order. In this 
sense, globalisation, following their parlance, is the global expression of financial operation and 
prevalence in capitalistic development, for ―[i]t is finance that dictates its forms and contents in the 
new stage of internationalization; it is not internationalization or globalization that creates the 
insuperable necessity for the present evolution of capitalism‖ (Duménil and Lévy, 2005: 17). 
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over long-term stability and social and individual relationships.  
     This change is closely associated with the cultural, for the change, first of all, connotes 
temporal reconfiguration, or the temporal readjustment of speed of circulation and 
realisation of value. This then functions as the extrapolation of a new rhythm as the condition 
of the new reality.42 Rhythm actualises a pattern of mobilisation of value in the monetary 
economy. According to Simmel, rhythm is ―the rationalistic-systematic principle‖ that 
defines reality (Simmel, 2004: 490). Considering that ―reality is in constant motion‖ (Simmel, 
2004: 511), the tendency towards acceleration in the monetary economy, especially by 
investment banking, greatly influences the pace of life. Here we need to ask whether 
shortening of turnover time in financial transactions is affecting socio-political arrangements 
and relationships in society. If so, by introducing a new rhythmic movement, what kind of 
cultural operation is entailed in legitimising the new ―rationalistic-systematic principle‖ that 
redefines reality? These are questions economists and cultural theorists rarely pose. By 
appraising the change in the nature of banking as a process symptomatic of financialisation, 
one that involves the inscription of a new rhythm, this chapter articulates the transformation 
as diversification and expansion of the capitalistic mode of production. It sees this as 
something that also functions as an epistemological and ontological reconfiguration, thereby 
affecting actors‘ cognition and behaviour. It is where performativity of the economic is at 
stake,43 in that, following the linguistic philosopher Austin, the intervention of performative 
                                            
42 Valorisation of rhythm is an inevitable operation in extrapolation, or reconfiguration of temporality, 
from the cultural perspective as well, in that extrapolation, beyond transformation of policy in the 
economic, eventually aims to valorise futurity. It aims to do this through the narrative constitution. 
As it is a conditional constitution, the constitution is basically unknowable and unproven to actors. 
That is why Ricoeur insists that narrative extrapolation and valorization of the futurity only exist ―in 
the context of a story.‖―To talk about the whole history is to compose a complete picture of the past 
and the future. But to pronounce on the future is to extrapolate from the configurations and 
concatenations of the past in the direction of what is still to come. This extrapolation, constitutive of 
prophecy, consists, in turn, of speaking about the future in terms appropriate to the past. But there is 
no history of the future due to the nature of narrative sentences, which re-describe past events in light 
of subsequent ones unknown to the actors themselves. Such a meaning can be conferred on events 
‗only in the context of a story‘. The vice of substantive philosophies of history, as a consequence, is 
that they write narrative sentences with regards to the future when they can only be written with 
regards to the past‖ (Ricoeur, 1984: 144). 
43  The performativity of financial economics can be viewed as the power of intervention and 
representation of financial hypothesis that leads to practical action if such hypothesis fails to describe the 
reality, as MacKenzie succinctly puts it in association with economic performativity and semantic 
representation. ―[F]inancial economics in the form of the efficient-market hypothesis has not simply 
been ‗applied‘ (for example, in the form of index funds): ‗failed‘ tests of the hypothesis have given rise 
to practical action that generally has had the consequence of tending to restore the hypothesis‘s 
empirical validity. It is this kind of interweaving of ‗words‘ and ‗action‘of representations and 
interventions – that the concept of ‗performativity‘ is designed to capture‖ (MacKenzie, 2008: 5). 
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information, such as speeches, statements, and representation of the market situation, 
introduces and grounds a new economic rationale and, therefore, functions for the 
production of rationality in (re)cognition and behavior. This will be closely analysed in 
Chapters 5 and 6. In the case of Korea, the financial crisis functions as a leverage point for 
neoliberal restructuring, by which financialisation of the banking sector, non-financial 
corporations, and individual actors is critically generated and motivated. A collection of 
economic information and statements by narrators in the dominant financial apparatuses 
supported financial structural change in the Korean economy, and this is the exemplar of the 
performativity of the economic that sutures ―cognitive dissonance‖ (Parenteau, 2005: 127). 
This, Parenteau explains, is the operativity of information in finance that functions as a 
―disinformation campaign‖ (Parenteau, 2005: 131).44 
Financialisation is indeed a ―disinformation campaign‖ through which the cognitive 
dissonance of financial mania is effectively contained, concealing its damaging effects and 
valorising the inherent bubble-mechanism as a legitimate mode of value-production and 
realisation. Sustaining and amplifying transactional orientation among actors in the financial 
market, the financial system masks cognitive dissonance through its operativity of 
information. This modulates the epistemological and ontological context of the actors. The 
intensification of the transactional orientation of investment banking over commercial banking, 
non-financial corporations, and individual actors becomes the criteria of behaviour and 
expectation, with the collective information of financial narrators supporting such behaviour 
as the rational and legitimate condition of dominant value-production and transference. This 
in turn valorises the temporality of futurity, the future value, associated with flows of 
dominant value. With this double operation, reconfiguring the ontological and 
epistemological context, financialisation is eventually set to function as the condition of 
performativity in individual actors, which is critical in the construction of financial reality. It 
stimulates belief and guides action, without which financial integrity, credit relations, and 
transactional orientation could not be sustained. To reveal the concrete aspects of cognitive 
dissonance and the operation of overcoming it through the performativity of the financial 
economic, this chapter first proposes that from the perspective of the general economy, 
                                            
44 In Ricoeur‘s analysis, narrative transforms the ―cognitive dissonance‖ into ―dissonant consonance,‖ 
which he traces as a ―theme‖ in narrative theory. Transcoding cognitive dissonance into consonance 
is a crucial narrative operation; even Ricoeur insists that―[t]he [narrative] encoding is thus governed 
more by the expected meaning effects consist essentially of making the unfamiliar familiar‖ (Ricoeur, 
1984: 168), thus emphasising the study of encoding as ―my theme of dissonant consonance‖ in whole 
narrative theory (Ricoeur, 1984: 168). 
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financialisation (which is motivated and generated through the engine of the investment 
banking model and technique) is detrimental to the growth of a nation‘s economy. Looking 
at the process of widespread establishment of investment banking in commercial banking, 
non-financial corporations, and individual actors through a major financial shake-upafter 
the Korean financial crisisthis chapter reveals that the code of investment banking 
becomes a ―sign of wealth‖ (Bourdieu, 1992: 66). It functions as the sign of authority and 
communication in motivating the process of financialisation. 
 
The Transactional Orientation of Investment Banking: A System of Temporal Articulation  
 
As Greg Albo suggests, ―there is a mismatch between the time horizons of financial and 
industrial capital: where the latter requires long-term investment, the former thrives on 
short-term profits‖ (Albo, 1996: 7). However, it should be noted that there are different 
temporal workings even within financial capital. Unlike a commercial bank, which offers 
long-term loans to corporations and businesses as well as individuals, an investment bank 
trades securities in the capital markets and invests hedge funds, mutual funds, and pension 
funds. Crucially, it operates on a short-term basis. In essence, the investment bank operates 
on an ―opportunistic basis,‖ without an embedded relationship with customers. As such, it 
has more of a ―transactional orientation‖ than a relational orientation (Eccles and Crane, 
1998: 205). According to Eccles and Crane, the investment bank has three features for a 
speedy response to market opportunities: complexity, fluidity, and flatness. First of all, 
―[c]omplexity is required because of the mediation function, economic characteristics and 
production process of investment banking,‖ in that ―matching issuers and investors 
required a large number of ties between those who have contact with each side of the market 
interface.‖ Second, ―[f]latness is required in order to process information in a timely fashion,‖ 
while ―[f]luidity is required because of the constant change in internal ties created by 
constant change in external markets‖ (Eccles and Crane, 1998: 206, emphasis added). Here, 
―flatness‖ refers to a tendency toward an immediate and direct interrelationship between 
front office brokers and back office mangers in making deals. These factors are essential for 
facilitating both deals and the flow of assets. The highly technical and specialised practice of 
banking formulates ―internal ties,‖ through which investment bankers ―share information‖ 
and ―identify opportunities.‖ Because ―each deal itself requires a unique and changing mix 
of specialist resources, ties are created between the people who work together to get it done‖ 
91 
 
(Eccles and Crane, 1998: 206). However, these internal ties are not as strong as those in 
traditional firms. They are flexible and ―weak ties,‖ which can be characterised as the 
organisational feature of financial and global cutting edge firms, mainly given the fact that 
―firms will exploit weak ties to extend their network. Because it correlates with difference, 
distance from the centre adds to the value of information peripheral partners can yield.‖ In 
addition, ―weak ties have the further advantage of being easily breakable if a peripheral 
agent is no longer of use to those at the centrewho thereby avoid having their adaptation 
sabotaged or slowed by a network partner who proves resistant to, or incapable of, 
necessary change. Shedding of weak ties is generally easier in inter-firm than intra-firm 
networks, membership of which confers status which makes disloyal or dysfunctional 
agents harder to cast off, or dangerous to do so because of the information they can carry to 
rival firms‖ (Shipman, 2001: 138). To capture the unexpected ―creative‖ point of intervention 
in the creation of market opportunities, an up-to-date player in the financial industry, such 
as an investment bank, orients itself toward a ―loose structure,‖ in which each agent 
maximises his or her turnover. This is done by an arbitrary sharing of knowledge and 
information. However, ―[c]omplementing the loose structures in a self-designing 
organisation are,‖ as Eccles and Crane also point out, actually ―tight management control 
system[s] designed and installed by top management. These systems direct the energies of 
people throughout the firm and are thereby important way by which top management 
exercise control‖ (Eccles and Crane, 1988: 207). 
The transactional orientation of the investment bank does not allow horizontal or 
democratic relationships, it seems. It is, rather, a system of temporal articulation of human 
relationships, in which a series of transient combinations of human resource, experience, 
knowledge, and information is implemented in a transaction. Financial flows can then be seen 
as the objective expressions of consecutive and collective temporal articulations of transactions in 
financial markets, on which each trader can project his or her subjective expression. This is 
usually in conjunction with temporal fluctuations. In this sense, financial flows are 
changeable entities that ―must be expressed in terms of a time interval‖ (Knorr Cetina and 
Preda, 2004: 53). Here changes of volumes and positions of participants eventually become 
meaningful actions. According to Knorr Cetina and Preda, financial flows that formulate 
financial realities perform ―bridging and mediating roles in giving support to a moving 
market and in updating and forwarding the market on a time zone trajectory‖ (Knorr Cetina 
and Preda, 2004: 55). Thus we must emphasise that ―[t]emporal features of finance capital 
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empower it [economic globalisation] to subject other forms of capital to its rhythms‖ (Sassen, 
1999: 222), thus transforming ―the slow moving and rule-bound public accountability of 
governmental processes‖ for ―the accelerated dynamic of private ‗regulatory‘ functions and 
markets‖ (Sassen, 1999: 224). 
The financial rhythm, led and maintained by investment banks, is not just an 
―accelerated dynamic‖ but a series of ―rapid-fire trades‖ 45  that are performed in 
milliseconds. According to a report from the Wall Street Journal, the US investment bank 
Goldman Sachs is the ―dominant player in high-frequency trading, in which computers use 
complex formulas to conduct rapid-fire trades in markets around the world.‖ It says that 
―[i]n the week ending July 3 [2009],‖ the investment bank ―accounted for 24% of all program 
trading, or computer-generated trading.‖―High-frequency trading,‖ performed by a 
dominant investment bank, ―has become one of the fastest-expanding strategies on Wall 
Street, accounting for more than 73% of stock-trading volume in the U.S. this year [2009], up 
from 59% in 2008.‖ This pattern of transaction, called a ―flash-order,‖ virtually removes the 
temporal gaps between selling and buying. ―Powerful algorithms execute millions of orders 
a second and scan dozens of public and private marketplaces simultaneously. They can spot 
trends before other investors can blink, changing orders and strategies within 
milliseconds.‖46 High-frequency traders in investment banks can ―bully slower investors,‖ 
for they often ―confound other investors by issuing and then canceling orders almost 
simultaneously. Loopholes in market rules give high-speed investors an early glance at how 
others are trading.‖ Due to the introduction of this new financial pattern, the ―[a]verage 
daily volume has soared by 164 percent since 2005.‖ According to the report, the New York 
Stock Exchange estimates that ―a handful of high-frequency traders,‖ in investment banks, 
―now account for a more than half of all traders.‖47 High-frequency traders are thought to 
have generated profits of $21 billion in 2008. Here, the new cutting edge method of 
investment banking indicates two things: first, investment banking is fundamentally a 
temporal operation that is combined with ultramodern technologybecause of which 
investment bank traders have a vantage position, thereby creating massive volumes in the 
form of dominant financial flows; second, the temporality investment banking seeks is an 
abstract entity severed from the real economy, superseding concrete human relationships in 
the field of the economy in an instant money game. ―There is,‖ as Parenteau explains, ―a 
                                            
45 ―Rivals Play Catch-Up as Goldman Thrives,‖ Wall Street Journal, 13 July, 2009. 
46 ―Stock Traders Find Speed Pays, in Milliseconds,‖ New York Times, 23 July, 2009. 
47 ―Stock Traders Find Speed Pays, in Milliseconds,‖ New York Times, 23 July, 2009. 
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trading culture‖ that demarcates investment banks from commercial banks at the level of 
temporal operations. He goes on: 
 
There is a trading culture. This more rapid turnover of asset holdings also means 
investment banks find their principal less damaged by periods of unanticipated 
inflation. There are no 30-year mortgage loans, for example, sitting on the books of 
investment banks, with the purchasing power of the loan principal getting eaten up by 
high and rising inflation during the term of the loan. Consequently, in very gross terms, 
the interests of investment bankers are more closely aligned with wealth-holders 
owning equities than with commercial bankers per se. (Parenteau, 2005: 134) 
 
Investment bankers with specialised banking techniques, maximising information for higher 
profits in each deal, earn a distinctive position in financial capitalism. This is due to their 
power to make rules that influence other participants‘ behaviours and expectations. As such, 
the specialisation of the banking system provides investment banks with a source of 
operativity of information: reputation. And this functions with cognitive and behavioural 
value to guide the financial markets to meaningful action. Since it obtains reputation in 
value-realisation through its performance, an investment bank can maintain ceaseless 
―differentiation through reputation‖ (Eccles and Crane, 1988: 109), transforming itself as a 
―self-designing organization‖ (Eccles and Crane, 1988: 207). This way of pursuing the 
banking system as a methodology for dominant value-production and transference 
motivates commercial banking as well.48 Therefore ―[d]uring the past two decades, ‖the 
―bank model has been replaced by most issuing customers, particularly sophisticated and heavy users 
                                            
48 There are, however, limitations in commercial banking, although some big commercial banks, such 
as Chase Manhattan and Citicorp, have been operating investment banking components ―within the 
constraint of the Glass-Steagall Act.‖This act was established in America in 1933 for controlling 
speculation. But the issue of legal regulation is somewhat auxiliary. There are ―two major obstacles‖ 
to a commercial bank succeeding in investment banking. The two factors are ―skilled people and 
culture,‖ According to Eccles and Crane. And the―[t]ypical corporate loan officer is perceived as 
lacking in the final sophistication necessary in the investment banking business.‖ However, as this 
issue is one of human resources, a commercial bank can cope with the weakness by means of 
―massive internal training programs and by recruiting from investment banks.‖ The second issue is 
more fundamental because it is a ―legitimate reason for commercial banks to be concerned about 
credit risk, as investment banks doing bridge loans are aware.‖ Risk aversion regulates 
epistemological and ontological boundaries as it grounds perception and behaviour with regard to 
risk by commercial bankers. Nevertheless, as Eccles and Crane insist ―[f]or commercial banks 
attempting to be successful in the investment banking […] they will have to move significantly 
toward the practices used by investment banks as a few commercial banks have begun to do‖ (Eccles 
and Crane, 1988: 214–215). 
94 
 
of investment banking services, by a set of investment banks‖ (Eccles and Crane, 1988: 205, 
emphasis added). This is a crucial diagnosis, from which we can infer the way in which the 
financial banking structure has been transformed and evolvedas the main source of 
performativity in finance.  
The prevailing position of investment banking in today‘s financial climate is in no 
doubt. For example, as of 2004, Morgan Stanley is the leader in world stock markets, in 
market sectors such as global equity and equity-related stock, global convertible offerings, 
and global common stock, with a market share of more than 10%. Another investment bank 
giant, JP Morgan, tops global loans with a 18.9% share. Goldman Sachs is the overwhelming 
force in mergers and acquisitions (M&A), as ―worldwide announced financial advisors,‖ 
occupying 29.5% with a profit of nearly $400,000 million.49 International stock and loan 
markets, as well as M&A markets, are all under the sway of big investment banks. The 
―transactional orientation‖ of investment banks proves that they are more actively engaged 
in stock markets than with bonds, which generally have fixed terms for repayment with 
interest. These patterns of banking are very different from those of traditional commercial 
banks, which profits from deposits from individuals and businesses, and by lending to them. 
With its specialized market-making and rule-setting banking techniques, including the 
operation of arbitrage and hedge funds, investment banks ceaselessly undertake 
―differentiation‖ in widening market opportunities. In the context of this research, one 
question is whether there is any relation between the proliferation of investment banking 
and financialisation. When a national economy‘s financial restructuring is forced in the 
name of financial liberalisation, by considering the nature of the structural change in the 
banking sector it is possible to find out whether financialisation facilitates and fosters a 
tendency toward transaction-oriented financial behavior. In this sense it would be severed 
from long-term investment in the real economy, and characterised by investment banking as 
the content of financialisation. The Korean financial crisis can be considered an exemplary 
case, in which financialisation of a national economy was witnessed in the banking sector as 
well as in non-financial companies and individual actors. The rise of investment banking is 
the episteme of value. 
 
Financial Crisis and Financialisation in the Banking Sector 
                                            
49 Thomson Financial League Tables 
(http://thomsonreuters.com/products_services/financial/league_tables/) 
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Financialisation can be observed in the gradual prevalence of investment banking, where its 
techniques dominate value-production and transference in the financial sector. Epstein 
states that ―financialization means the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, 
financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international 
economies‖ (Epstein, 2005: 3). However, financialisation does not just influence the financial 
sector, for it ushers in structural change and encourages the investment behaviour of non-
financial corporations (NFCs) as well. NFCs are thus also being more and more strongly 
affected in terms of financial motives and operations. The two trends in financialisation 
eventually insinuate and motivate individual actors as well, given that each actor recognises 
and reacts to the actions of dominant players in financial markets. These players embody the 
(meta) frame of dominant value, functioning as the objective field into which the actor is 
assimilated. Considering specific processes as the concrete momentum of financialisation, 
this chapter continues to articulate the Korean financial crisis as a case of neoliberal 
financialisation, where the structure of the nation‘s economy was transformed in order to 
internalise and intensify three trends in financialisation. Provided that financialisation is the 
process of reassertion of the ―power of financial elites that benefits handsomely from these 
policies despite these cost to many others‖ (Epstein, 2005: 12), it is fundamentally 
detrimental for the democratisation of a local economy. However, such harmful processes 
are officially legitimatised by the intervention of performative economic statements and 
utterances, as well as of economic theories and models. Such official intervention 
exploits―[t]he resource dependence of developing countries‘ development models that make 
them depend on economic theories and models that support financialization, liberalization 
and globalization,‖ and thus functions as a kind of performativity of the economic, which 
redefines and reconfigures the normativity of economic process and its affects. In this sense, 
―[t]he unwillingness of most economists themselves to honestly face the profound problems 
associated with these theories and policies‖ (Epstein, 2005: 12) is an act of tacit approval 
authorising the intervention. As I contend throughout this chapter, the Korean financial 
crisis needs to be reevaluated as a convergence point at which the trends of financialisation 
and the performativity of economic and political statements were collectively performed. 
In January 1998, amid rising fear of financial turmoil in Korea, US financier George 
Soros, who owns the world‘s biggest hedge fund firm, Quantum Fund, met President-Elect 
Kim Dae-Jung and his chief economic aides. He forced the nationsuffering from a liquidity 
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crisis in the private sectorto restructure its financial system, in order ―to create a better 
environment for foreign investment.‖ Soros directly requested financial liberalisation and 
flexibility in the labour market, both of which were described as ―crucial‖ for recovering 
foreign investors‘ confidence in the Korean financial market. Pull-backs of financial 
restrictions and massive layoffs in labour were once again recommended as important steps 
following the provisions of the IMF bailout plan. 50  Soon after, the limit on foreign 
ownership of domestic listed firms on the Korean stock market was lifted from 4 to 50%, 
both on an aggregate and individual basis. This meant allowing foreign investors to hold the 
position of main shareholder of basically any company in Korea. Meanwhile 14, almost half 
of the nation‘s 30, merchant banks were suspended. With this structural change, foreign 
capital began to rush into the Korean financial market. Foreign investors soon took over the 
management of major commercial banks, such as Korea First Bank, Hanmi Bank, Korea 
Exchange Bank, and Kookmin Bank. American private equity fund Newbridge Capital 
bought Korea First Bank, while another equity fund, Lonestar, became the major 
shareholder of Korea Exchange Bank. Hanmi Bank was sold to Carlyle. Along with 
American private equity fund firms, investment banks also joined the Korean financial 
market. Goldman Sachs became the largest shareholder of Kookmin Bank, with the 
acquisition of 30% of its shares, replacing the Korean government, which had an 8.2 percent 
stake; Lehman Brothers led and managed Hanvit Bank‘s new stock issue, which was sold to 
foreign investors. 51  As Korean bank shares had plummeted due to the crisis, these 
investment banks and private equity funds bought them at very low prices and were soon 
rewarded with massive profits. Goldman Sachs made $571 million from reselling Kookmin 
Bank shares, which made a 100% profit in four years. The Korean financial crisis was, 
according to a newspaper report, ―a gold mine for Goldman Sachs‖ as the bank made huge 
profit from brokerage as well as from direct investment. The report stated that: 
 
During the nation‘s financial crisis and its aftermath, Korea was actually a gold mine for 
Goldman Sachs. The core area of its operation was as a brokerage firm when the nation 
                                            
50 ―Soros to Send Investment Team to Korea,‖ Korea Times, 6thJanuary, 1998. The IMF specifically 
prescribed financial liberalisation as the core of the bailout economic program designed to deal with 
financial crisis. In the program, foreign investment was given full access to Korean financial as well as 
industrial markets, stipulated as follows: ―all foreign investors to purchase, without restriction, 
domestic money market instruments; all foreign investment to purchase, without restriction, in the 
domestic corporate bond market; eliminate restrictions on foreign borrowing by corporations‖ 
(―Summary of IMF Bailout Economic Program,‖ Korea Times, 6 December, 1997). 
51 ―Foreign Banks‘ Advance into Korea Accelerating,‖ Korea Herald, 12 April, 1999. 
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seeking to attract foreign capital, providing corporate sale-related consulting and 
investing directly into the country. Its Hong Kong branch, which is responsible for 
investments in Korea, said, ‗since 1992, we have acted as a brokerage firm when Korea 
sought foreign capital worth 16 trillion won [$16 billion] and provided consulting for 21 
trillion won worth [$21 billion] in corporate sales deals plus 1.45 trillion worth [$1.45 
billion] of direct investment.‘52 
 
Goldman Sachs was an important mediator in introducing foreign capital and, thus, in 
transforming the nation‘s financial sector. It also became an influential investor in the 
Korean financial markets. However, the bank also aggressively invested in the non-
performing loans market as well as the real estate market. The bank was the largest single 
investment financial institution in Korea, spending $500 million purchasing non-performing 
loans (for example, Jinro Corporation), corporate equity stakes (such as Kookmin Bank), and 
corporate buildings (such as Daewoo Group‘s headquarters). In 2003, foreign investors 
possessed 45% of the nation‘s main banks. In major banks such as Kookmin Bank, Korea 
Exchange Bank, and Shinhan Bank, foreign investors led by American investment banks and 
private equity funds held more than 50% equity.53 From these radical changes of ownership 
right after the crisis, we can see that this was the extrapolative fashion of financial 
restructuring, performed by foreign speculative capital. ―The most serious danger posed by 
foreign bank domination in Korea is,‖ as Crotty and Lee point out, ―that investment 
spending will continue to be constrained by a shrinking corporate bank loan market‖54 
(Crotty and Lee, 2006: 673). This would come with a change in the lending pattern of major 
Korean banks, under the control of foreign investment banks and equity funds.  
                                            
52 ―Goldman Puts Its Midas Touch on Korea,‖ Korea Herald, 24 December, 2003. 
53 ―Introduction to Foreign Capital,‖ Korea Times, 1 November, 2004. 
54  According to their analysis, right after the crisis, corporate bank loans were drastically 
―evaporating.‖―Between 1998 and late 2003, foreign banks slashed corporate loans as a percentage of 
total loans by 33 percentage points. The share of corporate lending in total bank lending decreased 
from about 75 percent in 1996 to 43.5 percent in 2004. External funds provided by all financial 
institutions to the corporate sector decreased from about 118 trillion won in 1997 to an average of 65 
trillion from 1999 to 2004, a drop of 45 percent in nominal term‖ (Crotty and Lee, 2006: 673). Unlike 
the sudden drop in lending to the corporate industry, household lending saw a spike as ―the 
household debt doubled from 214 trillion won in 1999 to 439 trillion won in 2002, with the ratio of 
consumer debts to GDA soaring from 44 percent to 74 percent‖ (―Nonbanking Financial Firms Brace 
the Shakeup,‖ Korea Times, 22 July, 2003). In 2002, the Bank of Korea reported that household loans 
had increased four times in 2002, compared to1998, a trend that would ―cause an increase in bad 
loans and lead to the weakening of individual banks and even the financial system‖ (―Plans for the 
Improvement of the Operation of Banks‘ Assets,‖ Bank of Korea, 2003). 
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What is at stake in this change of lending pattern is that ―foreign banks have reduced 
Korea‘s growth potential by shifting from corporate lending toward consumer loans and the 
purchase of government bonds.‖These banks are also better able to ―resist pressure to 
cooperate with government economic policies that are domestic institutions‖ (Crotty and 
Lee, 2006: 673). A series of investment bank takeovers of Korean commercial banks shows 
the near-instant change in banking patterns and behaviours of the nation‘s banks, now 
preferring short-term profits and shunning the mid- or long-term investment of traditional 
industries. This is a conspicuous symptom of financialisation in Korea from which, above all, 
temporal reconfiguration of profits is redefined, interlocking the interests of investment 
banks at the expense of the interests of the nation. Carlyle, for example, resold their KorAm 
Bank shares in 2003, garnering capital gains of $500 million in three years; Newbridge 
Capital also disposed of their stake in Korea First Bank to HSBC after three years. 
Investment banks and funds ―invest with the clear target of exiting the investment normally 
within a 3–7 year timeframe‖ after ―turnaround restructurings‖ that fundamentally 
transform the roles of commercial banks. 55  The ―turnaround restructuring,‖ from 
commercial banking to investment banking, was the core target for neoliberal 
financialisation of the national economy. Restructuring the financial sector into a new frame 
of value-production and transference by reconfiguring temporality for a transactional 
orientation is not limited to this sector alone: by affecting and influencing the pattern of 
lending to industry more generally, the new banking practice also alters the structures of 
non-financial corporations. 
 
Financialisation of Non-Financial Corporations and Individual Investors 
 
Radical financial deregulation and subsequent takeovers of commercial banks by foreign 
investment capital gave Korea‘s leading conglomerates, Chaebols, the opportunity to join 
the financial market, thus bringing about a structural shakeup of non-financial corporations 
as well. Korean conglomerates such as LG and Hyundai affiliated themselves with the 
financial sector by acquiring financial firms, in order to cope with the fast-growing demands 
of investment banking.56 The increase in financial components in chaebols led them to 
heavily engage in the stock brokerage industry, speeding up capital circulation in non-
                                            
55 ―Are Foreign Funds Poison or Medicine for Banks?,‖ Korea Times, 7 November, 2003. 
56 “Manufacturers Muscle into Investment Banking,‖ Korea Herald, 10 April, 2008. 
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financial corporations. This move saw a concentration of short-term profits and, thus, an 
increase in the speed in which shareholder value was maintained. Growing financialisation 
in the structure of non-financial corporations has been a characteristic of financial 
liberalisation since 1970s. This structural change, according to Crotty, bridged the gap 
between the highly increased productivity (due to technological revamps) and the slowing 
aggregate demand, which led to a fall in profit rates of non-financial corporations. However, 
the transformation, as it focused on the increased value of shares for shareholders rather 
than long-term ―managerial incentives,‖ has been extremely detrimental for ―long-term 
survivalist strategies,‖ lowering profit rates of non-financial corporations: 
 
[…]in the 1970s and thereafter NFC [Non Financial Corporation] performance was 
adversely affected by two major changes in their environment created by the impact of 
neoliberal globalization on product and financial markets: a slowdown in the rate of 
global aggregate demand (AD) growth and an increasing intensity of competition in 
key product markets and a shift from ‗patient‘ finance seeking long-term growth to 
impatient financial markets that raised real interest rates, forced NFCs to pay an 
increasing share of their cash flow to financial agents, drastically changed managerial 
incentives, and helped shorten NFC planning horizons. The combined effect of changes in 
both sectors lowered NFC profit rates, raised NFC indebtedness, slowed the rate of 
capital accumulation, and forced NFC top management to switch from the long-term 
‗survivalist‘ strategies that involved attacks on white- and blue-collar labour and on key 
firm suppliers. (Crotty, 2005: 78, emphasis added) 
 
As a result, there is a situation of neoliberal competition, through which the non-financial 
corporations are becoming more and more heavily involved in ―coerced investment,‖ in 
order to maintain their share value in the stock market. However, due to the very fact that 
―[t]he combination of sluggish demand growth and coerced investment leads to chronic 
excess capacity,‖ neoliberal competition is caught in a vicious circle. In this regard, Crotty 
suggests ―three stylized facts about the condition of most NFCs in the neoliberal era‖: 
 
First, slow demand growth and more intense competition reduced average NFC profit 
rates well below their Golden Age levels. Second, while NFC investment spending 
eventually declined, coerced investment delayed the decline and limited the extent of its 
100 
 
fall. Third, coerced investment in the context of falling profits forced NFCs into ever-
rising indebtedness. (Crotty, 2005: 82) 
 
This is exactly what the ―neoliberal paradox‖ consists inconsidering that ―intense product 
market competition made it impossible for most NFCs to achieve high earnings most of the 
time, but financial markets demanded that NFCs generate ever-increasing earnings or face 
falling stock prices and the threat of hostile takeover. We can see the logical outcome of this 
contradictory set of forces in the USA stock market bubble of the late 1990s and its 
subsequent collapse, as well as in the unmasking of widespread fraud in the financial 
statements of US NFCs‖ (Crotty, 2005: 79). By pursuing short-term profit in the stock market 
for the purpose of maintaining shareholder value rather than seeking long-term 
management, NFCs have poured their capital into the stock market and sustained the 
bubble mechanism. For example, ―in 1998 alone, NFCs made net purchases worth $267 
billion, over 30 percent of cash flow that year. From 1995 to 2001, NFCs purchased $870 
billion of their own stock, helping prolong the bubble.‖57 The growing tendency towards 
financialisation of US NFCs has, instead of enhancing productivity and capital accumulation 
of NFCs, proved harmful for them. This is because coerced investment leads to an increase 
in indebtedness.  
The productivity of NFCs in Korea has also been radically dragged down in 
conjunction with the structural shakeup of financial initiatives. According to the Korea 
Productivity Center, the industrial productivity rate fell drastically from 18% to 5%overthe 
10 years (1999–2009) after the financial crisis. Employment and reinvestment rates were also 
decreased by 3% and 8% respectively.58 These data clearly show that, unlike what the 
dominant financial narratives tell us, financial liberalisation, characterised by extrapolation 
of transactional orientation in commercial banks and NFCs, is not helpful for the nation‘s 
general economy. It is not for the majority but for ―a particular class and a sector of the 
                                            
57  Business Week, 1 July, 2002: 30. Escalating asset prices, according to Parenteau, are directly 
associated with the ―macrodynamics asset bubble.‖ This spreads to individual actors, given the fact 
that ―[r]ising asset prices can act as a financial accelerant on investment spending and a financial 
depressant on the desired household savings rate thereby shifting the investment accelerator function 
and the consumer expenditure multiplier enough to fuel boom conditions in the economy. Booming 
economic conditions in turn appear to validate and further inflate the asset price bubble. A self-
amplifying feedback loop is introduced, taking portfolio positions and the economy far from a 
sustainable dynamic equilibrium‖ (Parenteau, 2005: 111). Bubble dynamics area ―latent tendency of 
asset markets that can endogenously emerge under the right conditions‖ (Parenteau, 2005: 115). 
58 “Manufacturing Without Employment,‖ Kyunghyang Daily Newspaper, 18 August, 2009 (In Korean). 
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economy‖ that ―benefited from the crisis in amazing proportions‖ (Duménil, 2005: 18).This 
is where ―cognitive dissonance‖ is sutured by the collective intervention of financial 
narrators, whose ―euphoric episode is protected and sustained by the will of those who are 
involved in order to justify the circumstances that are making them rich. And it is equally 
protected by the will to ignore, exorcise or condemn those who express doubts‖ (Parenteau, 
2005: 127–128). 
The prevalence of investment banking in commercial banking and non-financial 
corporations directly influences the investment patterns of individual investors in Korea. 
Kookmin Bank, under the control of Goldman Sachs, aggressively recommended that 
individual investors open accounts related to stock investment funds, in an effort to reduce 
the institution‘s reliance on the corporate loan business; this can be seen as a fundamental 
transformation of Korean individual investors‘ buy and hold mentality and attitude. 
According to a report, the bank opened more than 450,000 individual accounts worth $1.1 
billion in 2004 and ―[a]ll in all, the money is rolling back into equity investments, helping to 
push funds under management to an estimated $204 billion this year [2005], up from $140 
billion just two years ago.‖59 Sales of fund products by major banks have been soaring, from 
17% in 2003 to 27% in 2004 and 32% in 2005, of which individual investors formed the major 
portion, occupying 66% in 2004 and 80% in 2005. With the boom in fund investment, as of 
2009, the number of fund products in Korea is 9,512, with more than 10 million individual 
accounts, putting the country first in the world in terms of fund products offered, ahead of 
Luxembourg (9,196), France (8,240), the US (8,051), Brazil (4,302), and Japan (3,376).60 
 
Cognitive Dissonance and Operativity of Information in Financialisation 
 
As we have seen, financialisation is a process of involving financial institutions, non-
financial institutions, and individual actors in financial fluctuations at the expense of long-
term stability, growth, and employment. By maintaining the bubble mechanism, which is 
inherent in the stock market, the process conceals the reality and the cost the majority of 
people have to pay, reconfiguring its operation as an irrevocable procedure in the evolution 
of the capitalistic mode of production. Necessitating financialisation by accompanying the 
bubble mechanism with transactional orientation as a legitimate process in the realisation of 
                                            
59 ―Fund Frenzy Hits Korea,‖ BusinessWeek, 14 March, 2005. 
60 ―Korea World No.1 in the Number of Fund Products,‖ Hankyoreh Daily Newspaper, 13 August, 2009 
(In Korean). 
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dominant value, financial capitalism re-describes cognitive dissonance. The collective 
information produced by financial narrators that transcodes the dissonance as consonance 
grounds the field of cognitive operation beyond the economic diagnosis; thus it functions as 
a source of performativity and operativity by guiding cognition and action for actors. With 
the operativity of information, the real economy is transformed in terms of financial 
rationale. Analysing the relationship between real value and financial expectation, 
Parenteau points out that the operativity of information is a ―disinformation campaign,‖ 
through which the cognitive dissonance of financial mania is effectively contained: 
 
Management, in their single-minded attempt to enhance shareholder value (now that 
they too are shareholders), learned how to take the management of Wall Street analyst 
expectations to a higher level as well. With the evolving campaign to obscure earnings, 
it is no surprise that analyst earnings expectations came to bear no relation to the 
sinking profitability visible in the national income accounts during the latter half of the 
1990s. After all, cognitive dissonance is much easier to breed amidst the fog of a 
disinformation campaign. (Parenteau, 2005: 131) 
 
As this disinformation campaign is ―made most urgent by the alignment of management 
interests with shareholder interests intended by the granting of stock options as 
management compensation‖ (Parenteau, 2005: 131), it prioritises short-term financial 
interests for shareholders over long-term investment and stability, and thus accelerates the 
departure of financial markets from the real economy. In the end, financial rationale 
becomes the main engine influencing the restructuring of the real economy, in terms of 
financial initiatives. The financial rationale, which transcodes the adverse effects of 
financialisation of the nation‘s economy as a process of legitimisation and normalisation of 
value-production and realisation, is actualised through collective intervention of 
information. Through this a meta-frame of cognition and expectations of individual actors is 
informed and activated. With a lack of information and technical and theoretical skills, 
individual investors become trend-followers in financial markets in order to identify the 
dominant value, for ―[w]hile widespread adoption of computers and the internet have 
surely democratized the tools for trading, such information has not led to more informed 
investment decision making by individuals. Rather, it has facilitated the identification of 
asset price trends, fostered momentum investing and for a while at least, made momentum 
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investing a self-fulfilling prophecy‖ (Parenteau, 2005: 118). It is a mechanism of financial 
flows, where the main players‘ initiatives create momentum for identifying future value for 
individual investorswho do not generally have the information power to modulate the 
trends.61 However, the financial narrator‘s view conceals this inequality in the information 
game, transcoding the undemocratic situation as the democratic field of information, which 
is portrayed as accessible to all participators in the market. Denouncing Greenspan‘s view 
that suggests that improved technology provides market participants with equal access to 
information, Parenteau criticises the financial narrator‘s performativity, which he thinks 
―primarily reinforces extrapolative behaviour‖ in rationalising the trend following 
behaviour of the actors: 
 
In Chairman Greenspan‘s view, the future is less opaque and more predictable given 
the improved information flow that technology has made available for the average 
investor. Yet in reality, precisely the opposite has emerged. Information flows have 
been employed by individual investors in a manner that primarily reinforces 
extrapolative behaviour. Extrapolative expectations behaviour seriously undermines 
the very basis of the asset pricing models constructed by efficient marketers. (Parenteau, 
2005: 118) 
 
The adaption of extrapolative information, such as prices, rumors, monetary policies, and 
the statements of financial narrators, by individual actors is an act of valorisation of risk and 
uncertainty. This applies especially with temporally reconfigured action, advancing the 
future in fluctuation of stock prices. In this sense, ―[t]he future that market participants seek 
to anticipate consists primarily of stock prices, not of fundaments,‖ because, ―[t]he 
fundamentals matter only insofar as they affect stock prices‖ (Parenteau, 2005: 121); this 
symptomatically and substantially shows the reversed relationship between the virtual and 
the real economy. What is at stake in individual actors identifying the fundamentals in the 
                                            
61 Trend-following in the financial market is, according to Orléan, ―mimetic rationality,‖ where the 
―the rationality of imitation in a situation of uncertainty is quite obvious in those cases where the 
model in fact has some knowledge about the value one is after.‖ In the financial markets, ―this kind of 
situation is formalized in numerous models of speculation with rational expectations, where two 
types of agentsthose with and without informationare distinguished‖ (Orléan: 1989: 77). As such, 
it is important to understand that for those uninformed agents, trend-following is a ‗formalized‘ 
rational choice, through which specularity becomes apparent. In this sense, ―[a] mimetic contagion of 
opinion is seen as the main explanation for speculative bubbles, be it a matter of describing the 
market‘s steady climb or its catastrophic crash‖ (Orléan: 1989: 76). 
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financial system, and thus in participating in financial markets, is that while the 
financialised propensity of institutional investors (motivated and enhanced by the 
transactional orientation of investment banking of financial and non-financial corporations) 
provides individual actors with a criteria of behaviour, the collective information of financial 
narrators, by supporting the behaviour as the legitimate action of dominant value-
production and transference, becomes the criteria of expectation, or anticipation. It aims to 
valorise the temporality of futurity, the future value, associated with flows of the dominant 
value.62 With this double operation, of reconfiguring the ontological and epistemological 
condition, financialisation is eventually set to function as the condition of performativity for 
the individual actor. The double operation is critical for the construction of reality, 
stimulating belief and guiding action, through which financial integrity, credit relations, and 
transactional orientation can be operated and maintained.  
Although it is thought that the process of adapting external information performed by 
individual actors can be heuristic, rather than coercive, it should be also noted that the actors 
cannot be free from the externality of information, given that trend-following is justified as a 
rational and irrefutable hypothesis. In this sense, the concept of, for example, a ―self-
fulfilling prophecy‖ whereby the behaviours and expectations of actors are justified in 
association with collective action, is no less than an economic convention, as we briefly 
mentioned at the beginning of the introduction. Analysing the famous Black and Scholes 
formula, which a foundation of the modern theory of finance, Callon explains that ―the 
Black-Scholes-Merton model can be self-fulfilling because it is all about the behaviors and 
                                            
62 The collective information, which here is narrative statements, according to Ricoeur, ―implies 
memory and prediction implies expectation‖ (Ricoeur, 1984: 10). For him narration is a critical device 
of valorization in futurity, as it can function as a causal sign, bringing things from the future into the 
present. We will investigate this further in Chapters 5 and 6. In relation to temporality and 
anticipation, Ricoeur continues: ―Now, what is to remember? It is to have an image of the past. How 
is this possible? Because this image is an impression left by events, an impression that remains in the 
mind‖ (Ricoeur, 1984: 10). ―Expectation is thus the analogue to memory. It consists of an image that 
already exists, in the sense that it precedes the event that does not yet exist (nondum). However, this 
image is not an impression left by things past but a ‗sign‘ and a ‗cause‘ of future things which are, in 
this way, anticipated, foreseen, foretold, predicted, proclaimed beforehand‖ (Ricoeur, 1984: 11). More 
importantly, prediction, with its signifying operation, has a ―predictive value of a hypothesis.‖ Here 
we instantiate through Black and Scholes model: ―Prediction is just the inverted statement of the 
explanation in terms of an if/then statement. One result is that the predictive value of a hypothesis 
becomes one criterion of the validity of an explanation, and the absence of a predictive value is a sign 
of the incomplete character of the explanation. This remark, too, has to apply to history‖ (Ricoeur, 
1984: 113). 
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human beings, and human beings depend on beliefs and expectations‖ (Callon, 2007: 322). 
He goes on: 
 
To predict economic agents‘ behaviors an economic theory does not have to be true; it 
simply needs to be believed by everyone. Since the model acts as a convention, it can be 
perfectly arbitrary. Even if the belief has no relationship with the world, the world ends 
up corresponding to it. We can thus consider that the famous Black and Scholes formula 
has no truth value, that it says nothing of real markets, and that it is simply a 
coordination tool that allows mutual expectations. It constitutes a false but effective 
representation, and can be seen as pure convention. (Callon, 2007: 322) 
 
This ―pure convention‖ is the performativity of the economic, with which even a false 
representation of reality can be described as ―effective.‖ What is at stake in this intervention 
of the economic, for producing a new ―convention‖ by guiding behaviour and expectation, 
is the effectiveness of a model in setting financial flowsrather than the appropriateness of 
a description of reality. By containing the ethical and social context in which the economic is 
located, the economic performativity of finance re-describes the world as existing in terms of 
its effectiveness. It can thus be thus said that the new economic intervention, which is 
implemented by a new hypothesis or assumption, is the operation of representation of 
financial cognitive dissonance. Here the fundamental difference between the reality and the 
new hypothesis is imaginatively sutured. In this sense, Milton Friedman, who is regarded as 
the designer of modern economics, and who was also successful in portraying unrealistic 
assumptions as normative economics, exposes an important mechanism of performativity of 
the economic hypothesis, which works to create a new reality: 
 
Truly important and significant hypotheses will be found to have ‗assumptions‘ that are 
wildly inaccurate descriptive representations of reality […] A hypothesis is important if 
it ‗explains‘ much by little […] if it abstracts the common and crucial elements from the 
mass of complex and detailed circumstances […] and permits valid predictions on the 
basis of them alone. To be important, therefore, a hypothesis must be descriptively false 
in its assumptions. (Friedman, ―The Methodology of Positive Economics,‖ quoted in 
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MacKenzie, 2008: 9–10)63 
 
It is no wonder that financial flows are becoming more and more detached from reality, 
given the fact that financial models, statements, and utterances,which support a 
―descriptively false‖ financial reality as the irrevocable evolution of the capitalistic mode of 
production in the name of financial liberalisationare based on assumptions bracketing 
―the common and crucial elements from the mass of complex and detailed circumstances.‖ 
The two processes of financialisation, which are the widespread application of investment 
banking techniques to commercial banks and non-financial corporations, prove to be 
detrimental to the structural stability and long-term growth rates of these sectors. But 
despite this, financial models and financial narratives legitimise the reality they describe 
mainly because, regardless of the flaws in their representation of current situations, they 
function as the source of predictions and further action. 
One of main financial narrators, Michel Camdessus, described the Korean financial 
crisis as a matter of a decaying ―old mansion‖ that could not be repaired without the radical 
intervention of ―an audaciously modern architect‖ of the Western financial system.64This 
statement did not just effectively conceal the fundamental and universal risk of financial 
contagion and entanglement on a global scale, but also operated as are presentation, or as a 
preliminary cognitive operation with which the necessity of radical imposition of action and 
anticipation was materialised in the performativity of the economic. The statement is 
undeniably performative, in that it guides action and cognition with its (il)locutionary force, 
thereby framing the distance between the subject and the object, and suggesting the 
necessity of overcoming the distance. It suggests producing the dominant value, through 
which a specific mode of financial production, transactional orientation of investment 
banking, is motivated and supported as financial liberalisation. This in turn leads to 
integration with the global market. According to Austin, the term ―performative‖ is used in 
                                            
63 Here it is important to note that, as Ricoeur puts it, ―the predictive value of a hypothesis,‖ rather 
than the appropriateness of the hypothesis as such, becomes the ―criterion of the validity.‖ That is, if 
the assumption of the hypothesis is not verifiable. ―Predictionis just the inverted statement of the 
explanation in terms of an if/then statement. One result is that the predictive value of a hypothesis 
becomes one criterion of the validity of an explanation, and the absence of a predictive value is a sign 
of the incomplete character of the explanation. This remark, too, has to apply to history‖ (Ricoeur, 
1984: 113). According to this explanation, prediction or assumption functions as the code of the truth 
claim, in that it accompany valorization of uncertainty through guiding expectation, even if ―the 
hypothesis must be descriptively false.‖ In this sense, prediction implies expectation towards the 
truth claim (Ricoeur, 1984: 10). 
64 ―Toward a New Financial Architecture for a Globalized World,‖ Chatham House, 1998. 
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a ―variety of cognitive ways and constructions, much as the term ‗imperative‘ is‖ (Austin, 
1976: 6). Since the word ―perform‖ is derived from the word ―action,‖ this indicates that ―the 
issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action‖ (Austin, 1976: 6). Therefore ―the 
uttering […] is, or is a part of, the doing of an action, which again would not normally be 
described as, or as ‗just,‘ saying something‖ (Austin, 1976: 5). A performative statement, 
uttered by the main financial narrator, in this regard becomes ―a code both legislative and 
communicative‖ (Bourdieu, 1992: 44), thus valorising cognitive dissonance into the ―sign of 
wealth‖: 
 
Linguistic exchangea relation of communication between a sender and a receiver, 
based on enciphering and deciphering, and therefore on the implementation of a code 
or a generative competenceis also an economic exchange which is established within 
a particular symbolic relation of power between a producer, endowed with a certain 
linguistic capital, and a consumer (or a market), and which is capable of procuring a 
certain material or symbolic profit. In other words, utterances are not only (save in 
exceptional circumstances) signs to be understood and deciphered; they are also signs of 
wealth, intended to be evaluated and appreciated, and signs of authority, intended to be 
believed and obeyed. (Bourdieu, 1992: 66, emphasis in original) 
 
The financialisation of post-financial crisis Korea was made possible through the imposition 
of such a ―sign of wealth,‖ which had ―to be believed and obeyed.‖ Investment banking, the 
true sign of wealth, was propagated as the quintessential hypothesis of ―an audaciously 
modern [financial] architect.‖This led to the fundamental structural change in the banking 
and non-banking sectors, transforming the criteria of behaviour and expectation of the 
actors through a temporal reconfiguration in realising value. Although more than fifteen 
years have passed since the Korean financial crisis, and even after the global credit crunch, 
the signs of wealth still haunt the countryand will continue to do so. 
 
Neoliberal Financialisation and the Changing Position of Korea after the Global Financial 
Crisis in 2008 
 
In this chapter we have explicated the process and impact of neoliberal economic 
restructuring in Korea that was initiated and undertaken by the IMF after the Korean 
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financial crisis in 1997, demonstrating that the neoliberal transformation was carried out 
through a financialisation of the countrynot just through financial institutions, but also 
through non-financial corporations (NFCs), where individuals were strongly affected in 
terms of financial rationale. We have also shown with hard data that the transformation was 
and has been detrimental, as it above all focused on short-term shareholder value rather 
than long-term initiatives of wealth redistribution. In this respect, we have pointed out that 
the ―neoliberal paradox,‖ following Crotty, which is clearly identified in contemporary 
capitalism, is propped up by intensifying and subsuming financialisation. While intense 
product market competition decreases the profit rate of NFCs to the point of stagnation, the 
financial market forces NFCs to ―generate ever-increasing earnings or face falling stock 
prices and the threat of hostile takeover‖ (Crotty, 2005: 79). Neoliberal financialisation is 
therefore caught up in coerced investment in order to sustain share value in the stock market; 
for example, NFCs in the US alone were reported to have purchased $870 billion of their 
own stock from 1995 to 200165 in an effort to prolong the bubble mechanism. The coerced 
investment naturally leads to profit rate fall and rising indebtedness. 
It is worth observing John Bellamy Foster‘s analysis in this context. He finds the causes 
of financialisation in the more fundamental structural features of capitalism, namely in a 
general tendency to stagnation. To break the deadlock of this stagnation tendency, 
capitalism regenerates monopoly finance as the new mode of capital accumulation. With a 
close observation of the causes of the financial crises since the nineteenth century, Foster 
argues that financial expansion in developed capitalist countriesincluding the U.S.—is 
―symptomatic of the underlying stagnation tendency that has its roots in the whole pattern 
of accumulation under monopoly-finance capital‖ (Foster, 2009: 19-20). Therefore it is the 
stagnation tendency that drives the financialisation of the economy. The neoliberal paradox 
is once again confirmed here in terms of stagnation and ever-expanding financialisation. 
Stagnation and finance are symbiotic in facing the economic impasse. According to Foster, 
the symbiosis has ―three crucial aspects that can also reveal fundamental causes and 
directions of financial crisis‖: 
 
(1) The stagnation of the underlying economy meant that capitalists were increasingly 
dependent on the growth of finance to preserve and enlarge their money capital. (2) 
The financial superstructure of the capitalist economy could not expand entirely 
                                            
65 Business Week, 1 July, 2002: 30. 
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independently of its base in the underlying productive economy – hence the bursting 
of speculative bubbles was a recurrent and growing problem. (3) Financialization, no 
matter how far it extended, could never overcome stagnation within production. 
(Foster, 2009: 83) 
 
Foster‘s view provides a more systematic insight into the causes of financialisation, which 
are in direct association with the stagnation tendency inherent in capitalism. It is important 
to see in the stark explanations the idea that the speculative bubble mechanism cannot be 
sustained in the long-term, as it will not be able to become completely detached from the 
real economy in the end. The necessity of a neoliberal disinformation campaign, or 
Neoliberal Though Collective (NTC), to use Mirowski‘s terminology, arises at this locus of 
paradox to mask and thereby revalorise the irrevocable truth of stagnation and its dilemma. 
The disinformation campaign, actualised through the collective and concerted intellectual 
interventions of the main financial narrators, constantly transcodes the adverse effects of 
financialisation as a legitimate process of value realisation and reproduction.  
Mirowski notes certain concerted interventions, such as the operative feature of NTC, 
whose involvement is not to act on an economic model but to construct an economic model 
that justifies the market as a self-sufficient entity. The ―injunction to act in the face of 
inadequate epistemic warrant is,‖ as he contends, ―the very soul of constructivism, an 
orientation sometimes shared with the field of science studies, and the very soul of the 
Neoliberal Thought Collective‖ (Mirowski, 2013: 53). In this sense, neoliberalism is seen as a 
collective epistemic operation that constructs the conditions of a model, or a hypothesis, 
which is no less than the economic performativity of representation in our analysis. 
 
The starting point of neoliberalism is the admission, contrary to classical liberal 
doctrine, that their vision of the good society will triumph only if it becomes reconciled 
to the fact that the conditions for its existence must be constructed, and will not come 
about ―naturally‖ in the absence of concerted political effort and organization. As 
Foucault presciently observed in 1978 ―Neoliberalism should not be confused with the 
slogan ‗laissez-faire,‘ but on the contrary, should be regarded as a call to vigilance, to 
activism, to perpetual interventions.‖ (Mirowski, 2013: 53) 
 
As we substantiated when examining Milton Friedman‘s bold tenet of narrative 
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representation of the neoliberal project in this chapterwhich supports a descriptively false 
financial reality as the irrevocable evolution of the capitalistic mode of production in the 
name of financial liberalizationit is interesting to turn to Mirowski to underscore this use 
of narrative as a crucial attribute of NTC, one which constructs the market as a self-sufficient 
model in containing market failuresalthough he does not develop the notion of narrative 
further in his analysis. 
 
Neoliberals conventionally reject all such recourse to defects or glitches, in favor of a 
narrative where evolution and/or ―spontaneous order‖ brings the market to ever more 
complex states of self-realization, which may escape the ken of mere humans. This 
explains why the NTC has rejected out of hand all neoclassical ―market failure‖ 
explanations of the crisis. (Mirowski, 2013: 56) 
 
Mirowski argues that the financial crisis is an epistemic phenomenon that holds up NTC 
interventions in the financial crisis as a point of construction of ―spontaneous order‖ for 
revalorising the system.66 We have already analysed that definition and representation of 
the crisis given through financial narrative interventions support the mechanism of self-
valorisation of financial capital, which corresponds to constant contradictions in the 
exploitation of the uncertainty of the crisis. These are the actual implementations of a 
narrative practice of finance, through which the problem of ever-growing systematic defects 
of indebtedness and stagnation is continuously sutured in the epistemic operation. The 
contradictions and the financial crisis function as a leverage point for neoliberal 
restructuring, by which, as exemplified in the Korean financial crisis, financialisation of the 
banking sector, non-financial corporations, and individual actors is critically generated and 
motivated. 
Greg Albo in this respect suggests that the financial crisis reinforces neoliberalism 
rather than undermines it, which is the ―central paradox,‖ yet at the same time an ―integral 
                                            
66 In paralleling the uncertainty of the financial crisis and the intervention of the NTC, Mirowski 
figuratively yet aptly asserts that the NTC‘s operation is based on performing an uncertainty that 
manufactures ignorance, which is ironically termed ―agnotology‖: ―[t]he deployment of agnotology is 
a major hallmark of the neoliberal collective […] From this perspective, the crisis is, in the first 
instance, an epistemological phenomenon. The beauty of the manufacture of ignorance is that it has 
proven an ideal short-term response to unanticipated surprises: when disaster hits, and reformers 
proposes to strike while the iron is hot with their nostrums and antidotes, the Neoliberal Thought 
Collective can stymie them and can buy time by filling the public sphere with fog‖ (Mirowski, 2013: 
344). 
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feature‖ of the system. Financial crises thereby provide ―developmental features of 
neoliberalism‖: 
 
The fault-line internal to financial capital of breeding financial crises and speculative 
bubbles—in the pursuit, as Marx phrased it, of ―money begetting money‖—must be 
interpreted with these integral features in mind. This is the key to unlocking a central 
paradox of neoliberalism within American capitalism: financialization gives rise to such 
financial volatility that crises actually become one of the developmental features of neoliberalism, 
and this reinforces rather than undermines the central position of financial interests in 
capitalist power structures. (Greg Albo et al., 2010: 35, emphasis in original) 
 
Under the process of neoliberal financialisation the role of the state is redefined ―to meet the 
new imperatives of financialization‖ (Foster, 2009: 84). Thus a ―primary ambition of the 
neoliberal project is to redefine the shape and functions of the state, not to destroy it” 
(Mirowski, 2013: 56, emphasis in original). However the state is doubly implicated in 
financial geopolitics, which will be further explicated in the case of the Brady Plan in the 
final chapter. While the role of the borrowing state is greatly reduced to guarantor of risk, or 
lender of last resort responsible for the risk of private sector debt as well as sovereign debt in 
support of conditionalities imposed upon it, the role of the dominant states, which oversee 
global debt conditions through international financial institutions, is ever more powerful 
over indebted countries. Our examination of the Brady Plan will clearly show how 
commercial banks backed by the U.S., Europe, and Japan became the main creditors to debt-
ridden countries, imposing heavy sanctions on the states in planning and implementing 
economic policies such as capital flow and interest-rate setting.  
I will briefly reflect and update on the changing role of Korea and the limitations in the 
contemporary context of the post-2008 credit crunch crisis. It will then give an insight into 
how Korea has been transformed since the neoliberal financial restructuring, and how the 
change affects the country after the crisis in 2008. Through this, we will see the neoliberal 
financialisation and its subsumption mechanism more clearly, in terms of how the object is 
activated in the objectifying field of main value (the global financial market) set by the 
subject and its criteria. At surface level, the subsumption process seems successful, as Korea 
has, for instance, been awarded enhanced membership in the IMF reform of ‗quota and 
voice.‘ But the subject effect is the subjectivation of object, which internalises limited 
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conditionality as a condition of participation into the system and thus transforms itself into a 
model of a heroic investor without fear of risk taking and indebtedness, as we will also see 
in Chapter 8. As will be closely examined in the case of the international debt framework of 
the Brady Plan, the formation of pseudo-subjectivity is therefore revealed as a concrete 
exemplar of subjection or subjectivation of the object in the financialisation of Korea. In this 
respect the Korean financial crisis and the tendencies of far-reaching financialisation can be 
seen as an actual instance of the subsumption mechanism of the financial systemin which 
the formation of a new economic subjectivity of the object is finally activated.  
To see the reality more closely, I will briefly recapitulate the distinctive data that show 
what was brought about in the Korean financial crisis and the successive neoliberal financial 
restructuring in a global context. With this information on the table, I will suggest three 
attributes (the intensifying coupling movement of the Korean financial market with global 
financial markets; the increased quota in the membership in the IMF; and the emergence of a 
new regional economic block by BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and 
Asia) as the most conspicuous tendencies of neoliberal financialisation in Korea—all of 
which clearly reflect the changing role of Korea in bearing new economic subjectivity and 
identity under the subsumption process into the international financial system. 
 
Neoliberal Financialisation in Korea and Global Context 
 
In the beginning of the chapter we have demonstrated the key aspects of financial liberation 
in Korea undertaken by the IMF in detail. They were: radical financial market deregulation, 
tight fiscal policy (public spending cuts and high interest rates), and labour market 
flexibility, all of which were concerted to reducing the autonomy of the Korean government 
in economic planning and financial management and thus interlocking the economy with 
the global financial markets. Indeed, the forceful implementation of the new economic 
prescriptions brought fundamental changes in the Korean financial market that can, above 
all, be characterised as an intensifying coupling with global financial markets—at its apex 
with the U.S. As exemplified, following the provisions of the IMF bailout plan, the Korean 
government deregulated the limit on foreign ownership of listed firms in the Korean stock 
market. Within a couple of years, foreign ownership soared from 4 to 50%, both on an 
aggregate and individual basis, allowing foreign investors to hold the position of main 
shareholder. The total amount of stock bought by foreign investors in the Korean financial 
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market more than quadrupled to 42% in 2004 from 9% in 1997.67 This fundamental change 
transformed the Korean stock market, interweaving it with the global financial movement 
and introducing fluctuation in short-term profit realization. 
According to a financial report on the patterns of foreign stock buyers in the Korean 
market, the turnover rate of foreign investors has increased at an astonishing rate, to 91.3% 
in 2002. In 1996, the turnover rate was 53.8%. By contrast, the turnover rates of institution 
traders and individual traders in Korea decreased to 49% and 56% respectively during the 
same period.68 The rising turnover rate reaffirms the transactional orientation and short-
term profit realisation of foreign investors, who are mostly American and European 
investment banks and hedge-funds, which was illustrated in this chapter. Due to the volume 
of and information from foreign investors, their movements were keenly perceived as an 
index of trendsetting in the daily stock market, which proved their prevailing influence. It 
was therefore paralleled in the report, such that when foreign investors bought more stocks 
than they sold, the KOSPI (Korea Composite Stock Price Index) rose 0.33%; when they sold 
the stocks, the index fell 0.75% in average daily terms.69 This meant that the Korean stock 
market came under the critical influence of foreign buyers. 
However, with regard to the changing pattern of financial behaviour of Korea and its 
subsumption into the global context after neoliberal financialisation, a more significant 
transformation can be found in the tendency towards an intensified coupling with global 
financial fluctuations. As the influence of foreign investors became prevalent in the Korean 
stock market, their modulations in alignment with the global financial climate became more 
and more directly reflected in the domestic financial reality. In this respect, and following a 
recent analysis, the distinctive feature of this coupling tendency can be identified in three 
ways: first, this tendency was found to have been strengthened since the global financial 
crisis in 2008; second, the tendency has been more conspicuously present in times of global 
financial volatility and unrest; and finally, the coupling movement started to diversify with 
newly emerging financial centres—particularly with the Chinese stock markets and Europe, 
beyond the ever-dominant U.S. and Japan. 70  Although these changes are directly 
intertwined with the ever-growing number of foreign investors in the Korean stock market, 
                                            
67 Dong-A Ilbo (Dong-A Daily Newspaper), 6 Jan 2009; ―Weekly Economy Report,‖ LG Economy 
Research Institute, 9 June 2004. (In Korean) 
68 ―Weekly Economy Report,‖ LG Economy Research Institute, 9 June 2004. 
69 Ibid. 
70 ―LG Business Insight,‖ LG Economy Research Institute, 23 May 2012. (In Korean) 
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they are also implicated in the activation of the new economic subjectivity Korea is now 
identifying in the objectifying field of value. After the financial liberalization, Korean public 
and private institutions were equipped with financial portfolio techniques operating within 
their own financial components or via external investment or funding sources, as shown in 
the chapter. As a result of this, their investment portfolios have now diversified to include 
China and other newly-emerging economies. In reflecting these changes, the correlation 
rates of the KOSPI index with the MSCI (Morgan Stanley Capital International) World index 
covering global stock market indexes, rapidly increased to 0.460 points after the global 
financial crisis in 2008. Before the Korean financial crisis in 1997, the index point had been 
0.118.71 This distinctive tendency towards co-movement and an increase in reliance on 
global financial markets provide further evidence that the Korean financial market has been 
extensively tied to global markets, exposing it to external risk factors and thus making it 
susceptible to global financial volatility. 
With the accelerated integration into the global financial system, Korea has acquired a 
new position in the global context, with more shares in the IMF operation, which is known 
as ‗quota and voice‘ reform. We have explained the alteration in terms of IMF reform after 
the financial crisis in 2008 in Chapter2. But the real point is to be found in the way in which 
the subject interpellates the object in the coordinates of value objectification, and then 
activates the object by insinuating the position of the subject. With the so-called ‗quota and 
voice‘ reform, it seems that the position of Korea in an international economic context is 
qualitatively transformed from the object of rescue (by the IMF loan package) to a subject 
participating in the management of the institution. As observed, the G20 summit in London 
in 2009 received wide and critical attention, as it was held right after the global financial 
crisis, which was triggered by the collapse of the American subprime mortgage industry, to 
avert widespread fear of further financial unrest and global recession. Whilst the summit 
focused on stimulating the national and international economy, inputting massive funds 
($1.1 trillion for restoring credit, employment, and growth), the real agenda was 
singlehandedly focused on radically enhancing the role and function of the IMF as the 
omnipresent financial apparatus of the global financial system.72 
     The G20 summit endorsed the IMF as the legitimate mediator and regulator, enforcing 
access to macroeconomic prescription and action through the IMF. Without rectifying the 
                                            
71 Ibid. 
72 The G-20 Statement, 2 April, 2009 (http://www.londonsummit.gov.uk/en/summit-aims/summit-
communique) 
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institution‘s consecutive mishandlings of previous regional financial crises—including 
Korea—the summit authorised it to act as the unilateral financial institution through the 
reform, in an alleged ‗quota and voice‘ restructuring of governance of the institution, in turn 
based on the portion of funding for IMF resources. Under the new contribution and 
membership program, Korea‘s contribution was drastically increased more than twenty 
times, from $500 million to $10.5 billion.73 
The influence on the IMF from Washington, however, does not show any sign of 
significant moderation, as the ‗voices‘ of the main players, such as the US, Europe, and Japan, 
would have still more power in making decisions. In this respect, in line with the increased 
funding contributions of the emerging economies—including BRICS and Korea—their 
shares were supposed to be raised to up to 6 percent (in case of China), which is average rate 
of advanced countries other than the U.S. (who hold 17 percent). It was, however, reported 
that the raising of shares (voice) for emerging countries was still ―met with conflict from the 
advanced nations and the emerging economies‖74 in the G20 summit in Seoul in 2010. The 
G20 summit in Seoul reached an agreement that the quota and voice share of BRICS 
countries would be moved up to the top ten share positions, with Korea being the 16th.75 
The necessity of restructuring the governance of the IMF surfaced due to a lack of resources, 
especially after the financial crisis 2008. Without contributions from emerging economies, 
which were subsequently reflected in quota increases, the funding and coordination of the 
IMF would no longer have been feasible. However, the real transformation in the 
governance of the IMF was yet to be accomplished. 
The new position of Korea in the IMF was highly welcomed by the mainstream media 
in Korea, who widely interpreted the change as a recognition of the country as an economic 
powerhouse of the institution.76 Given that Korea was under IMF trusteeship just 15 years 
ago, the change meant a qualitatively different era had begun, in which the country held 
some status as well as influential membership, in the financial world order. Unlike the 
appreciative rhetoric murmured by the conservative camp, it is still unsubstantiated 
whether the increased portion of financial contribution could lead to real transformation in 
the structure of governance in the IMF. With regard to this point, a more meaningful and 
critical change is sensed throughout BRICS and Asia—including Korea—reflecting a move 
                                            
73 E-Today Daily Online Newspaper, 1 June 2010. (In Korean) 
74 Korea Herald, ‗Over 6% of Quota to Move to Emerging Economies,‘ 23 October 2010. 
75 Korea Herald, ‗IMF Faces Hugh Governance Reforms,‘ 24 October 2010. 
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of divergence from the U.S., Europe, and Japan as the leaders of a dominant global financial 
order represented by the IMF and the World Bank. 
On 15 July 2014, after the sixth BRICS summit in Fortaleza, Brazil, the five presidents 
of these countries reached a historic agreement to create the New Development Bank (NDB) 
and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), ―with the purpose of mobilizing resources 
for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging and 
developing economies.‖77 NDB and CRA will both have a $100 billion fund for concerted 
operations towards financial crisis response, as well as development lending for emerging 
economies.78 The move has been widely regarded as a counter-movement to the IMF-
centred global financial order. The long-standing dissatisfaction with the IMF and the failure 
of recent ‗reform‘ of quota and voice resulted in this new economic block, which holds 
separate financial arrangements in a global context. The inner demand of the IMF reform, 
particularly by BRICS and other emerging economies, was to enhance their voice following 
increase share, but this has been disregarded by the U.S. House of Representatives for more 
than four years. The Fortaleza Declaration clearly points this out in Clause 18: 
 
We remain disappointed and seriously concerned with the current non-
implementation of the 2010 International Monetary Fund (IMF) reforms, which 
negatively impacts on the IMF‘s legitimacy, credibility and effectiveness. The IMF 
reform process is based on high-level commitments, which already strengthened the 
Fund's resources and must also lead to the modernization of its governance structure 
so as to better reflect the increasing weight of EMDCs (Emerging Market Economies 
and Developing Countries) in the world economy. The Fund must remain a quota-
based institution. We call on the membership of the IMF to find ways to implement the 
14th General Review of Quotas without further delay. We reiterate our call on the IMF 
to develop options to move ahead with its reform process, with a view to ensuring 
increased voice and representation of EMDCs, in case the 2010 reforms are not entered 
into force by the end of the year. We also call on the membership of the IMF to reach a 
final agreement on a new quota formula together with the 15th General Review of 
Quotas so as not to further jeopardize the postponed deadline of January 2015. 
 
                                            
77 Sixth BRICS Summit – Fortaleza Declaration (http://brics6.itamaraty.gov.br/media2/press-
releases/214-sixth-brics-summit-fortaleza-declaration). 
78 Xinhwa Press, ‗BRICS Forges Stronger Economic Partnership,‘ 16 July 2014. 
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The new financial coordination of BRICS was, however, often met with strong scepticism by 
the mainstream western media.79 For instance, The New York Times diagnoses that, due to 
internal division, political unrest, and divisive agenda among the members, BRICS will have 
difficulty in formulating a concerted global financial operation like the World Bank and the 
IMF, and thus falls short of being a counterweight to the West. However, on the other hand 
it is also seen as a critical step towards ―a challenge to western economic supremacy‖ by 
rejecting the neoliberal economic model.80 
Along with the establishment of a new BRICS-led global financial institution, there has 
been another important movement in Asia, which can be read as another sign of divergence 
from the neoliberal financial system. In 2000, Asian countries tried to form an alternative 
funding source that would mobilise and share an emergency fund in case of looming 
financial crisis in the region. This was to avoid repeating the predicament faced by these 
countries in the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, facilitating regional cooperation without 
harming the autonomy of each member country. This shared concern was initiated as the 
Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM), with the wide participation of ‗ASEAN+3‘ 
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations plus China, Korea, and Japan). The initiation of the 
plan by the thirteen countries was accelerated after the European financial crisis of 2008, and 
eventually took effect in March 2014 with the expected reserve pooling a total of $240 billion, 
to which Korea would contribute about $40 billion. Unlike the operation of the dominant 
financial apparatuses, such as, the IMF and the World Bank, CMIM was allegedly designed 
to give more weight to smaller economies, accorded no right of veto by more powerful 
countries. In Korea, the implementation of CMIM was generally seen to be a meaningful 
movement for enhancing the region‘s financial safeguard. Along with the growing amount 
of foreign currency reserve—tantamount to $360 billion as of May 2014, which is the world‘s 
7th largest foreign reserve—the creation of multilateral funding mobilisations such as the 
CMIM was thought to effectively increase safety measures. 
Both the BRICS-centred new financial arrangements and the new financial 
organisation of the CMIM in Asia can be seen as meaningful divergences from the dominant 
neoliberal financial system, in both of which China became the foundational and driving 
force. In this changing global financial context, Korea will strive to balance in the existing 
order and the emerging order. But in terms of global capitalism, in which the capitalistic 
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mode of production is more and more dependent on finance and its operations to maximise 
its money capital and overcome the general tendency of stagnation, the main propensity of 
financialisation will be more consolidated. In this respect, regardless of internal inflection in 
a global financial order—such as new financial arrangements in BRICS and Asia—the 
tendency of financialisation is expected to be more pervasive and extensive as long as the 
system recourses to finance as the dominant mode of capitalistic production. Korea is also 
trapped in this paradox. 
After the Korean financial crisis in 1997 and the global financial crisis in 2008, the 
position of Korea is more thoroughly intertwined with the financial system, in existing 
global financial institutions, or in the newly emerging regional block with an allegedly 
enhanced status. A critical question should be posed in the context of neoliberal 
financialisation. Korea has been desperately looking for a safer and sounder financial 
reshaping in alignment with global financial criteria. Yet, however sound it maybe on the 
surface level, the change was made possible at the expense of the economic autonomy of the 
nation, exposing the country to more risks involved with foreign money—as detailed in the 
intensifying coupling with global financial market and thus increased dependency on the 
neoliberal financial system. In this respect, the changing position and role of Korea, 
represented as enhanced membership in the IMF along with its new membership in 
‗ASEAN+3‘ and its capability to respond to a possible financial crisis, cannot conceal the 
damaging consequences on the economy from deepening financialisation, which ―could 
never overcome stagnation within production,‖ as Foster points out (Foster, 2009: 83). The 
internal consequences of financial market dependency, soaring household debt, and 
excessive polarisation as the symptom of neoliberal financialisation have been left unsettled, 
although Korea sought to improve the financial index such that it could fit external financial 
criteria without resolving its internal predicaments.81 The subject effect undergone by Korea 
in the global financial context can thereby be reaffirmed as a process of the subjection of the 
object. The further financialisation extends in order to conceal the irreversible structural 
tendency of stagnation and recurring financial boom-burst cycles, the more the narrative 
operation by the main narrators will be intensified to refine its allodoxia—a truth claim that 
                                            
81 It was reported that from 2001, average household debt exceeds average household income for the 
first time and the tendency has been accelerating ever since. After the global financial crisis 2008, it 
was so exacerbated that the ratio of households with debt three times their income reached 20%. The 
tendency, as the report pointed out, was fuelled by economic stimulation through public money 
injection as a form of lending by the government. ―Korean Economy Trapped into Debt,‖ Hankyoreh, 
10 Jan 2011. 
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is made on the basis of mis- or false information, as explicated in Chapter 2 and in the 
following chapter—in order to justify the legitimacy of economic prescriptions for the 
furthering of financialisation. 
Chapter 5 will in this respect demonstrate the practices and functions of financial 
narrative in detail, particularly of the IMF and World Bank throughout the Korean financial 
crisis. Narrative operation problematises a crisis-in-the-making even before the event 
becomes the preliminary cognitive frame and before subsequent political action. To 
underscore that narrative is the structure of meaning-making around the event, with the 
grounding of foreknowledge and its ensuing performative procedures, the chapter examines 
narrative truth claims, allodoxia. This functioning narrative truth claim works as a device of 
consent by replacing the socio-political procedure. In this regard, the chapter also shows 
narrative explanations provided by the US government and intelligence, as well as the 
Korean government, contribute to the portrayal of shock-therapy as a legitimate process of 
restructuring in the Korean economy. This reveals that the process of identification of 
subjective valuefrom the objectand its subjectivation in activation in the financial system 
work by associating the intentions of the financial narrators with the formation of economic 
subjectivity. To develop the theoretical concerns further, and with regards to the formation 
of economic subjectivity in financial narrative operation, the following chapter instantiates 
the concrete strategies of narrative intervention and representation. It shows that these are a 
specific mechanism of cultural as well as economic subsumption which valorise the 
uncertainty. I situate the IMF in the making of narrative junctures through the Korean 
financial crisis, whereby the intention of the system is represented informs of narrative 
accounts. What narrative aims at, I argue in this chapter, is the bringing about of 
problematic certainty through uncertainty, by guiding purposeful action. Through these 
contingent meanings and relations surrounding the crisis are transformed into a stable and 
practical relation. Above all, this occurs through the imposition of narrative reality. 
As such I will specifically examine how the main narrative agentsinternational 
financial apparatuses, credit rating firms, and governmentsinsinuate narrative 
interpretations as hermeneutic procedures. We see narrative articulations and performative 
criteria replacing political changes, affecting ownership and actualising and implementing 
the new value relationship. Investigating instances of narrative intervention by financial 
narrators in the Korean financial crisis in terms of political action as well as preliminary 
cognitive operation, I identify instances of this intervention supporting the subsequent 
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imposition of political intentions onto the economic event. With its explanatory effect, 
narrative necessitates the construction of the valuable by valorising external economic shock 
therapy. Narrative intervention in the Korean financial crisis justified the subsequent 
imposition of political intentions. It had an explanatory effect that transcoded economic 
uncertainty into problematic certainty, in the design of the economic structure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
121 
 
 
Chapter 5 
 
Narrative and RepresentationFrom Uncertainty To Problematic Certainty: 
Linguistic Exchange and Narrative Problematisation of the Korean Financial 
Crisis 
 
 
 
Associating narrative practice and speech act theory with the actual discourse of 
international and Korean financial authorities and bankers, based on which both cognition 
and actions towards new value production and transference is guided, we will in this 
chapter reveal how such discourse-making contributes to the problematisation of financial 
narrative. This narrative works as a performative force, or as cultural performativity, in the 
formation of the financial reality. To understand this process of value struggle and adoption, 
this chapter first observes how the main international financial apparatuses interpret the 
roots of the financial crisis in Korea, based on which a set of new values is inscribed in the 
local economy. This subsequently leads to value struggles and adaptation, suggesting that 
the definition of the crisis (as the politics of description and representation) are examples of 
grounding actual signifying practice. Through this practice the code of wealth is 
problematised and becomes the frame of valorisation. 
According to Bourdieu, the politics of description and representation are an essential 
part of the ―rite of institution‖ (Bourdieu, 1992: 117). This functions as social ―labour of 
dramatization‖ through ―labour of enunciation‖ in linguistic exchange (Bourdieu, 1992: 129, 
emphasis in original); for what the linguistic exchange pursues is the actualisation of ―power 
relations between the speakers and their respective groups‖ (Bourdieu, 1992: 37). It is 
important to note that this process of actualisation is performative, given that it insinuates 
cognition, recognition, and even misrecognition with regard to legitimacy. As such, the 
―arbitrary boundary‖ set by the narrative intervention of the institution becomes effective in 
the realisation of value-production and transference. Bourdieu insists that: 
 
[t]o speak of rites of institution is to suggest that all rites tend to consecrate or 
legitimate an arbitrary boundary, by fostering a misrecognition of the arbitrary nature of 
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the limit and encouraging a recognition of it as legitimate; or, what amounts to the 
same thing, they tend to involve a solemn transgression, i.e. one conducted in a lawful 
and extra-ordinary way, of the limits which constitute the social and mental order 
which rites are designated to safeguard at all costs […].‖ (Bourdieu, 1992: 118, 
emphasis in original) 
 
It is important to note that the rite of institution tends to legitimatise an ―arbitrary boundary 
by fostering a misrecognition‖ involving ―a solemn transgression‖―in a lawful and extra-
ordinary way.‖ Problematising this ―arbitrary boundary‖ entails a process of redefining 
―misrecognition of the arbitrary nature of the limit‖ as legitimate ―recognition.‖ In the case 
of the Korean financial crisis, this ―misrecognition‖ is represented through the 
(dis)information campaign, which we analysed in Chapter 3. It aims at transcoding the 
necessity of the subsumption of the local, in order to problematise the ―misrecognition‖ as a 
legitimate ―recognition.‖ There is a redefinition of the local economy, through which the 
stark reality financial of restructuring causes is contained, and the narrative interventions of 
the international apparatuses describe as existing.  
In the intervention, it is suggested that moral and cultural leadership of the western 
financial regime should be reinforced, since the core regime, from which the local economy 
recognises its epistemological and economic distance, provides the local economy with an 
identity. This identity is such that it allows problematisation of the other to function through 
the margin of uncertainty in crisis. It is where a narrative discourse of crisis is at stake as the 
critical formation and actualisation of performance, with cultural as well as economic 
implications and practices, appropriating the temporary lacuna of forces in a crisis. These 
become the point of redefinition and, thus, reorganise the relationship between the narrator 
and the narratee, or the subject and the object. This cultural representation of narrative, 
according to Homi Bhabha, becomes ―political rationality‖ (Bhabha, 1990: 2) in the discourse 
of (trans)national identity. Reinterpreting Benedict Anderson‘s Imagined Communities, 
Bhabha contends that a nation is a process/result of narrative problemtisation. Narration 
takes the form of narrative wherein ―textual strategies, metaphoric displacements, sub-texts 
and figurative strategems‖ are systematically exercised for narrating the nation. (Bhabha, 
1990: 2) 
     The narrative intervention, from which the problematisation of the event is initiated, 
following McCloskey, conveys above all authorial intention, which is from our theoretical 
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concern the intention of the narrator. Creating an ―authorial audience‖ is to instigate the 
field of objectification. ―The entire game,‖ for instance, ―in a science such as biology or 
chemistry or economics is to evoke this submission to authorial intentions […] An economist 
expounding a result creates both an ‗authorial audience‘ (an imagined group of readers who 
know that this is fiction) and a ‗narrative audience‘ (an imagined group who do not)‖ 
(McCloskey, 1990: 12). Citing Peter Rabinowitz (1980: 245), McCloskey explains that ―‘the 
narrative audience of ―Goldilocks‖ believes in talking bears‘: the authorial audience knows 
it is fiction. The split between the two audiences created by the author seems weaker in 
economic science than in explicit fiction, probably because we all know that bears do not 
talk but we do not all know that marginal productivity is a metaphor‖ (McCloskey, 1990: 
12–13). McCloskey also emphasises the use of metaphor in economics, with which the 
―authorial audience‖ is introduced to economic discourse. We will demonstrate in this 
chapter how a problematisation of this ―arbitrary boundary‖ as a legitimate frame of 
reference was undertaken throughout the Korean financial crisis, with economic discourse 
performing with regards to the uncertainty of the critical instance. 
Attracting foreign capital, for instance, was the crucial catchphrase for the newly-
elected president Kim Dae-Jung in early 1998, right after financial panic had led to an 
exodus of foreign capital. He also had to cope with a strong demand for short-term loan 
repayments, which amounted to$25 billion in the three months from January to March of 
1998. Financial crisis, on a local level, created a vacuum of capital, with which the local 
economy had hitherto been totally unfamiliar and based on which, ironically, the force of 
capital was recognised as the dominant value in societynot just at the local level but on the 
international financial stage. Soon the imperative necessity of attracting foreign capital 
became the slogan of the new era as the code of wealth. This recognition, above all, of the 
urgency to overcome the contingency, effectively contributed to the grounding of a new 
financial narrative. The main narrator exemplified the performative standard for cognition 
and action in value production and transference. In this sense, such recognition, which is 
misrecognition for the general economy of the local, eventually turns into cultural 
performativity in the formation of financial reality. Reconceptualisation of the notion of 
necessity and value is the crucial thing we must note about the financial crisis, as observed 
in Chapter 2, whereby narrative intervention of financial institutions functions as ―the 
scheme of perception and thought‖ (Bourdieu, 1992: 128) at the margin of uncertainty. 
Bourdieu points out the relation between the ―constitutive power of language‖ and ―crisis,‖ 
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insisting that the extra-ordinary situation produces and, thus, justifies, an ―extra-ordinary 
kind of discourse‖: 
 
[…]the constitutive power of language, and of the schemes of perception and thought 
which it procures, is never clearer than in situations of crisis: these paradoxical and extra-
ordinary situations call for an extra-ordinary kind of discourse, capable of raising the 
practical principles of an ethos to the level of explicit principles which generate (quasi-) 
systematic responses, and of expressing all the unheard-of and ineffable characteristics 
of the situation created by the crisis. (Bourdieu, 1992: 128-129, emphasis in original) 
 
Crisis invites ―the constitutive power of language,‖ and financial narrators extrapolate the 
―extra-ordinary kind of discourse‖ for problematising the crisis as the frame of new 
cognition and action. This problematisation becomes ―the scheme of perception and thought‖ 
for narrative operation, and through this the crisis is recognised and, thus, ―generate[s] 
(quasi-) systematic responses.‖ With this redescription and representation of the old regime, 
entailing so-called self-fulfilling crisis factors (with which the weak link for the new financial 
regime is materialised as the problematisation of the event), a paradoxical and extra-
ordinary prescription and therapya ―shock doctrine‖is effectively promoted. Financial 
narrators express ―all the unheard-of and ineffable characteristics of the situation created by 
the crisis,‖ positioning the local country, focusing, in particular, upon the newly emerged 
financial system and making a ―call for an extra-ordinary kind of discourse.‖ This act of 
reinterpretation exposes the intentions of the financial system, whereby, in the local context, 
the necessities of incorporation into the financial system are effectively emphasised; and in 
the wider context, the international stability of the financial system is further consolidated 
with the subsumption of the variable. By analysing the problematisation practices of the 
main financial narrators in the crisis, this chapter argues that the narrative operation is 
simply as politics of representation, by which a local economic structure are recognised 
under the new value-creating system. After retracing the crucial occurrences in the Korean 
financial crisis, this chapter investigates the explanatory effect of the narrative operation. 
This is associated with illocutionary linguistic force as a process of (dis)information, which 
grounds the code of wealth in narrative politics. 
 
Rhetoric vs. Reality: Justifying the Allodoxia 
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Narrative intervention promotes a crisis-in-the-making. The grand narrative of the Korean 
financial crisis, regardless of the entanglement and transference of international finance 
capital within the local economy, was the urgency of financial deregulation in restoring 
foreign investors‘ confidence; foreign capital became the communicative as well as 
legislative code in the local economy. It was, thus, widely promulgated that attracting 
foreign capital would lead to improved circulation of capital, and this would contribute to 
the creation of work place and sound consumption. However, financial deregulation in 
Korea brought with it the vicious circle of the neoliberal economy, with its emphasis on 
short-term profits and shareholder value, and this led to deterioration in productivity of 
non-financial corporations, as observed in the previous chapter. It fundamentally 
reconfigured temporal consciousness for value realisation.  
What this sort of grand narrative works with is a form of allodoxical presentation, based 
on which the constructive totality of the system is effectively problematisedas I briefly 
suggested in the introduction. It is, therefore, a crucial constituent of the preliminary 
operation for cognition and action for the event. Although his explication of the liturgical 
conditions of language and crisis does not focus upon the actual aspects of value production 
and transference, Bourdieu hints at how the linguistic intervention of the authorities in a 
crucial phase of crisis operates, reconfiguring the false presentation, the allodoxia, as a truth 
claim in the name of the public good.82As such, he emphasises that the uncertainty of a crisis 
works as the engaging point for ―pre-vision‖ or ―theory effect‖ that can be decisively 
articulated with narrative intervention: 
 
The pre-vision or theory effect operates in the margin of uncertainty resulting from the 
discontinuity between the silent and self-evident truths of the ethos and the public 
expressions of the logos: thanks to the allodoxia made possible by the distance between 
                                            
82 As Ricoeur argues, a truth claim is conveyed through narrative description. But the truth claim is 
made over the ―particular occurrences,‖ which is ‗the event‘ in our analysis. By claiming truth over 
the partial instance, the claim transcodes particularity as universality, which, therefore, makes the 
claim allodoxia. ―So if history is characterized by statements that account for the truth of a particular 
occurrence in terms of its unintended consequences, the truth of the statements bearing on the 
subsequent events is important for the meaning of the narrative description. The theory of narrative 
sentences thus is valuable in a discriminating way as regards discourse about action in ordinary 
language. The discriminating factor lies in the ‗retroactive re-alignment of the Past‘ brought by the 
properly narrative description of action. This alignment is far-reaching. To the extent that the past is 
considered temporally in terms of unintended consequences, history tends to weaken the intentional 
accent in action.‖ (Ricoeur, 1984: 150) 
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the order of practice and the order of discourse, the same dispositions may be 
recognized in very different, sometimes opposing stances. (Bourdieu, 1992: 132-133)  
 
The ―allodoxia‖ is ―made possible by the distance between the order of practice and the 
order of discourse‖ ―in the margin of uncertainty‖ of crisis. False judgment and the process 
of its justification are unveiled, based on which the stark reality is containedboth for the 
order of discourse and the problematic of the dominant value. This is the disinformation 
campaign that the financial narrators eventually aim at. It can be more clearly demonstrated 
by approaching the performative narrative speeches of the financial institutions as acts of 
truth claim, or ―the allodoxia.‖ 
The 21st November, 2007, marked ten years since Korea was hit by the financial crisis 
and requested emergency financing from the IMF. In Korean society, most major media gave 
special coverage to reviews of the turmoil. Although more than a decade has now passed, 
the event still traumatises the public. It is, according to one daily newspaper, ―the ongoing 
event as the present continuous form.‖83  Twelve years ago, the day was commonly 
described as a national disgrace or humiliation day, and the face of the general director of 
the IMF was depicted as ―the face of the commander of the occupational army.‖84 Korea 
was under ―the IMF trusteeship.‖ The crisis was not just an economic disruption but a far-
reaching transformation of society, in which the prescription of financial institutions (open 
financial market through deregulation, financial and non-financial sector restructuring, and 
high interest rate policy for attracting foreign capital) was widely and forcefully 
implemented as the new rationale of the time.  
It is widely agreed that, when tracing the origins of the crisis in Korea, a series of 
bankruptcies of chaebols early in 1997 should be seen as the starting point. The investment 
boom in manufacture in Korea during, in particular, 1994–1996 attracted a massive influx of 
foreign capital. The dishonored chaebols have been criticised for their inappropriate 
investment behaviours, such as repeated and overlapping investments and expansion-
driven policies that caused a crisis in confidence. However, the role of international capital 
in the investment boom has been also widely pointed out. According to the Institute of 
International Finance, based in Washington, the influx of international private funds in four 
countries (Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines) soared from $45 billion in 1994 
                                            
83 ―Through the Eyes of the Victims: 10 Years of Financial Crisis,‖ Editorial, Chosun-Ilbo, 21 November, 
2007. 
84 Segye daily newspaper, 11 November, 1999. 
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to $93 billion in 1996. The capital involved was mostly speculative, aiming at high interest 
rate returns on a short-term basis.85 The overflowing transnational financial capitals were 
competing to find profitable investments in the emerging markets. In addition to the stock 
markets, in Thailand capital was concentrated in the property market; while in Korea it was 
heavily concentrated in the manufacturing sector. 
Hanbo, ranked the 14th biggest company in 1997, was rapidly expanding into the steel 
industry. At the time of its bankruptcy in January 1997, the total amount of debt of the 
company, borrowed from the prime and sub-prime financial market, was more than $5 
billion. Later, it was revealed that Hanbo had bribed financial officials to make such massive 
loans. What made the lending possible was a flood of foreign capital into the financial 
market. Whenever the conglomerate planned to expand its facilities, the major resource was 
foreign capital. After the default of the Hanbo group, between March and June, big 
corporations such as Sammi, Jinro, and Newcore collapsed consecutively, owing to the 
liquidity problem. On top of this, the sudden fall in value of the Thai Baht currency on the 
2nd of July was a severe blow to Korean economy, accelerating the flight of foreign capital. 
The liquidity crisis led almost immediately to the bankruptcy of Kia motors, which was the 
8th biggest chaebol in Korea.     
On the 14th August, the Indonesian currency crashed. After two weeks, the investment 
bank Morgan Stanley published an urgent report entitled ―Withdraw all the investment in 
Asia,‖ which, critically, justified the herd behaviour of the investors as the only rational 
choice. Following the news from Bloomberg that suggested that Korean foreign reserves 
amounted to $2 billion,86 Peregreen, a securities company in Hong Kong, released a report 
headlined ―Get out of Korea‖ on the 5th November. With the worsening liquidity situation, 
the government made a request for an IMF emergency loan on the 21st November. In 
accordance with the restructuring program, in January 1998, the Korean financial 
supervisory commission announced the names of fifty-five companies that had to be 
removed, while immediately closing five banks as one step in the implementation of 
financial reforms. As the restructuring program was executed to ‗enhance‘ labour flexibility 
in the labour market, the unemployment rate, which had been 2~3 percent throughout the 
1990s, soared to 12.2 % in 1998.  
                                            
85 Walden Bello, ―Asia‘s regression to low growth?‖ Chamsesang, 3 September, 1998 (In Korean). 
86 The actual amount of foreign reserve was, as of October 1997, $24 billion (Bank of Korea data). 
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*Table 1: GDP Growth Rates Since the Financial Crisis in Korea (Source: Korea Statistical Information 
Service) 
 
*Table 2: Number of Unemployed before and after the Financial Crisis in Korea (Source: Korea 
Statistical Information Service) 
 
*Table 3: Growth in the Number of Temporary Workers After the Financial Crisis in Korea (Source: 
Korea Statistical Information Service) 
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The data clearly show that the IMF intervention contracted the nation‘s economic growth, 
transforming the labour market from one based on long-term employment to one that was 
volatile and temporary, as short-term employment exceeded 50% of the labour market with 
a record number of unemployed people. What is at stake here is how such a deep structural 
change, or extra-ordinary transformation of a society at the cost of the majority, can be 
justified for the necessity of financial restructuring. 
Was the financial restructuring itself as successful as the U.S.-led international 
financial apparatuses promised instabilising financial composition in the local economy? In 
November 1997, right before taking the IMF rescue package, President Kim Young-Sam 
suddenly sacked the deputy prime minister and economy minister, Kang Kyung-Sik and the 
president of the Bank of Korea, Lee Kyung-Sik, who were allegedly hindering negotiations 
with the IMF by insisting on independent approaches to policies of foreign exchange rates 
and autonomy of the Bank of Korea. Mr. Kang‘s position was immediately filled by Lim 
Chang-Yeol, a former officer of the IMF. Mr. Lim‘s appointment was a crucial point in the 
initiation of extrapolation of the IMF prescriptions. While the foreign exchange rate had 
been regulated as the market average rate by the authorities before the crisis, it was fully 
deregulated as a variable exchange rate. With the transition in foreign exchange rate policy 
and deregulation for foreign acquisition of Korean chaebols and banks, the Korean financial 
market was even further destabilisedas Tables 4 and 5 clearly show. The total amount of 
foreign debt soared, and, more critically, steep increases in short-term speculative money 
resulted in serious volatility and led to the financial crisis of1997. The Korean economy came 
under the sway of foreign capital.  
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* Table 4: Change in Foreign Debt and Short-Term Debt Since the Financial Crisis (Source: 
Kyunghyang Newspaper, 1 July, 2007) 
 
 
* Table 5: Rates of Foreign Investment in the Korean Stock Market 
 
This stark reality shows how ―the allodoxia‖ was made possible through the uncertainty of 
crisis. The narrative politics of the authorities operated false judgment, and its justification, 
through which the bare reality was contained for the order of discourse, was the problematic 
of the dominant value. This radical transformation of society cannot be legitimised without 
coordinated dissemination of narrative information by the main financial apparatuses, 
investment banks, and mainstream media in the initial stages of the financial problems. Here 
the intentions of the main financial apparatuses are circulated and proliferated, and 
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responses of market participants are generated in an effort to actualise cognition and action 
of the event and implement the subsequent prescription. This proposition can be 
corroborated if we show that the narrative operation of the system problematises a crisis-in-
the-making, before as well as after the event, as the preliminary cognitive frame and 
subsequent political action. 
According to a special coverage report of KBS (Korea Broadcasting System), well 
before the crisis, the intention of the main apparatuses was coordinated for the 
reconstitution of society from a ―state led closed economy to fully deregulated free market 
system.‖87The report team had continuously demanded, over two years, the release of 
classified documents produced by the U.S. Treasury, State department, and CIA concerning 
the Korean financial crisis, and finally they obtained them. The documents are particularly 
important because they reveal how the intention of the system works with regard to the 
particular event and, in doing so, what kind of preliminary frame of reference is 
conceptualised to problematise the crisis. The crucial information the report discloses is as 
follows: 
 
1) The U.S. intelligence agency, the CIA, started to leak information on a possible 
financial crisis in Korea in the early 1997, when the Korean government was stressing 
the nation‘s ―sound fundamentals.‖ 
    2) Once the problem loomed, the U.S. government completely contained any alternative 
solutions, except for the IMF loan package and its restructuring program for the 
liquidity problem of Korea, which made the situation a crisis. The uncompromising 
preconditions of the IMF rescue program aimed at the total transformation of the 
Korean economy into a deregulated neoliberal free market. 
    3) The U.S. government blocked the creation of a Japanese government-led Asian 
Monetary Fund, through which Korea could have availed of emergency loans to 
implement the principle thoroughly. This fact, according to the report team, was 
repeatedly confirmed throughout interviews with the then Korean Economic Minister 
and the Japanese Deputy Economy Minister. 
   4) Throughout the process of negotiation with the Korean government, the IMF was in 
close liaison with the U.S. government. As a result, the IMF stipulations demanded 
                                            
87 ―Over the Surface: The US Classified Documents, the IMF and the Trojan Horse,‖ Issues and News: 
Ssam, KBS, 1 September, 2009 (In Korean). 
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agreement with conditionalities beyond the ordinary for a debtor country, 
accomplishing rapid deregulation and labour market flexibility for foreign capital. 
    5) The U.S. government-backed IMF program eventually targeted long-term benefits for 
the U.S. finance and trading industry, rather than the economic stability and prosperity 
of the debtor country.88 
 
The declassified documents clearly support the proposition that narrative intervention 
promotes a crisis-in-the-making, in that, first of all, the financial narrators of the U.S. 
government, the U.S. Treasury, and the CIA, along with the IMF, had clear intentions even 
before the crisis, grounding foreknowledge of the event. Second, the intervention aims to 
valorise the future temporality of the event with its schematised road map. Finally, and most 
importantly, it reconfigures the relationship between the narrator, the subject, and the 
narratee, the object, insinuating performative roles throughout the process of ―restructuring.‖ 
This prearranged judgment with the intention, the allodoxia, for the object, in this sense, 
problematises the event, institutionalising the uncertainty through the frame of the IMF. By 
imposing conditionalities, the narrators leverage the uncertainty of the financial situation as 
the threshold beyond which no other alternatives can intervene to reverse the prescription. 
They aim to establish and transfer the intentions of the system by replacing the democratic 
process of the people.  
Narrative, as the structure of meaning-making of the eventand with the grounding 
of foreknowledge and its ensuing performative procedurestherefore eventually functions 
as a device of consent in the financial era. It contains political conflicts and procedures by the 
people for the necessity of macroeconomic integration. In this regard, narrative intervention 
into a financial crisis is political action that justifies the subsequent imposition of political 
intentions. It had an explanatory effect that represents economic uncertainty as problematic 
certainty in the design of economic structures. Unlike the formation of a discourse, in which 
competing agents struggle and assimilate in the acquisition of new values, narrative, above 
all, presupposes the position of the narrator and the narratee: this becomes at hierarchical 
structure in which he cognition and action of the main value is guided through performative 
utterances and speeches. With the clear intention of the narrator, narrative unfolds ―the 
labour of dramatization‖ (Bourdieu, 1992: 129) for the initiation and valorisation of new 
                                            
88 “Over the Surface: the US Classified Documents, the IMF and the Trojan Horse,‖ Issues and News: 
Ssam, KBS, 1 September, 2009 (In Korean). 
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economic dominance. In the case of the narrative intervention of U.S. institutions, it goes 
even further, since it is not just a financial shakeup but, as Chossudovsky correctly points 
out, ―to extend the free market to the entire Korean peninsula‖ with the intention of 
valorising a future inter-Korean relationship: 
The system of indirect colonial rule first instated by the U.S. Military under President 
Sygman Rhee in 1945 had been disbanded. Korea‘s ruling business elites had been 
crushed. An entirely new system of government under President Kim Dae Jung had 
been established, geared towards the fracture of the chaebols and the dismantling of 
Korean capitalism. In other words, the signing of the IMF bailout Agreement in 
December 1997 marks an important and significant transformation in the structure of 
the Korean State. It also marks a decisive step in inter-Korean relations and 
Washington‘s design to extend the free market to the entire Korean Peninsula.89 
The narrative for the new ―design‖ of the market system is insinuated in the making of the 
crisis-yet-to-come, with the clear intention of restructuring the relationship between the 
narrator and narratee altogether. The crisis is thus the inevitable point of leverage through 
which the unprecedented is materialised, for ―all the unheard-of and ineffable characteristics 
of the situation [are] created by the crisis‖ (Bourdieu, 1992: 128–129). The narrative is critical, 
problematising the financial uncertainty into a new context of financial imperialism. We will 
now analyse in detail how narrators of the system actually narrate the intention of the 
system, insinuating an intention to problematise the crisis through performative utterances. 
 
Performative Utterances of the ―Official‖ Apparatuses and Illocutionary Force 
 
Reviewing the procedures of response to the financial crisis in Asia, the IMF published a 
―factsheet‖ (January 1999) in which the origins of the crisis in the region were 
comprehensively described and represented, symptomatically revealing the narrative 
operation. The document first of all defines ―the origins of the crisis,‖ which ―stemmed from 
weaknesses in the financial system and, to a lesser extent, governance.‖ The disruptions 
have, according to the report, not just originated from the financial system in the economic 
                                            
89 Michael Chossudovsky, ―The Recolonization of KoreaSeoul Black Monday and IMF Intervention 
in Korea,‖ Global Research, 22 July, 2005. 
(http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=719) 
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field but also, from the defects of governance itself. Here, the specific arrangements of 
―governance‖ of each country are bracketed and labeled as a universal problem in the region. 
―A combination of inadequate financial sector supervision, poor assessment and 
management of financial risk, and the maintenance of relatively fixed interest rates,‖ the 
report continues, ―led banks and corporations to borrow large amounts of international 
capital, much of it short-term, denominated in foreign currency, and unhedged. As time 
went on, this inflow of foreign capital tended to be used to finance poorer-quality 
investments.‖ These systematic problems in the financial sector were worsened by 
―governance issues‖ in the region, as there were problems due to ―government involvement 
in the private sector and lack of transparency in corporate and fiscal accounting and the 
provision of financial and economic data‖ (emphasis added). This discursive framing has 
been widely shared by Western financial narrators.  
The U.S. Deputy Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers‘s performative utterances 
prove this point.90 As also briefly mentioned in Chapter 2, Summers defines the ―Asian 
model‖ as the ―systemic root of the crisis.‖ The ―Asian model‖ exemplifies an inefficient 
financial system, in which an economic ―approach favored centralized coordination of 
activity over decentralized market incentives.‖ The crisis of governance is described, as ―the 
[Asian] governments targeted particular industries, promoted selected exports, and 
protected domestic industries.‖ The model thus has a ―common element with almost all 
financial crises: money borrowed in excess and used badly‖91 (emphasis added). As such, 
―fundamental change is expected in what government is to do‖not to mention micro and 
macroeconomic reforms in the region.  
The World Bank shares this view of the crisis, and its concerns are focused mainly on 
the ―domestic systemic weaknesses‖ in the financial sector and ―macroeconomic policy‖ in 
governance of the local. 92  Such a weakness, irrespective of various indexes of the 
fundamentals, led to ―the crisis of confidence.‖The World Bank report remarks that ―the 
Asian crisis was precipitated by savings-investments imbalances in the private sector […] 
unlike the Latin American episodes.‖ The public sector, along with the private sector, was 
                                            
90 Lawrence Summers, ―Opportunities out of Crises: Lessons from Asia,‖ 19 March, 1998. 
91 Putting evaluative ethical codes, such as ‗good‘ and ‗bad‘, into the formation of Otherness is a 
simple yet critical coding task in narrative operation, as Jameson argues: ―what is really meant by ‗the 
good‘ is simply my own position as an unassailable power center, in terms of which the position of 
the Other, or of the weak, is repudiated and marginalized in practices which are then ultimately 
themselves formalized in the concept of evil‖ (Jameson, 1989: 117). 
92 Javad K Shirazi, ―The East Asian Crisis: Origins, Policy Challenges, and Prospects,‖ World Bank, 10 
June, 1998. 
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operated ―in a weak domestic institutional and regulatory environment and permissive 
international capital market.‖―The engines of Asian progresssavings and investment,‖ 
thus, ―need to be overhauled with an emphasis on quality objectives.‖ The ―quality 
objectives‖ are mainly centered upon establishing criteria for the financial order. 
―Developing domestic long term finance market‖ is the first task for ―reducing vulnerability 
to external flows.‖ As the report suggests, ―the East Asian countries still have one of the 
highest savings rate in the worldabove 30 percent on average over the 1975–95.‖―Prior to 
the crisis, they also had investment rates of 30–40 percent of GDP.‖ These fundamentals 
were easily renounced as inappropriate for the new international exchange regime, as they 
ensured that resources generally remained within the boundary of the local as ―‗non-
performing capital.‖ Korea had enjoyed an average 8% annual economic growth as a result 
of these strong fundamentals, and even right after the crisis Korea managed to recover to 
some extent. In 1999, the GDP growth rate was over 10%, while it was 8.5% in 2000, as Table 
1 shows. However, the speedy recovery of the Korean economy was attributed to the ―early 
resolution of creditor panic‖ (Lee and Rhee, 2006: 1), rather than to the country‘s 
fundamentals, since these could revalorise financial flows.  
Another report by the IMF suggests that, in the Korean case, the lack that caused the 
crisis surfaced due to the ―tradition of fiscal conservatism,‖ which was basically 
incommensurate to financial capitalism (Beaumont et al., 2004: 5. Emphasis added). Fiscal 
conservatism might be an optimum fiscal policy ―in heavy and chemical industries,‖ but 
such an approach eventually brings about financial crisis ―when fiscal deficits exceeded 4 
percent of GDP.‖ Such fiscal conservatism had kept ―spending within revenue,‖ which has 
become a ―touchstone of fiscal policy‖ (Beaumont et al., 2004: 5). ―Keeping spending within 
revenue‖ is repeatedly diagnosed as a critical defect in a financial regime, as the financial 
system has to be sustained by the ceaseless circulations of international capital. As the report 
acknowledges, Korea‘s tradition of fiscal conservatism ―has helped to contain the 
accumulation of public debt to just over 20 percent of GDP, which is very low compared to 
the average of 74 percent among OECD countries‖ (Beaumont et al., 2004: 5). Therefore the 
―effectiveness of counter-cyclical fiscal policy‖ is underscored. ―There appears to be a belief 
in Korea that the larger the surplus the better,‖ continues the report. ―The approach,‖ 
however, ―has fostered a tendency to underestimate revenues and overstate planned 
expenditures. In addition, strict adherence to the principle of spending within revenue is not 
always consistent with counter-cyclical fiscal policy‖ (Beaumont et al., 2004: 9). The 
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transformation of conservative fiscal policy to counter-fiscal policy made it easy to borrow 
and invest international capital. 
Throughout these explanations, provided from the perspectives of the main financial 
institutions, it is insinuated that the crisis was not the problems of industrial fundamentals 
but of symptoms of incommensurability between the ―conservative‖ local economic system and 
the international financial system. The official hermeneutic move foregrounds the necessity 
of system-transformation from the perspective of financial rationale, through collective 
interpretation of the causes of the crisis. The causes are also commonly represented as 
endogenous to the local itself, stemming from its ―structural weakness,‖ not in 
manufacturing or industrial or public sectors, but ―in financial and corporate sectors.‖The 
chart below, however, shows how the movement of international financial capital, the 
exogenous factor, influenced the crisis. 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Latin America*                 East Asia** 
Type of flow                1993-1994   1995-1996        1995-1996   1997-1998 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Liabilities to banks              14.9        -0.1             51.3        -60.3 
Debt securities issued abroad     5.6         1.3              5.2          4.3 
Total                          20.5         1.4             56.4        -56.2 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* Argentina and Mexico, ** Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand 
* Table 6: Net short-term capital flow during the recent financial crises ($ billions) (Source: BIS-IMF-
OECD-World Bank, Joint Statistics on External Debt online database) 
 
During the first and second years of the financial crisis, the total amount of capital outflow 
in the four countries was, as the table shows, more than $100 billion. In 1997, the foreign 
reserve, for instance, in Korea, amounted to only $24 billion. In contrast, the outflows of 
capital during the Latin American financial crisisand its effect: the impact of the sudden 
movement of international short-term moneycould be regarded as one of the crucial 
factors directly precipitating the breakdown of the vulnerable local financial system. 
Analysing the financial flows alongside the real fundamentals of these countries, Krugman 
defines the crisis ―as the one brought on by financial excess and then financial collapse‖: 
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What all of this suggests is that the Asian crisis is best seen not as a problem brought on 
by fiscal deficits, as in ‗first-generation‘ models, nor as one brought on by 
macroeconomic temptation, as in ‗second-generation‘ models, but as one brought on by 
financial excess and then financial collapse. Indeed, to a first approximation currencies 
and exchange rates may have had little to do with it: the Asian story is really about a 
bubble in and subsequent collapse of asset values in general, with the currency crises 
more a symptom than a cause of this underlying real (in both senses of the word) 
malady. (Krugman, 1998) 
 
According to this examination, the ―underlying real malady‖ (the structural defects of the 
real indexes and fundamentals of the economies of the region) was not the ―cause‖ of the 
crisis. What is important in Krugman‘s analysis is that the currency crises are seen to have 
been more of a ―symptom‖ than a direct cause of the financial crisis. Under financial 
capitalism, a symptom can be described as a risk factor. As Rudolf Hilferding explains, a 
symptom can even be manufactured as the general climate of a financial market. A symptom 
is not a fixed cause but a fluid one, which can be given shape as a form of articulation, with 
which various factors are temporally aligned and realigned to affect the situation in 
processas the financial narrators perform.  
The representation of the crisis, through which a symptom of risk is described and 
interpreted, is the actual implementation of articulation practice in which ―a number of 
distinct elements interact, in a moment of temporary unity‖ (Evans and Hall, 1999: 5). This is 
enacted for the (re)valorisation of the system. The sealing of the ―temporary unity,‖ out of 
the disequilibrium of crisis, is the signifying practice in question. As mentioned, the unifying 
voices of the official perspectives on the local economies, given the varying economic 
circumstances of the countries, is the active engagement of the regime in the subsumption of 
the local; grounding foreknowledge of the event and, thus, legitimising subsequent actions. 
Therefore, alternative viewssuch as the insistence on external capital movements 
influencing the localare difficult to find in the official diagnosis, although outside the 
official sector, Krugman insists that ―it is clearly wrong to blame all of the overinvestment 
and overvaluation of assets in Asia on domestic financial intermediaries. After all, private 
individualsand foreign institutional investorsdid buy stocks and even real estate in all 
the economies now in crisis. This suggests that other kinds of market failure, notably 
‗herding‘ by investors, still have some explanatory role to play‖ (Krugman, 1998). The 
138 
 
diagnoses of the main international financial narrators therefore function to misrepresent the 
workings of external and international capital and speculative mechanisms, transcoding the 
cognitive dissonance of the bubble mechanism into cognitive consonance in the making of 
the crisis. The process of imposition of new conditionalities, for transforming the local into 
the main financial system, as we have shown, entails a narrative emphasis on structural 
weaknesses in the financial sectors of the local, which works against valorising the locality 
as such. 
What is even more critical is that the information, or linguistic performance and 
exchange produced by the narrators, becomes the condition of possibility for cognition and 
action, encoding the economic situation in terms of ethical judgment and evaluation. This is 
clearly witnessed in the words used, such as ―bad,‖―weakness,‖―lack of transparency,‖ and 
―conservatism.‖ Speech-act theory generally presupposes an equal relationship between the 
speaker and the listener, often overlooking the power relations between the two. The 
political and cultural force of the ethical evaluation the speaker performs goes beyond 
linguistic conventions and rules. Such ethical descriptions are actually, following Smith, 
―descriptions of a system of constraints‖ (Smith, 1988: 109, emphasis added), through which 
―particular contingencies of which the value of the objects of that kind appear to be a 
function for people of that kind‖ (Smith, 1988: 103). It is important to note that the narrator, 
with his illocutionary force of description, indoctrinates ―a system of constraints‖ on the 
objectagainst which conditions of possibility for the valorisation of subjective value create 
foundations through the contingencies of crisis. In this sense, the financial narrators‘ 
descriptions are distinctively performative; they are utterances that guide successive actions, 
embedding the ethical and cultural identity of the object for full implementation of the 
narrator‘s intention. Speech act theorist Searle (1969), for instance, categorises the 
illocutionary acts of the speaker into five groups: 
 
1. Representatives: Illocutionary acts that undertake to represent a state of affairs, 
whether past, present, future, or hypothetical, e.g. stating, claiming, hypothesizing, 
describing, predicting, telling, insisting, suggesting, or swearing that something is the 
case. 
2. Directives: Illocutionary acts designed to get the addressee to do something, e.g. 
requesting, pleading, inviting, daring. 
3. Commissives: Illocutionary acts that commit the speaker to doing something, e.g. 
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promising, threatening, vowing. 
4. Expressives: Illocutionary acts that express only the speaker‘s psychological state, e.g. 
congratulating, thanking, deploring, condoling, welcoming. 
5. Declarations: Illocutionary acts that bring about the state of affairs they refer to, e.g. 
blessing, firing, baptizing, bidding, passing sentence. (recited in Pratt, 1977: 80–81) 
 
These five categories of illocutionary force, however, cannot fully explain the actual 
formation of narrative discourse in which the five components are inevitably intertwined 
and thus brought into play in the field of power. They should be analysed in association 
with the constructive totality of the systemat which the intention of the speaker eventually 
aims.  
McCloskey, however, more specifically applies Searle‘s analysis of illocutionary acts, 
analysing economic propositional sentences into four different modes of linguistic 
implications: 
 
The economic scientist is a linguistic actor, and to his performance can be applied the 
dramatic notions of Kenneth Burke or the philosophers J.L. Austin and John Searle. 
Scientific assertions are speech-acts made in a scene of scientific tradition by the 
scientist-agent, though the agency of the usual tropes, for purposes of describing 
nature of mankind better than the next fellow. Searle‘s analysis of the Law of Demand 
for gasoline would go as follows: 
 
The utterance act (speaking)‖ ―the di-mand‘ kurv f r gas‘ e len‘ slops doun.‖ 
The propositional act (logic): ―the demand curve for gasoline (referent) slopes down 
(predicate).‖ 
Illocutionary act (rhetoric, argument, attempt to persuade): ―Believe me, the demand 
curve for gasoline slopes down.‖ 
Perlocutionary act (the reader‘s response, the result of the illocutionary act): ―By God, 
you‘re right: the demand curve for gasoline does slope down.‖  
 
The error is to think that one is engaged in the propositional act, which is a matter of 
formal logic, when in fact one is engagedall day, most daysin illocutionary acts, 
which are rhetorical. (McCloskey, 1984: 105-106) 
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The utterance itself, ―the demand curve for gasoline slopes down,‖ is a propositional act. 
However, it is actually an illocutionary act in which intentional ―rhetoric, argument, attempt 
to persuade‖ is implicated, inviting a reader‘s response. Therefore an utterance is a 
performative illocutionary act, in which the intention of narrator is conveyed in order to 
activate the narratee. To dissects how the propositional utterances of narrators in fact 
function as illocutionary acts, or as the guiding force in identifying the main value, we will 
continue to observe the operation with the ―description of a system of constraints‖ for the 
object. This conveys the intention of the narrators modulating the narrative struggle for the 
object in acquisition of the dominant value. 
 
The Internal ―Official‖ View and the Adoption of Dominant Value93 
 
In December 1999, two years after the financial crisis that brought about far-reaching and 
forceful social restructuringas well as financialisationin Korea, as a condition of 
financial aid from the IMF, the National Assembly operated a special committee that was 
supposed to investigate the causes of the crisis and, if necessary, charge the officials 
associated with any grave mistakes made in the process of policy decision making. The 
committee planned to summon more than ninety government officials and business leaders 
as witnesses and observers, including ex-president Kim Young-Sam and the former 
Economic Minister, although some of these eventually refused to attend the hearings. The 
Bank of Korea, which was also under investigation by the committee, submitted a report 
analysing the origins and contexts of the crisis in relation to the international financial 
climate. As it was an official publication detailing the causes and development of the critical 
situation from the authoritative perspective of a financial institution in Korea, it has also 
                                            
93 ―Economists have two attitudes towards discourse‖ according to McCloskey, which are ―the 
official and unofficial, the explicit and the implicit. The official rhetoric, to which they subscribe in 
abstract and in methodological ruminations, declares them to be scientists in the modern mode. The 
credo of Scientific Method, known mockingly among its many critics as the Received View, is an 
amalgam of logical positivism, behaviourism, operationalism, and the hypothetico-deductive model 
of science‖(McCloskey, 1983: 484). As she argues, however, the official view or attitude is in many 
cases ―unexamined,‖ since the official narrative is not an objective of examination but of consent, 
authorial approval, or disapproval. ―What is alarming about the workaday rhetoric is not its content 
but that it is unexamined, and that in consequence the official rhetoric pops up in mischievous ways. 
Economists agree or disagreetheir disagreements are exaggeratedbut they do not know why. Any 
economist believes more than his evidence of a suitably modernist and objective sort implies. A recent 
poll of economists, for example, found that only three percent of those surveyed flatly disagreed with 
the assertion that ‗tariffs and import quotas reduce general economic welfare‘‖ (McCloskey, 1983: 493). 
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been widely regarded as the orthodox stance of the Korean government on the crisis. The 
report looks at the nature of the Korean financial crisis in association with two main factors 
that led to the fiasco. To focus on the specific aspects of the Korean case, it first defines the 
general financial crisis, reflecting various historical cases, ―as a product of sudden and 
drastic depreciation of a currency triggered by international speculative money which 
eventually drains foreign currency reserves.‖ ―The degree and impact of a financial crisis,‖ it 
continues, ―are influenced by the international financial market factor and the response of a 
local government.‖94 This view of the financial crisis accentuates the fact that any financial 
crisis on a local level is inseparably related to the international circulation of money, in 
particular, with ―international speculative money.‖ The nature of the financial crisis 
proposed by the Bank of Korea thus shows that the workings of the exogenous element are a 
critical part of the making of a crisis, in contrast with descriptions of the international 
financial apparatuses. It presents the financial crises of the UK (1992), Mexico (1994), and 
Thailand (1997) as representative cases in which speculative money played a major role, 
considering that the countries‘ currencies were generally over-evaluated with strict 
exchange rate policies, which eventually exposed them to attack by speculative money 
aiming at maximising short term profits.  
While underscoring the influential forces of international hot money in the historical 
financial crises, the report downplays, however, the role of international money in the 
Korean case, positioning endogenous factors as the main cause of the crisis, in line with the 
interpretations of the main international financial agencies. ―The Korean financial crisis is 
different from the ones triggered by international speculative attacks,‖ it decisively insists, 
because in early 1997 a series of bankruptcies of chaebols such as Hanbo and Daewoo 
brought about a feeling of fundamental distrust, which lead to lowered credit ratings; thus 
worsening the problem of liquidity in the financial market. Such an analysis clearly admits 
that the endogenous factor is at the core of the crisis, although the report later reluctantly 
accepts the workings of international money as an auxiliary factor in the problem. 
The report, therefore, finds the source of the currency crisis in the weakness of internal 
fundamentals that brought about panicked herd behavior in the financial sector. According 
to the report, stability of the financial system in Korea was harmed by the weakness of the 
fundamentals underpinning the country itself. This weakness is ―over-investment of 
                                            
94 ―Report on the Causes and Development of the Financial Crisis in Korea,‖ the Bank of Korea, 1999 
(In Korean). 
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conglomerates, the inflexibility of labour market and some structural problem accumulated 
throughout the rapid economic growth.‖ The roots of these fundamental weaknesses 
―simultaneously‖ surfaced, along with the economic decline of the time. In this sense, the 
internal defects of the economic structure itself invited the speculative attacks. The report 
adds that the financial and political authorities in Korea did not respond properly to the 
initial symptoms of the financial crisis, owing to the ―lack of consistency and transparency in 
policy,‖ which echoes the views of financial narrators. The radical downgrading of Korea‘s 
credit rating was, thus, according to the report, ―inevitable.‖ The interpretation of the 
financial crisis by the internal financial authority undoubtedly overlaps with the analyses of 
international financial institutions such as the World Bank or the IMF, underscoring the role 
of endogenous defects, and particularly structural weakness, in the formation of the 
financial crisisrather than raising its own voice for regulating short-term speculative 
capital for the majority. 
It is here worth noting how an economic value is formed through the interaction of the 
subject and the object, through the analysis of Simmel, who observes that an economic value 
is a form of objectification of subject value. Formulating a value is to overcome the economic 
distance between the subject and the object through exchange relations. Under the universal 
monetary system, the economic value is set by the ―renunciation of the non-monetary uses 
of monetary material‖ (Simmel, 2004: 152). For Simmel, money is the autonomous medium 
through which objects acquire exchangeability or commensurability in financial terms. Here, 
―renunciation of the non-monetary uses‖ of an object is an essential process in incorporation 
into the dominant value of the financial regime, and, thus, in identifying the value of the 
subject. Simmel‘s analysis of the value-creating processinvolving the subject and the 
objectcan be applied to the interpretations of the crisis. The view of the bank of Korea, as 
an object in the exchange relation, was to identify the economic value of the subject to 
overcome the distance. Accentuating its own systemic defect in the process of recognition of 
the subject value, the object renounces manifold instances of the crisis and its own 
fundamentals and, thus, represents itself through the value of the subject. The politics of 
representation, as the signifying practice, are, in this case, effectively completed as the 
economic distance is overcome. This is achieved through the formation of the new financial 
value in accordance with the grand narrative. As a result, the local economic system 
becomes more easily commensurable to the financial exchange regime, after renouncing the 
narrative struggle for making its own discourse. 
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In the following chapter, I reinterpret Gérard Genette‘s theory of narrative discourse to 
propose a notion of narrative economy. By applying Genette‘s literary notion to the analysis 
of financial operation, the chapter supposes organisational and mediating features of 
narrative temporality, in conjunction with the narrative schematisation of events, as the 
distinctive feature of a narrative economy. As the chapter scrutinises the notion of narrative 
economy, it focuses upon the salient features of the narrative temporality of financial 
capitalism, as closely instantiated in Chapter 3. There, I examined the case of financialisation, 
which I argued was propelled by investment banking. Here narrative economy can be 
understood as the main driving force operating the economy, through implicit methods of 
narrative scattering, just as international financial centres perform in the making of narrative 
junctures for the extension of the dominant financial narratives; they do this by promoting 
and consolidating financial value-politics. 
For financial narrators, the financial crisis is the crucial engaging point of narrative 
economy. From here the distortion of speed and transgression of order, and the ‗abnormal‘ 
temporality of crisis, bestow on the system wider room for intervention. This allows 
valorisation of the dominant rhythm. From a cultural perspective, a financial crisis can be 
reassessed as a temporal disruption, against which a narrative temporal operation 
ceaselessly seeks to revalorize the rhythm for ―intelligible time of futurity‖ (Lash et al: 1998: 
3). By scattering narrative information through the main financial narrative apparatuses, 
particularly at the time of crisis, financial narrators encode narrative junctures. Through 
these the narrative economy articulates and proliferates its core intention as the foundation 
of legitimate knowledge-production, with strong rewriting of the financial master-code: this 
enables it to redefine cognitive dissonance as the legitimate financial rationale. Narrative 
economy is thus viewed as the cultural strategy of financial capital, or as a system of 
narrative regulation for effective and efficient ―reciprocal entanglement‖ (Genette, 1980: 79). 
Here the frequency and duration of interpolations and extrapolations are exercised for the 
purpose of narrative valorisation and for realigning the social relationship. As narrative 
economy is set to function through a valorisation of informationon the basis of 
reconfigured temporalityrepresentation is at the same time critical for the extension of the 
primal event. This event is the main theme for narrative thematisation, for which other 
events as the subsets of narrative information are interpreted and regulated. The primal 
event thus functions as the paradigm for other events yet to come.  
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Narrative economy produces narrative knowledge; discussing this, the chapter also 
reconsiders Lyotard's observations on the narrative field, and its production as the 
objectifying field of comparison and evaluation. It is associated with the making of economic 
subjectivity by indicating the distance between the narrator and the narratee, without which 
the necessitation of the legitimacy of financial domination and expansion is unfeasible. 
Actors participate in the weaving of a field of narrative knowledge, which is portrayed as 
the necessary condition for knowledge-production and extension. It is seen as the condition 
of valorization of not just economic but also existential status. This new activation of 
legitimacy is appraised as the distinctive mechanism of narrative economy.  
With regard to temporal configuration in narrative economy, I will expand the scope 
of analysis to look at the implications of narrative temporality by reinterpreting Gerard 
Genette, Marx, and Simmel. I will articulate capitalistically configured temporality in terms 
of narrative time, in which, following Ricoeur, the ―circular transmitting of values‖ (Ricoeur, 
1988: 50) is embedded, and a series of narrative performances thus take place. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Narrative and Temporality: Narrative and the Temporal Reconfiguration of 
Finance Capital 
 
 
 
Repetition enables accumulation. By being repeated, time becomes a meaningful and 
productive entity in the actualisation and realisation of value. A value-system presupposes 
constant repetition for the valorisation of value production. With the establishment of the 
valorising system, a certain rhythmic pattern gives legitimate access to the dominant value, 
and becomes the performative criterion in value production and transference. ―Rhythms,‖ at 
this stage, ―enter into products‖ (Lefebvre, 2004: 6). As Marx asserts, in the money economy, 
―the circulation of money as capital is an end in itself, for the valorization of value takes 
place only within this constantly renewed movement. The movement of capital is therefore 
limitless‖ (Marx, 1990: 253, emphasis added). By appropriating time as the agent of the self-
valorizing process, capital builds a foundation for the condition of reproduction for further 
valorization. As suggested in Chapter 3, financial narrative expands this economic condition 
into the conditions of psychological life, encoding its modalities as a form of economic as 
well as cultural performance. This chapter inquires into the implications of time by 
reinterpreting Marx and Simmel, relating capitalistically-configured temporality to narrative 
time, in which the circular transmitting of values is embedded. It links this to a series of 
narrative performances which thus takes place. Focusing on how the temporal operations of 
monetary capital are activated, it also articulates Gérard Genette‘s theory of narrative 
discourse, from which organisational and mediating features of timein conjunction with 
events and actionsare illuminated under the schematisation of narrative. Finally, this 
chapter proposes a notion of narrative economy as the strategy of the cultural economy for 
guiding and legitimatising financial reality.  
From the perspective of description and representation of information, narrative 
economy employs specific methods such as narrative scattering and narrative juncture, 
supporting the performativity of a new financial structure and its temporality as the rhythm 
of life. For financial narrators, financial crisis is the crucial engaging point from which the 
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distortion of speed and transgression of order of the ‗abnormal‘ temporality of crisis bestows 
on the system room for intervention for revalorising the dominant rhythm. In this regard, a 
crisis is a temporal disruption against which the narrative temporal operation ceaselessly 
seeks to revalorize the rhythm for ―intelligible time of futurity.‖ (Lash et al: 1998: 3) By 
scattering narrative information through the main players at the time of crisis, financial 
narrative make narrative junctures, and through these the narrative economy articulates and 
proliferates its core intentions as the legitimate narrative process. The narrative economy 
presupposes narrative knowledge as an objectifying and operational field, with regard to 
which we will reconsider Lyotard‘s observations as to the role of narrative. Actors 
participate in the weaving of narrative knowledge, which is the necessary condition of 
knowledge production for narrative extension. I suggest that this new way of activation of 
legitimacy is the distinctive mechanism of the narrative economy. 
The valorisation system of rhythm in the financial regime necessarily accompanies a 
devalorisation process of rhythm outside the system. ―The spontaneous established link‖ is 
effectively implemented at a time of crisis, ―between narrative inspiration and repetitive 
event,‖ since the narrative juncture, as Genette puts it, functions not merely to interpret the 
instance; it is also the process of making the event absent for the unification of the dominant 
narrative rhythmby containing the multiple identities of the event (Genette, 1980: 126). As 
we saw in the introduction, narrative functions as the cultural operation of inclusion and 
exclusion through an affirmation and negation of content, especially considering that 
―amending the iterative plural to singular‖ is one of essential operations in narrative the 
effectively screens unsaid events95 (Genette, 1980: 150). 
                                            
95 Concerning narrative operation through the double function of representing and containing the 
multiple identities of the event, Threadgold puts it that ―[t]he whole notion of habitus, and of 
ideology, of the ways in which institutions and practices become corporeal for example, introduces 
other questions about the significance of narrative‖ (Threadgold, 2005: 263). This is due to the fact that 
―[in narrative] what matters is who has the power to name, to represent common sense, to create 
‗official versions,‘ and to represent legitimate social worlds, while excluding other stories which 
might construct these things very differently‖(Threadgold, 2005: 264). Therefore, what narrative 
performs is the politics of inclusion or exclusion (―unsaid events,‖ to use Genette‘s term) around 
which the actors are motivating as well as motivated for the dominant set of relationships.  
  As Genette points out, narrative information doesn‘t just make the event absent but also excludes 
the presence of the narrator. It is therefore not just lack of information but also excess of information 
that can make the narrator absent. ―The strictly textual mimetic factors, it seems to me, come down to 
those two data already implicitly present in Plato‘s comments: the quantity of narrative information 
(a more developed or more detailed narrative) and the absence (or minimal presence) of the 
informerin other words, of the narrator […] Cardinal precepts and, above all, interrelated precepts: 
pretending to show is pretending to be silent […] therefore, we will have to mark the contrast 
between mimetic and diegetic by a formula such as: information + informer = C, which implies that 
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The narrative of events […] is always narrative, that is, a transcription of the (supposed) 
non-verbal into the verbal. Its mimesis will thus never be anything more than an 
illusion of mimesis, depending like every illusion on a highly variable relationship 
between the sender and the receiver. (Genette, 1980: 165) 
 
The iterative narrative, which is repeated with different modalities throughout the narrative 
process, regulates disseminated episodes and thus unifies them into a singulative narrative. 
It gives an actor the sense of the variations in experience from which the impact of further 
fluctuation is valorised epistemologically. This is the ―classic function of iterative narrative,‖ for 
―[t]he classic function of iterative narrative is thus fairly close to that of description, with 
which, moreover, it maintains very close relations: the ‗moral portrait,‘ for example, which is 
one of the varieties of the descriptive genre that operates most often through accumulation of 
iterative traits. Like description, in the traditional novel the iterative narrative is at the service 
of the narrative ‗as such,‘ which is the singulative narrative‖ (Genette, 1980: 117, emphasis 
added).This double implication of the narrative process, in concealing as well as revealing 
events in narrative, is symptomatic of the politics of interpretation of a crisis in the financial 
era. It can be dealt with using narrative temporal operations, through which ―accumulation 
of iterative traits‖ of financial narrators aims at a ―moral portrait‖ of the other economic 
systemto which we will return shortly. 
 
Valorised Time and the Temporality of Finance Capital 
 
In Marxian analysis, time is the basic condition of production. Without valorisation of time 
as the continuous movement with which a series of stable circulations takes place in the 
sphere of production and consumption, the capitalist system cannot be operated or 
sustained. Under the system, time becomes rhythm, rhythm as a form of economic life. 
Value is determined using the measure of the time-unit, transcoding human labour into a 
definite quantity of congealed labour-time, such as a working hour or time-wage. Time is 
embodied as the split units of the quantitative continuum 96 which are necessarily 
                                                                                                                                       
the quantity of information and the presence of the informer are in inverse ratio, mimesis being 
defined by a maximum of information and a minimum of the informer, diegesis by the opposite 
relationship‖ (Genette, 1980: 166). 
96  According to Bergson, material or quantitative representation of time, which is the cultural 
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incorporated into the entire performative series of production: 
 
The duration of [capitalist] turnover is determined by the sum of its time of production 
and its time of circulation. This time total constitutes the time of turnover of the capital. 
It measures the interval of time between one circuit period of the entire capital-value 
and the next, the periodicity in the process of life of capital, or, if you like, the time of 
the renewal, the repetition, of the process of self-expansion, or production, of one and 
the same capital value. (Marx, 1992: 235-236) 
 
Congealed labour time, in the form of quantitative units, becomes the condition of 
valorisation of the value system, in which human labour turns into the constant that has to 
be continuously quantified and measured as the magnitude of value. However, the crucial 
point is that the capitalist value-system mystifies the relationship between labour-time and 
its determination in terms of value. ―The determination of the magnitude of value by labour-
time is,‖ as Marx grasps, ―a secret hidden under the apparent movements in the relative 
values of commodities,‖ (Marx, 1990: 168) in that ―[t]he alienation of labour-power and its 
real manifestation, i.e. the period of its existence as a use-value, do not coincide in time‖ 
(Marx, 1990: 277). 
The fundamental discordance, through which the inevitable difference between the 
actual value of labour power and its expression of time-measured wages appears, however, 
is evaporated; this is due to the fact that surplus value, which is not measured in time-wages, 
is bracketed in labour time and, thus, concealed. For the system, such ―unpaid labour‖ is, 
according to Marx, decisively important in the process of ―the transformation of the value 
and price of labour-power into forms of wages, or into the value and price of labour itself,‖ 
given that ―[a]ll notions of justice held by both the worker and the capitalist, all the 
mystifications of the capitalist mode of production, all capitalism‘s illusion about freedom, 
all the apologetic tricks of vulgar economics, have as their basis the form of appearance, 
which makes the actual relation invisible, and indeed presents to the eye precise opposite of 
that relation‖ (Marx, 1990: 680).Concealing the ―invisible‖ (surplus) value of labour, which is 
labour unpaid in abstracted time-wages, enables capitalists to operate in the constant basis 
                                                                                                                                       
tendency of our era, presumes a notion of duration, since a certain time unit is signified in 
conjunction with the successive units. In this sense, ―we picture the causal relation as a kind of 
prefiguring of the future phenomenon in its present condition‖ and it also becomes ―objective by this 
very entanglement‖ (Bergson, 2001: 204–205). 
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of competition with low wages: 
 
The unpaid part of the price of labour does not need to be reckoned as part of the price 
of the commodity. It may be given to the buyer as a present. This is the first step taken 
under the impulse of competition. The second step, also compelled by competition, is 
the exclusion from the selling price of the commodity of at least a part of the abnormal 
surplus-value created by the extension of the working day. In this way, an abnormally 
low selling price of the commodity arises, at first sporadically, and becomes fixed by 
degrees; this lower selling price henceforward becomes the constant basis of a 
miserable wage for excessive hours of work, just as originally it was the product of 
those very circumstances. (Marx, 1990: 689) 
 
The modified time, which can be transformed into the form of wages, becomes socially 
necessary and meaningful as a temporal unit; it can determine as well as conceal the 
magnitude of value, conditioning further valorisation in constant competition and 
stabilisation for low prices. The fundamental contradiction, namely the growing gap 
between paid labour and unpaid labour in time, should be laid bare with the increase in the 
unpaid labour. However, as the portion of actual time used in producing surplus-value 
throughout the labour-time is abstracted, labour-time expressed in nominal time-wages 
becomes standard time in the configuration of temporality under capitalism. ―The worker is‖ 
therefore ―nothing more than personified labour-time‖ (Marx, 1990: 353). The equation of 
labour-time with time-wage, along with the establishment of money as the means of 
payment, becomes the threshold in valorisation of timeat which the complete circulation 
of capital production can take place.  
What is at stake here is that the fundamental discrepancy between nominal wage through 
labour time and its original value is sutured in valorised time, in which even the value in future is 
advanced and anticipated. This valorisation of time conditions the active transformation of the 
system, because the reconfigured time presupposes and subsumes the latency of value yet to come; 
this is an important point for capital. It is required in order to preoccupy the latency of a 
certain value, and to subsume it into the regime of value, which is the critical operation of 
valorisation in temporality. The advanced time of the future, in the capitalist mode of 
production, exists in the present. To exemplify the advanced time in everyday life, 
interestingly, Marx points out that the mode of payment in a capitalist society is normally 
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prefixed by a contract for a certain period in the future, rather than prepaid for labour-
power. This method of appropriation of future labour in the present becomes the foundation 
of the credit relationship, because ―the worker allows credit to the capitalist.‖ He goes on: 
 
In every country where the capitalist mode of production prevails, it is the custom not 
to pay for labour-power until it has been exercised for the period fixed by the contract, 
for example, at the end of each week. In all cases, therefore, the worker advances the 
use-value of his labour-power to the capitalist. He lets the buyer consume it before he 
receives payment of the price. Everywhere the worker allows credit to the capitalist. 
That this credit is no mere fiction is shown not only by the occasional loss of the wages 
the worker has already advanced, when a capitalist goes bankrupt, but also by a series 
of more long-lasting consequences. (Marx, 1990: 278) 
 
By advancing the value of labour-power in the future, capital valorises labour-time for the 
schematisation of credit circulation, thus covering up ―a series of more long-lasting 
consequences‖ in the sphere of production and consumption. 
 
Rhythm as Formative and Oppressive Power 
 
Simmel takes the problem of temporality under capitalism much further, illuminating its 
cultural implications in our life. By tracing the radical changes in the configuration and 
operation of time, he suggests that these changes also bring about significant 
transformations in the style of life,97 for ―the rhythm or symmetry‖ is one of important 
―contents of life‖ that can ground the field of objectification and normativity. In the money 
economy, the division of labour dissimilates individual actors‘ rhythms and, thus, 
assimilates them into the artificial rhythm as the new pattern of life. In this sense, Simmel 
underscores that the imposition of rhythmic symmetry through initial dissymmetry is the 
first means of production: 
                                            
97 While ―style‖ is becoming more and more patterned in accordance with the tendency of objectified 
culture, Simmel also notes that style always presupposes ―discrepancy‖ in proportion to how ―the 
entire life-style of a community depends upon the relationship between the objectified culture and the 
culture of the subjects‖ (Simmel, 2004: 453). This discrepancy or ―ambiguity‖ gives a momentum of 
differentiation in rhythm. ―Style will include the creation of new metaphor, stories, concepts, percepts 
and affects but will, at the same time, contain considerable ambiguity; indeed this ambiguity is a 
crucial part of the power of style.‖ (Thrift, 2002: 202) 
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So far the division of labour has been interpreted as a specialization of personal 
activities. Yet the specialization of objects themselves contributes no less to the process 
of their alienation from human subjects, which appears as an independence of the 
object, as the individual‘s inability to assimilate it and subject the object to his or her 
rhythm. In the first place, this is true of the means of production. The more 
differentiated these means are, the more they are composed of a multitude of 
specialized parts, the less is the worker able to express his personality through them, 
and the less visible is his personal contribution to the product. The tools that the artist 
uses are relatively undifferentiated and thus afford the personality the widest for 
releasing all his capacities. (Simmel, 2004: 459) 
 
The demand for rhythm has, more or less, existed throughout culture, since ―[r]hythm 
satisfies the basic needs for diversity and regularity, for change and stability […] Simplicity 
or complication of rhythm, the length or brevity of its individual periods, its regularity and 
its interruptions provide, as it were, the abstract scheme for individual and social, objective 
and historical life-sequences‖ (Simmel, 2004: 486). However, since the regularity of rhythm, 
even if it is a highly differentiated rhythmic movement, un-differentiates the workerwho 
is only able to express his subjective rhythm in accordance with the partial work he engages 
in. As such the division of labour greatly increases the tendency of ―the preponderance of 
objective over subjective culture‖ (Simmel, 2004: 470). In this regard, the modern factory is 
the representative locus that produces ―strong rhythmic elements‖ (Simmel, 2004: 491). 
Rhythm, thus, brings about the ―leveling effect of culture‖ (Simmel, 2004: 487).The rhythm 
realised in symmetry is regarded as a rational form: 
 
Rhythm may be defined as symmetry in time, just as symmetry is rhythm in space […] 
Symmetry is the first indication of the power of rationalism to relieve us of the 
meaninglessness of things and do accept them as they are […] The symmetrical 
structure is completely rational in origin; it facilitates the control of the multitude from 
one vantage point. (Simmel, 2004: 488) 
 
This rhythmic-symmetry is the ―technique of centralising tendencies‖ in the systematic form of 
life. Within this the individualistic-spontaneous principle of life is in conflict as well as in 
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harmony: 
 
The forms that rhythm or lack of rhythm bestow upon the contents of existence finally 
lost their form as alternating stages of development and present themselves 
simultaneously. The two principle of life that one can characterize with the symbols 
rhythmic-symmetrical and individualistic-spontaneous are two profoundly different 
trends whose opposition is not, as in previous examples, always reconcilable through 
integration in the course of development, but rather ultimately characterizes the 
permanent character of individuals and groups. Not only is the systematic form of life 
the technique of centralizing tendencies, where of a despotic or socialistic kind, but also it 
gains an independent charm. The inner harmony and external conciseness, the 
harmony of the parts and the calculability of their fate, confer an attraction upon all 
symmetrical-systematic organizations, the effects of which exert a formative power that 
extends far beyond politics to countless public and private interests. Such organizations 
are supposed to give the individual contingencies of existence a unity and transparency 
that transposes them into a work of art. (Simmel, 2004: 492-493) 
 
This is a significant passage, which articulates the rhythmic-symmetric drive as a formative 
power through which repetition also diversifies spheres of interests, not just for the system 
but for the individual as well. Rhythm expands the sphere of interests, valorising the system 
as a modulating structure rather than a fixed one. Thus it can regulate its pace, according to 
which ―individual contingencies of existence‖ have a foundation of stability as the 
performative field. Simmel analyses this modulation of rhythm as a matter of changing pace, 
through which the intensity and span of our lives transform. This regulation of pace is a 
critical distinction in monetary economy, extending our inner world according to the 
changes implied: 
 
Our inner world extends, as it were, over two dimensions, the size of which determines 
the pace of life. The greater the differences between the contents of our imagination at 
any one timeeven with an equal number of conceptionsthe more intensive are the 
experiences of life, and the greater is the span of life through which we have passed. 
What we experience as the pace of life is the product of the sum total and the depth of 
its changes. The significance of money in determining the pace of life in a given period 
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is first of all illustrated by the fact that a change in monetary circumstances brings about 
a change in the pace of life. (Simmel, 2004: 498, emphasis in original) 
 
The pace of life affects both our span of life and our experience, since it psychologically 
brings about a radical break in the contents of our imagination and our conception. Any 
imagination or conception faces the necessity of change when it faces ―a change in the pace 
of life.‖ Unlike the natural rhythm, which is relatively stable and is difficult to impose 
artificial modulation upon, the monetary economy opens up a new horizon with its fast 
circulation. While the establishment of rhythmic pace functions as a formative power for the 
system, it conceals the ―transitory character‖ of relationships among the actors, because, as 
Simmel warns, ―[t]he basic human trait of interpreting what is relative as an absolute 
conceals the transitory character of the relationship between an object and a specific amount 
of money and makes it appear as an objective and permanent relationship. This brings about 
disturbance and disorientation as soon as one link of the relationship changes‖ (Simmel, 
2004: 499). The ―disturbance‖ and ―disorientation,‖ often characterised as fluctuation and 
crisis, which we will see throughout following chapters as the critical break in the making of 
new subjectivity, can be seen as a diversification of rhythmic pace. It insinuates in the actors 
a sense of changeeven in seemingly stable rhythm. As such, these fluctuations function as 
differentiations in the rhythm of our life. In the monetary economy, frequent ―fluctuations in 
ownership brought about a sense of continuous change, sudden rifts and convulsions with 
the economic scene that spread to many other areas of life and were thus experienced as the 
growing intensity in the trend of economic life or as a quickening of its pace‖ (Simmel, 2004: 
500). The ―trend of economic life‖ is, therefore, ―mirrored psychologically‖ according to 
variations in the amount of money one can possess: 
 
The close relationship between money and the pace of life is illustrated by the fact that 
an increase as well as a decrease in the amount of money, as a consequence of its 
uneven diffusion, brings about those manifestations of differentiation that are mirrored 
psychologically in break-downs, irritations and the compression of mental process. 
This implication of change in the quantity of money is only a phenomenon or an 
accumulation of the significance of money for the relationship of objects, that is for 
their psychic equivalents. (Simmel, 2004: 503) 
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In this regard, Simmel tries to analyse the psychology of the stock exchange, where ceaseless 
fluctuations are witnessed as the generic rhythm of the monetary system. The stock exchange is 
the ―geometrical focal point‖ of all changes in valuation, where the ―swiftness‖ of the 
―sanguine-choleric oscillations between optimism and pessimism‖ directly affect emotional 
and psychological operation: 
 
[In the stock exchange] Economic values and interests are […] reduced to their 
monetary expression. The stock exchange and its representatives have achieved the 
closest possible local assembly in order to carry out the clearance, distribution and 
balancing of money in the quickest manner possible. This twofold condensation of 
values into the money form and of monetary transactions into the form of the stock 
exchange makes it possible for values to be rushed through the greatest number of 
hands in the shortest possible time […] The frequency of the turnover increases with 
fluctuations in the quoted price of a particular value […] Changes in valuation are 
greatly increased and even often brought about by the flexible quality of money to 
express them directly. And this is the cause as well as the effect of the fact that the stock 
exchange is the centre of money transactions. It is, as it were, the geometrical focal 
point of all these changes in valuation, and at the same time the place of greatest 
excitement in economic life. Its sanguine-choleric oscillations between optimism and 
pessimism, its nervous reaction to ponderable and imponderable matters, the swiftness 
with which every factor affecting the situation is grasped and forgotten again– all this 
represents an extreme acceleration in the pace of life, a feverish commotion and 
compression of its fluctuations, in which the specific influence of money upon the 
course of psychological life becomes most clearly discernible. (Simmel, 2004: 506) 
 
The rhythm in the stock market entails countless differentiations. It sees fluctuations, with 
which the rhythm seems to turn into an autonomous entity for the actors. Ceaseless changes 
in the amount of transactions and in valuations in the stock exchange embody rhythm as 
concrete and lived experience, for the frequency or the turnover time becomes, as such, a 
meaningful movement in the realisation of value. In this sense, rhythm transforms 
psychological life into a synthetic machine for reciprocating motions between pessimism 
and optimism, thus effectively modulating, for instance, any failure of the present for the 
anticipation of future success. It thus gives the actors a sense of forgetfulness as well as of 
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anticipation. By destabilising the psychic situation of the actors in constant ―feverish 
commotion and compression of its fluctuations,‖ the ―extreme acceleration in the pace of life‖ 
ironically stabilises the temporal operations upon which the capitalist narrative meta frame, 
the series of performances, can be conditioned as ―a form of defining reality‖ (Simmel, 2004: 
511). With the support of rhythm as lived experience in actualising value, as well as in defining 
reality in the monetary economy, narrative knowledge grounds contexts of performance for 
the formation of legitimatisation and normativity. Presupposing a temporal sequence with 
rhythmic repetition and differentiation, financial capitalism, under which even instant short-
sellings and day-tradings are regarded as normal in the rhythmic movement of value 
realisation, effectively valorises temporality in order to impose serialised narrative time as 
the ―extensions and configurations‖ of reality (Carr, 1991: 16). This is, of course, to guide the 
action and cognition of the actors.  
 
Narrative Time and Narrative Knowledge 
 
Articulating time with narrative, Ricoeur suggests first of all that narrative and time are, like 
two sides of a coin, in a symbiotic relationship, since ―time becomes human time to the 
extent that it is organised after the manner of a narrative; narrative, in turn, is meaningful to 
the extent that it portrays the features of temporal experience‖ (Ricoeur, 1984: 3). As the 
basic principle of organising temporality with semantic synthesis, narrative embodies the 
contents of time in association with events. Narrative, as the self-reproductive mechanism 
seeding ―productive imagination‖ for ―the schematism‖ of the ―signifying matrix,‖ guides 
human understanding and action in the representation of an event. Ricoeur goes on: 
 
With narrative, the semantic innovation lies in the inventing of another work of 
synthesisa plot. By means of the plot, goals, causes, and chance are brought together 
within the temporal unity of a whole and complete action. It is this synthesis of the 
heterogeneous that brings narrative close to metaphor. In both cases, the new 
thingthe as yet unsaid, the unwrittensprings up in language. Here a living 
metaphor, that is, a new pertinence in the predication, there a feigned plot, that is, a 
new congruence in the organization of the events. In both cases the semantic 
innovation can be carried back to the productive imagination and, more precisely, to 
the schematism that is its signifying matrix. (Ricoeur, 1984: ‗Preface‘ ix) 
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Here, the plot is the core intention of narrative, framing heterogeneous actions and events 
within a certain temporal unity of guiding action. For ―[a]ll the dynamism of employment 
finds itself referred to the logical-semantic operations and to the syntagmatisation of the 
narrative statements into programs, performances, and performance series‖ (Ricoeur, 1988: 
51). However, it also entails ―unsaid‖ or ―unwritten‖ interstices in narrative, in the synthesis 
of the heterogeneous. This occurs while ―bring[ing] narrative close to metaphor,‖ for which 
the narrative regulation brings up the possibility of reinterpretation as participationas 
well as of subsuming any sudden or unexpected actions in the name of creative articulations, 
which work for the extension of the system. Explaining this significant passage, Carr 
suggests that narrative, exploiting the capacity of ―seeing-as,‖ opens to ―the realm of the ‗as 
if‘‖: 
 
[N]arrative is a ‗semantic innovation‘ in which something new is brought into the 
world by means of language. Instead of describing the world, it re-describes it. 
Metaphor, he [Ricoeur] says, is the capacity of ‗seeing-as.‘ Narrative opens us to ‗the 
realm of the ―as if.‖‘ (Carr, 1991: 15)  
 
The opening of ―the realm of the ‗as if‘,‖ which is concomitant with the narrative 
representation of events, is the new mode of activation and extension of the intension of the 
system. Chiefly it brings up possibilities of synthesis through the politics of symbolic 
representations for the eventboth at present and for the event yet to come. This is in order 
to make a ―new congruence‖ in the interpretation as well as a new organisation of these 
events. In this sense, economists even acknowledge the necessity of employing literary tools 
for the analysis of the financial system. Following Lakoff (1992, p.418), McCloskey 
introduces metaphor as ―a structural mapping from one conceptual domain to another‖98 
(McCloskey, 1995: 215). McCloskey is one of few economists that underscore the need to 
incorporate literary devices in the analysis of mainstream economics. She tells us: 
 
In economic language, metaphors concern substitutability, metonymies concern 
complementarity. A set of supply and demand curves on a blackboard is a substitute, a 
                                            
98 McCloskey also puts emphasis on the relationship between metaphor and prediction in economic 
discourse, telling us that ―[t]he metaphors are best adapted to making predictions of tides in the sea 
or of shortages in markets, simulating out into a counterfactual world‖ (McCloskey, 1990: 6). 
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map, for a market. By contrast, the prediction of next month‘s unemployment is 
complementary with this month‘s figure: it completes the story. The one is modeling, 
the other history. When metaphor and story are combined, the result is allegory […] 
Allegories are particularly powerful systems of belief. Marxism combines a metaphor 
of class struggle with a story of the proletarian journey. Mainstream economics 
combines a metaphor of free exchange with a story of the bourgeois journey. The free 
exchange and the bourgeoisie are not in strict logic connected to each other but in 
combination make an impressive ideology. (McCloskey, 1995: 216) 
 
The traditional demarcation between ‗scientific‘ explanation and ‗fictional‘ metaphor is no 
longer feasible. The point is complementarity between the two, for persuasiveness of the 
case. In this sense, the equations and hypotheses in economy (as well as mathematics), along 
with all disciplinary fields of science, are ―stories‖: 
 
The equations are stories because they speak of time and therefore organize it, at least 
implicitly. The time-speaking themes will shape the raw experience, as a story does 
when it is more than a mere unthematized chronicle. The ‗time-speaking theme‘ is 
called in mathematics a ‗differential equation,‘ the fundamental mathematical idea 
introduced by Newton. (McCloskey, 1995: 217) 
 
Shaping the ―time-speaking themes,‖ which we observed as the temporal reconfiguration in 
the thematisation of financial narrative, economists live by metaphor by thematising the 
stories in which the market is a conversation (McCloskey, 1995: 230). McCloskey continues 
to associate economic thinking with literary theory in terms of value in her article, ‗The 
Literary Character of Economics‘: 
 
Both economics and synchronic linguistics are theories of value, that is to say, theories 
of psychological attitudes attached to things. […] The knowledge of economic history 
or economic politics or economic institutions is in this view the material for synchronic 
thinking. It becomes part of what the chemist and philosopher Michal Polanyi called 
the ‗tacit knowledge‘ about which the theorizing speaks. Synchronic theories such as 
neo-classical economics or Saussurean linguistics are suitable for mathematization. 
(McCloskey, 1984: 112–113) 
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For McCloskey, economics is literary and figurative operation; it is a discursive practice with 
the intention of persuasion. It works through the method of explanation, by suggesting 
―economics as rhetorical activity, in which economists deploy authorities, stories, and 
metaphors (models, for instance) to persuade each other‖ (McCloskey, 1989: 140). 
Interestingly, rhetorical activities in economics provide a ―moral entry point‖ (McCloskey, 
1989: 141) for the extension of a conversation in intellectual trade. As Genette also argues, 
narrative description contributes to a ―moral portrait,‖ which we will return to below. 
Rhetoric in economic discourse provides this moral entry point as an activation of discussion, 
which is opened to a wider field of conversation, for effective persuasion in the logic 
economists use. However, the rhetoric, metaphor, and literary character of economics that 
McCloskey accentuates are all unrelated devices, and should be encompassed within an 
organising principle. This is how they enter the field of power and exercise 
‗complementarity;‘ it is how such literary devices are employed and how they function: as 
narrative. 
Narrative operation allows actors to participate in the making of narrative extension 
only if they diversify the narrative plot in a new way. Financial narratives at a time of 
financial crisis, for instance, open up the possibility of reinterpretation of the event, and of 
reorganisations of the system, insofar as they are based on the main plot, of the bank as the 
crucial financial institution that has to be rescued at any cost. Narrative extensions are, 
however, differentiated, on the conditional continuity of „as if‟that is, if they are legitimatised. 
In this sense, narrative ―requires no legitimisation because it legitimates itself‖ (Sim, 2001: 1, 
emphasis added). A process of self-legitimisation through self-reference is the ground of 
extension for narrative knowledge, as we observed in Chapter 2. 
 
Narrative Time, Action, and Event  
 
As observed in the introduction, narrative legitimisation, following Lyotard, is a process of 
replacing the normativity of laws with performativity of discursive narrative procedures. 
This necessitates narrative configurations of time in the redescription of the event. The 
narrative capacity to represent, thus, entails understanding of the event in the context of 
temporal ―retention‖ and ―protention,‖ to use Husserl‘s terms, from which the event is 
located and anticipated. This is because the event is expressed in relation to temporal 
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procedures in which the ―protentional and retentional gaze‖ of the present spans the future 
as well as the past, in an actualisation of the event: 
 
The idea of an ‗event‘ is already that of something that takes time, has temporal 
thickness, beginning and end; and events are experienced as the phrases and elements 
of other, larger-scale events and processes. These make up the temporal configurations, 
like melodies and other extended occurrences and happenings, that are the stuff of our 
daily experience. Even though as temporal they unfold bit by bit, we experience them 
as configurations thanks to our protentional and retentional ‗gaze‘ which spans future 
and past. Like the spatial horizon, the horizons of the future and the past recede 
indefinitely, and it would surely be a mistake to identify retention and protention with 
‗short-term‘ memory and expectation. (Carr, 1991: 24) 
 
As temporal consciousness fuses the perspective of the present with the gaze of retention 
and protention in actualising the event, the event can acquire meaning as an organised series 
of performances. This is mainly because ―[i]n the midst of an action the future is not 
something expected or prefigured in the present, not something which is simply to come; it 
is something to be brought about by the action in which I am engaged‖ (Carr, 1991: 34, 
emphasis added). As such, the temporal span advances the future through the workings of 
action in the present, incorporating configured temporality into (future) event and action: 
 
[T]he temporal span is structured or configured into events, in the one case, and actions, 
in the other. For experience and for action, then, in order to qualify as a present phase, a 
given point in time must not only be a member of a sequence but must be an integral, 
functioning part of a temporal configuration constituting an event or an action. (Carr, 
1991: 41)  
 
The temporal configuration between action and event is ―essential to narrative structure‖ 
(Carr, 1991: 45). Here, it can be noted that in financial narrative, the ―financial gaze‖ is 
constantly working towards ―the increasing attention given to the measurement of short-
term financial performance‖ (Thrift, 2002: 203). Through this the actualisation of the event, 
or the realisation of value, is brought about by the performance, and by exploiting the 
latency of the future as the concrete as well as symbolic form of, for instance, ―futures.‖ In 
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temporal financial configuration, the future accommodates the present as the sense of ending 
that is to be realised. Hilferding comments that this is the act of manufacturing the mood in 
the stock market. Any ―analysis‖ in the market thus works to bring about actions on the part 
of the actors in the making of future valueat a time when the ongoing present is already 
intervening in the making of the future. Scattering narrative knowledge as various 
interpretations and analyses, the main players encourage the actors to participate in the 
extension of the narrative process. The actions of the actors, represented as volumes of the 
transaction, are directly linked with the profit. In this sense, narrative structure is 
―intersubjective and social‖ in which ―a self-reflective operation‖ of the actor, against the 
narrative voice, becomes the ―activity of interiorization of the social situation‖ (Carr, 1991: 
63). 
This can be seen in what Ricoeur characterises as the act of ―emplotment‖ in narrative 
formation. This is analysed as ―emplotment is the operation that dynamizes every level of 
narrative articulation. Emplotment is much more than one level among many. It is what 
brings about the transition between narrating and explaining‖ (168). ―Emplotment,‖ in this 
sense, ―is what qualifies an event as historical‖ (Ricoeur, 168). Carr also accentuates the 
mediating role of emplotment ―between events and story, [and] unifying the chronological 
with the non-chronological,‖ which thus constitutes the events in a ―linear fashion‖ (Carr, 
1991: 64).99 Signifying the sense of linearity in the constitution of event and action, the 
narrative process functions, as Simmel observes, as the specific ―technique of centralising the 
tendency.‖ In this process, the actor gains a sense of ―self-awareness‖ as a ―subject‖ in the 
group in action: 
 
Thus, in the relation between formulating and communicating, on the one hand, and 
receiving or accepting a narrative account, on the other, the group achieves a kind of 
reflexive self-awareness as a ‗subject‘ that is analogous to what we found in the 
individual. As with the individual, so with the group, the more complex and extended 
the undertaking, the greater the need for collective stock-taking or Besinnung, which 
may require revision of the narrative account to meet changing circumstance. (Carr, 
1991: 156) 
                                            
99 More fundamentally, the operation of constitution of the events in linearity is the operation dealing 
with uncertainty: aporia. ―Emplotment […] replies to the speculative aporia with a poetic making of 
something capable, certainly, of clarifying the aporia, but not of resolving it theoretically‖ (Ricoeur, 
1984: 6). 
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The formation of the subject, which is often seen in the use of the collective pronoun, we, in a 
narrative account, is an important technique in subjection/subjectivationas we examined 
in Chapter 2since the formation of a collective subject produces narrative inter-subjectivity 
between the narrator and the narratee. ―We‖ as the ―transcendental subject‖ is thus the 
essential narrative operation in the constitution of the group for a certain context. This 
grouping effect is, however, also an action in the politics of exclusion, with its containment 
of second- and third-person pronouns, and thus it makes the group ―forget‖ those outside 
the narrative context. This politics of oblivion does not just exclude the second- and third-
person pronouns; it also excludes individual positions, ushering the distinctive plural into 
the collective narrative subject we: 
 
The interesting thing is that such an analysis need not even give up the ―first person‖ 
perspective: in calling on these grammatical categories we have almost forgotten that 
the first person (like the second and the third) can be plural as well as singular. It is 
often in using the pronoun ―we‖ that each of us as an individual expresses his or her 
membership in some particular group. It is in each case I who say ‗we.‘ When this 
happens, a new subject emerges for the experiences and actions in which I am engaged. 
(Carr, 1991: 120) 
 
Genette contemplates that this first-person narrative politics of inclusion above all structures 
a sense of anticipation, according to which the actor‘s role and action can be alluded to. Here 
―[t]he ‗first-person‘ narrative lends itself better than any other to anticipation, by the very 
fact of its avowedly retrospective character, which authorizes the narrator to allude to the 
future and in particular to his present situation, for these to some extent form part of his role‖ 
(Genette, 1980: 67). 
 
Narrative Discourse and Narrative Economy 
 
Although Genette focuses his theory of narrative upon textual analysis, he also opens up the 
possibility of further articulation in three ways: first, his emphasis on narrative reality and 
narrative relationships can be reinterpreted for the analysis of narrative operation as ―the 
function of a sort of indispensible transfer point‖ for ―dispatching narrative‖ (Genette, 1980: 
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45); second, since he considers the essential feature of narrative operation to be temporal 
distortion, or narrative ―anachronism‖ in his termsthrough temporal (re)order, duration, 
and frequencytemporal (re)configurations in narrative time can be further articulated in 
the making of narrative operation; finally, his postulations of narrative temporality and its 
effects describe some important organising principles of narrative operation, such as 
―narrative economy.‖ Though he does not deliver a full analysis of these featured, his 
notionssuch as ―narrative economy,‖―narrative scattering,‖ and ―narrative 
juncture‖provide crucial points of engagement from which we will seek to reassess 
narrative in the field of finance, and examine its operation in supporting economic value. 
Genette defines ―three aspects of narrative reality,‖ extending the boundaries of 
narrative outside textual analysis and including ―oral‖ as well as ―written‖ narrative 
statements. ―Narrative,‖ according to him, first ―refers to the narrative statement, the oral or 
written discourse that undertakes to tell of an event or a series of events.‖ As narrative 
entails a ―series‖―real or fictitious,‖ the second aspect of narrative reality highlights the 
relational operation it entails. Here, ―narrative refers to the succession of events, real or 
fictitious, that are the subjects of this discourse, and to their several relations of linking, 
opposition, repetition, etc.‖―Analysis of narrative,‖ he adds, ―in this sense means the study of 
a totality of actions and situations taken in themselves, without regard to the medium, linguistic 
or other, though which knowledge of that totality comes to us.‖ Accentuating narrative as 
―the system of relationship,‖ Genette assumes a ―narrative totality,‖ in which actions and 
situations are located in relation to temporal ―succession.‖ What should be noted finally is 
the implication of the event, for ―narrative refers once more to an event not, however, the 
event that is recounted, but the event that consists of someone recounting something: the act of 
narrating taken in itself‖ (Genette, 1980: 25–26, emphasis added). For Genette, the event of 
narrative is not just the event ―recounted‖ (as static) but the event as active, which 
interconnects with the act of ―recounting‖ itself. The active event of recounting is the 
becoming event, and it is in a constant relationship with ―narrative enunciating.‖ Therefore, 
―it is just as evident that the narrative discourse depends absolutely on that action of telling, 
since the narrative discourse is produced by the action of telling in the same way that any 
statement is the product of an act of enunciating‖ (Genette, 1980: 26, emphasis added). In 
Genette‘s theory, an event has an entity and meaning within the ―action of enunciating.‖ 
Unlike other narratologists, Genette persistently points out that any narrative analysis must 
pay careful attention to ―the problems of narrative enunciating,‖ because they reveal how 
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the event and the action are interwoven and produced in the making of a narrative 
discourseas ―the study of relationships‖ in reality.100 
 
[A]nalysis of narrative discourse […] constantly implies a study of relationships: on the 
one hand the relationship between a discourse and the events that it recounts, on the 
other hand, the relationship between the same discourse and the act that produces it, 
actually or figuratively. (Genette, 1980: 26–27; emphasis added) 
 
Genette defines ―story‖ as ―the signified or narrative content,‖ and ―narrative‖ as ―the 
signifier, statement, discourse or narrative text itself.‖ However, these two signifying frames 
are active only through the mediation of ―narrating‖ as ―the producing narrative action, and, 
by extension, the whole of the real or fictional situation in which that action takes place.‖ 
Here, what is underscored is, once again, the ―narrating‖ or ―enunciating‖ process, by which 
actions and events eventually become productive (Genette, 1980: 27). 
Genette specifically emphasises that narrating or enunciating is effectively 
implemented in ―temporal distortions,‖ which act ―on the relationships of linking, 
alternation, or embedding among the different lines of action that make up the story‖ 
(Genette, 1980: 29). As the ―time of enunciating‖―focuses on the act of narrating and its 
protagonists‖ and, thus, forms ―the modalities of representation or the degrees of mimesis,‖ 
the temporality and its delivery of enunciation, through the making of ―narrative pseudo-time‖ 
(Genette, 1980: 30, emphasis added), is the crucial point in understanding the narrative 
operation. This critical analysis articulates narrative into temporality, conceptualising the 
narrative elements of event, and placing actor and action in linearity through temporal 
reconfigurationor in the instance of ―temporal distortions‖ for ―modalities of 
representation‖ with the narrator‘s intention. 
Episodic stories turn into a collective operativity. They form a narrative representation 
in aid of three basic classes of determination: tense, mood, and voice (Genette, 1980: 31). 
Tense operates temporal relations between narrative and story by way of order, duration, 
                                            
100 In this regard, Genette asserts that narrative is nothing other than a ―system of relationship[s]‖ in 
which repeated narrative events and statements guide a certain relationship. ―A system of 
relationships is established between these capacities for „repetition‟ on the part of both the narrated 
events (of the story) and the narrative statements (of the text)a system of relationships that we can a 
priori reduce to four virtual types, simply from the multiplication of the two possibilities given on 
both sides: the event repeated or not, the statement repeated or not‖ (Genette, 1980: 114, emphasis 
added). 
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and frequency. Mood is concerned with ―dealing with modalities (forms and degrees) of 
narrative ‗representation‘,‖ while voice is concerned with ―dealing with the way in which 
narrating itself is implicated in the narrative;‖―that is, the narrative situation or its instance, 
and along with that its two protagonists: the narrator and his audience, real or implied.‖ 
What is distinctive in Genette‘s account of narrative is that his observations are heavily 
focused on narrative tense, for he understands this as the essential category of the narrative 
system. It is here that which order, duration, and frequency make time the narrative 
temporality of ―pseudo-time‖ (Genette, 1980: 34). They guide cognition and action for the 
valorization of narrative operations.  
Narrative time is, in this regard, ―narrative anachrony‖ (Genette, 1980: 35). Here 
―anachrony‖―designates all forms of discordance between two temporal orders of story and 
narrative‖ (Genette, 1980: 40). Although ―anachrony is one of the traditional resources of 
literary narration‖ (Genette, 1980: 36), the effect of narrative anachrony does not remain 
fixed in the field of literature. In this sense, Genette points out that Proustian narrative is the 
refined realisation of anachronism, given that ―[t]he importance of ‗anachronic‘ narrative in 
À la Recherche du Temps Perdu [In Search of Lost Time] is obviously connected to the 
retrospectively synthetic character of Proustian narrative, which is totally present in the 
narrator‘s mind at every moment‖ (Genette, 1980: 78). It is the fundamental process of 
making things live, as it above all evokes ―memory‖ and allows ―the doing of life‖ in the 
present: 
 
Thus, the anachronism of the narrative is now that of existence itself, now that of 
memory, which obeys other laws than those of time. The variations in tempo, likewise, 
are now the doing of ‗life,‘ now the work of memory, or rather of forgetfulness. 
(Genette, 1980: 157–158) 
 
Narrative anachronism thus involves a double operativity: by formulating memory in a 
certain anachronistic form, through which ―all forms of discordance‖ between 
heterogeneous disseminated stories and narrative are correlated in narrative temporality, it 
also does the work of ―forgetfulness.‖ It works for ―the doing of life‖ as living experience, 
which can be seen as the politics of narrative in organising the real world as well. In this 
sense ―they [prolepses] are testimonies to the intensity of the present memory, and to some 
extent authenticate the narrative of the past […] To the extent they bring the narrating 
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instance itself directly into play, these anticipations in the present constitute not only data of 
narrative temporality but also data of voice‖ (Genette, 1980: 69–70). The temporal variation 
signifies the necessity of ―retrospection‖ and ―anticipation‖ for the actors in narrative 
regulation, and this can in turn be associated with a temporal understanding of the 
phenomenology of ―retention‖ and ―pretention.‖ While prolepsis is the ―narrative maneuver 
that consists of narrating or evoking in advance an event that will take place later,‖ analepsis 
is the ―evocation after the fact of an event that took place earlier than the point in the story 
where we are at any given moment‖ (Genette, 1980: 40). ―But the very ideas of retrospection 
or anticipation, which ground the narrative categories of analepsis and prolepsis,‖ are 
viewed as the fundamental operations of ―psychology,‖ which makes temporal 
configurations ―take for granted a perfectly clear temporal consciousness and unambiguous 
relationships among present, past, and future‖101 (Genette, 1980: 78–79). Narrative operation, 
mainly through these two temporal distortions, aims for the implementation of narrative 
pseudo-time as the existential condition. It thus has ―the function of a sort of indispensable 
transfer point for dispatching narrative‖ (Genette, 1980: 45). These basic narrative 
maneuvers, along with ellipsis and paralipsis, lend themselves to retrospective-prospective 
―filling-in(s)‖ (Genette, 1980: 52). Through the process of temporal reconfiguration, events 
are not just sequenced but valorized in different temporal operations, which then effectively 
                                            
101 Concerning the temporal reconfiguration of narrative and its psychological proposition, narrative 
repetitionmainly through analepsis and prolepsisneeds to be analysed as a process of ―mental 
construction.‖As Genette explicates, ―[t]he ‗repetition‘ is in fact a mental construction, which 
eliminates from each occurrence everything belonging to it that is peculiar to itself, in order to 
preserve only what it shares with all the others of the same class, which is an abstraction: ‗the sun,‘ 
‗the morning,‘ ‗to rise.‘ This is well known, and I recall it only to specify once and for all that what we 
will name here ‗identical events‘ or ‗recurrence of the same event‘ is a series of several similar events 
considered only in terms of their resemblance‖ (Genette, 1980: 113, emphasis in original). 
Repetition in narrative therefore eventually brings valorisation of temporality and action, as it 
establishes a relationship among events and their development. ―A system of relationships is 
established between these capacities for ‗repetition‘ on the part of both the narrated events (of the 
story) and the narrative statements (of the text)a system of relationships that we can a priori reduce 
to four virtual types, simply from the multiplication of the two possibilities given on both sides: the 
event repeated or not, the statement repeated or not.‖ (Genette, 1980: 114) The repeated events, with 
narrative statementwhich is iterative narrative in Genette‘s analysisdetermines, specifies, and 
extends the main event. ―Every iterative narrative is a synthetic narrating of the events that occur and 
reoccur in the course of an iterative series that is composed of a certain number of singular units. Take 
the series: Sunday in the summer of 1890. It is composed of a dozen real units. The series is defined, 
first, by its diachronic limits, and then by the rhythm of recurrence of its constituent units […] We will 
term the first distinguishing characteristic determination, and the second, specification. Finally, we will 
term the diachronic extent of each of the constituent units, and consequently of the constituted 
synthetic unit, extension[…]‖ (Genette: 1980: 127). 
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represent the structure of events. ―Narrative is,‖ therefore, ―not only constitutive of the 
temporal structure of communal events, which take the form of configured sequences with 
beginnings, middles, and ends, turning points and reversals, departures and returns, 
suspensions and resolutions, etc. It is also found in the reflective, prospective-retrospective 
grasp of these sequences which assigns them these configurations by telling about them as 
they are going on‖ (Genette: 1980: 168). 
This is the context Genette refers to with regard to ―narrative economy,‖ where he 
suggests that the ―narrative matrix‖ (Genette, 1980: 66) is effectively operated temporally. If 
we extend Genette‘s view to the analysis of the cultural strategy of financial capital in 
formulating financial reality, we see that narrative economy can be seen as a system of 
regulating narrative for effective and efficient ―reciprocal entanglement‖ (Genette, 1980: 79). 
Here the frequency and duration of interpolations and extrapolations are exercised, for the 
purpose of narrative valorization in supporting the narrator‘s intention. What narrative 
economy aims at is the extension of the primal event, for which other events are effectively 
interpreted and regulated in a reconfiguration of narrative temporality. The primal event 
thus functions as a paradigm that other events should follow. Genette explains, for instance, 
how some crucial scenes are primal events in Proust‘ novel, À la Recherche du Temps Perdu [In 
Search of Lost Time], function through the effects of narrative frequency and repetition: 
 
[…]on the occasion of first time (first kiss of Swann and Odette, first sight of the sea at 
Balbec, first evening at the hotel in Doncieres, first dinner with the Guermantes) […] it 
serves as a paradigm of the others that follow […] paradigmatic function by opening 
out a view onto the later series […] They are thus, like any anticipation, a mark of 
narrative impatience. (Genette, 1980: 72, emphasis in original) 
 
The primal event is produced repeatedly with multiple identities. So the identity of the primal 
event is at stake in the multiplicity of representions of the intensity of the experience. By 
describing the primal event with different modes of narrative temporal distortions, narrative 
constitutes a nexus of intentionalitiesthese form the primal unity from which a set of 
relationships takes shape, transferring and amplifying the intention of the narrator. As 
phenomenology has it, a ―primal impression‖ is constituted, since ―[c]ontinuous immanent 
production of primal moments always forms a multiplicity which undergoes temporal 
modification as it runs off. Although each primal multiplicity runs off as a simultaneous 
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unity, all belong to a single flow, always sharing the form of transience from not-yet to no-
longer now‖ (Turetzky, 2000: 170). Thus, ―[p]rimal impressions share the same running-off 
modes, even though they may vary in duration and in other intentional modifications 
included in their content. The being-together-now of this complex does not vary, but gets 
retentionally modified as a whole in a continuum of phases‖ (Turetzky, 2000: 170). This 
narrative work forms in the emergence of a simultaneity, for ―[s]imultaneity is constituted 
when primal impressions arise at a single now point‖ (Turetzky, 2000: 170). Therefore 
retentional-protentional ―being-togetherness‖ connects ―the primal impression‖ with the 
complex whole of the narrative process. According to Turetzky, ―[t]his intentional nexus 
unites the multiplicity of impressional consciousness and the complex of its running-off 
modes; hence the constitution of simultaneity cannot be extricated from that of temporal 
succession. Immanent time is constituted as a unity, a being-together of immanent objects 
and contents, necessarily and continually elapsing as ever new primal unities arise‖ 
(Turetzky, 2000: 170). 
The primal event is proliferated and intensified through narrative operations that 
interweave and realign various events around the primal event, distributing narrative 
junctures as points of reinterpretation of the event: thus they produce a the sense of 
connectedness. Narrative intervention at the time of the primal event initiates the 
extrapolation of a primal impression of the event through collective narrative scatterings, 
such as of media coverage, comments of international financial agents, and government 
briefings. When South Korea was hit by the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the narrative 
interpretation that defined the primal scene was a series of reports made by the World Bank. 
In 1998, the institution presented a comprehensive report titled ―East Asia: The Road to 
Recovery,‖ giving explanations of the causes and effects of the crisis and prescribing a 
temporal road map for opening up the financial markets of the region in order to overcome 
the crisis. As it was the first detailed official version of narrative intervention into the crisis, 
the report was widely enunciated. It had a ―paradigmatic function,… by opening out a view 
onto the later series,‖ as Genette puts it, that marked the narrative anticipation with 
repeated signification of the identity of the event. (Genette, 1980: 72) The main points it 
raises shed light on how narrative politics works, since the narrative representation of the 
event reveals a core nexus of intentionalities in the financial regime. It sets a context of 
performance and regulates narrative articulations with the portrayal of multiple identities of 
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the event.102 The report, first of all, clearly defines the root of the crisis as ―endogenous‖ 
rather than an exogenous or correlated, even though the event was the product of 
multilayered issueswith global as well as regional financial flows creating contagion and 
entanglement effects. Even if the report initially acknowledges the uniqueness of the crisis as 
it ―fused a currency crisis, banking crisis and a regional financial panic into a particularly 
virulent strand of economic malady,‖ the ―prescriptions‖ focus on the far-reaching 
restructuring of regional financial sectors for the purpose of ―revitalizing international 
capital flows by restoring investor confidence.‖ The aim was to contain exogenous factors 
such as excessive lending by international investment banks and sub-financial institutions to 
the region.  
The crisis, according to the main author of the report, Richard Newfarmer, was even 
designated a ―human crisis‖ of a lack of governance. It is not surprising that, based on this 
line of interpretation and representation, the institution, along with the IMF, rehistoricises 
the financial narrative by extrapolating the unprecedentedincluding imposing drastically 
raised interest rates throughout the crisis-stricken area, mainly to attract foreign ―investors.‖ 
The prescription immediately led to a high rate of unemployment (12% in Korea as of 1998, 
from 4% in early 1997) and rapid contraction of the economy in the region. According to an 
Oxfam report, this measure was nothing but a schematization for ―mortgaging the country‘s 
future to international creditors‖103by politicising the influence of international creditors 
in the local financial crisis and thus depoliticising the local government and the people. The 
narrative of the World Bank became the paradigm of the event, based on which other 
mainstream narrative articulations were made. What the narrative operation implies is, thus, 
not just economic ―reform‖ but the imposition of a new set of relationships between the 
narrator and the narratee, performing economic uncertainty as the narrative transfer point in 
delivering and consolidating the narrators‘ intentions.  
The following chapters, including the conclusion, extend the problematisation of 
narrative representation to the formation of economic subjectivity and the subsumption 
mechanism, showing how the narrative intention of the system is encoded and indentified 
                                            
102 In narrative articulations, the role and function of news media associated with main narrative 
apparatuses is critical. Although mainstream media, such as Time and Newsweek, are seemingly 
―arbitrary‖ in covering a certain event, ―a distinct linear pattern that can predict how coverage will 
unfold for future crisis coverage‖ can be witnessed as their ―narratives‖ are ―coded and identified‖ 
(Caldiero, 2007, emphasis added). ―The salient issue beyond the use of the narrative in crisis 
reporting,‖ according to Caldiero, ―is whether a pattern of reporting exists between the public and the 
news media by which stories are ‗pre-destined‘ to be reported in a particular way.‖ 
103 ―East Asian ‗Recovery‘ Leaves the Poor Sinking,‖ Oxfam International Briefing, October 1998. 
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in the object. I will examine how the formation of new economic subjectivity is an activation 
or subjection/subjectivation of the object. The cultural operation of finance should be firmly 
probed, on the basis of financial economic rationales, in locating the epistemological context 
of finance capital and its mediating character, and in transforming the social relationship. It 
is therefore important to map out the economic necessity of capital transformation that is 
related to the emergence of the monetary system. 
Chapter 7 focuses on the mediating function of monetary capital. Monetary capital is 
also emphasised as a form of cognition associated with symbolic influence and value 
transcoding functions in transforming social relationships. Money becomes an autonomous 
entity when accumulated as financial capital. The banking culture, for instance, as a 
legitimate regulatory activity and a universal measure of the mobilisation of individual 
money for the money-capital reserve, functions, following Ernest Mandel, as a ―mediating 
link in the process of cognition” (Mandel, 1981: 29, emphasis in original). It will be suggested 
that it gives legitimate access to the system, beyond economic procedures, and that it 
reshapes individual and social relationships. This theoretical approach is critical in 
scrutinising how the mode of production becomes social cognition, in which an economic 
process occupies the position of a socially symbolic episteme. This regulates cognition and 
subsequent actions in the actualisation and realisation of the dominant value. It is 
implemented through the mediation and transformation of social relations, opening thereby 
a narrative operation that works more effectively for cultural representation of value, and 
which thereby consolidates the economic. In the chapter, the newly authorised mediation, 
linked with the cultural performativity of financial capital, is analysed as the dialectical 
process of measurement of bank capital that underlies the accumulation of capital itself.  
As the chapter assays this new valorisation system, I show how it is radically different 
from the industrial mode of capitalistic production. I consider the fact that that in the 
process of surplus value production the monetary mode of production tendentially negates the 
mediation phase with which the concrete value of human labour and social relations is 
redefined in terms of financial logicparticularly in terms of the reconfigured temporality 
of financial transactions. It also transmits value through the circulation of abstracted and 
dematerialised financial flows, often decoupled from material contexts.104 Based on this 
                                            
104 Financial abstraction or immateriality is ―the form of capital empty of content‖ in Alliez‘s analysis. 
Therefore ―it is economic determination in its pure form, [and] it signifies the reversal of the true 
order of things on the basis of which money as such is already potentially value becoming valued. 
Because it capitalizes the essential dissemblance of potential time, its empty form and its pure force, 
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investigation, we can assume that finance capital is in a position to realign and appropriate 
social relations as the store of value; and therefore it is much easier for finance capital to 
foreground value politics on its own terms. This is the point at which I bridge the all-
permeating, subsuming mode of production with an analysis of narrative theory, through 
which we can eventually articulate the monetary form into its cultural strategy. We can see 
how the necessity of the new economic value is contrived, producing a hermeneutic code 
based on the abstraction of the division of labour and social and (inter)national relationships, 
according to which a local economic sub-system should be reinterpreted as existing. 
Focusing on the distinctive modes of activation of financial capital, the chapter also 
investigates the roles and functions of the credit system, which are closely coordinated with 
the banking system. As a transformational money-mediator, a capitalistic exchange 
relationship formulates a system of value in order to valorise its own value independent of 
material reproduction. A credit ratings company, like a bank, mediates social relations 
through surveillance of diverse sources of credit, transcoding heterogeneous actions into 
economic performance. This in turn is inseparably associated with the growing integration 
and international responsiveness of markets. As such, the seemingly decentralised and 
dematerialized globalization that occurs through financial activation is considered to be an 
oppressive form of diversity, through which differentiation of actions presupposes valorisation 
and moves toward de-differentiation and de-individuationunder the constant monitoring 
of the financial narrative apparatuses. With the credit agency‘s role correlated to the 
reference of Otherness, by providing information as a legitimate index for economic 
evaluation under financial capitalism, the interpretation becomes official data. Recall 
Moody‘s role in representing and rating the Korean financial crisisthis reveals the specific 
evaluating strategies of cultural performativity on the part of the financial agency. It 
occurred through the firm‘s ceaseless hermeneutic shifts in reinterpretation and redefinition 
of various local factors, by which the operativity of information and actors in the market are 
conditioned. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
the critique of finance capital sums up the whole critique of capitalism,‖ which lead to ―the operative 
autonomy of its mechanical action, in the senseless efficacy of its nominalist structure‖ (Alliez, 1996: 
xviii, emphasis in original). 
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Chapter 7 
 
Monetary Capital, Mediation and Transformation of Social Relationship 
 
 
 
After my close examination of the process of financialisation and its legitimisation and 
activation through narrative operation in the previous chapters, this chapter explains 
monetary capital as a mediating form of social relationship. It locates the role of monetary 
capital and shows its cultural implications under financial capitalism. Suggesting that the 
bank is one of three main agents, along with the international financial organisations and 
credit rating firms, that subsume the object into an exchange-value relationship, the bank is 
approached as, first, the capital reservoir of the monetary form, from which accumulation of 
money is eventually transformed into financial capital. Such a critical transformation of the 
character of money from the means of purchase to the means of payment, implying credit 
money, can only be possible as the bank emerges at the centremobilising all idle money. It 
operates the money-pool for financial commodities in the financial capital market. This 
chapter focuses upon three dimensions of the bank‘s role, associated with the formation of 
banking culture and its discursive performativityfor transformation of value and cultural 
valorisation of the economic under financial capitalism.  
The first approach is based on the traditional theoretical framework of economic 
studies, in which banks are viewed as entities engineering mobilisation of capital. However, 
I suggest that banking is a legitimate regulatory activity and universal measure, not only for 
the mobilisation of individual money, but for the reserve of money capital. They also 
function, according to Ernest Mandel, as a ―mediating link in the process of cognition‖ (Mandel, 
1981: 29, emphasis in original), which is essentially to say they encroach on the realm of 
epistemology beyond the economic in contributing to the valorisation of the system. This 
theoretical approach will show how a specific financial strategy becomes social cognition, 
with which the economic process attains a position of socially authorised mediation. Second, 
in conjunction with the cultural performativity of financial capital, the role of the bank is 
analysed from the perspective of credit and credit expansion. In this regard, the bank is, 
with the empowered authority of transferability, actively engaged as a ―guarantor of credit‖ 
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(Hilferding, 1981: 84). 
As a credit regulatory framework, the bank, finally, on an (inter)national level, plays a 
pivotal role in processes surrounding the capital flow, for which it even gets involved in the 
sphere of the cultural. That is to say, its conditionalities regulate expectations and 
behaviours beyond economic procedure. The conditionalities imposed by the World Bank 
and examined in this chapter are suggested to be not just economic guidelines but cultural 
assumptions affecting the performativity of the object. These three aspects of the bank‘s role 
are inseparable from one another in that they fundamentally presuppose the definition and 
realisation of the dominant value and its legitimacy, accompanying the reconfiguration of 
the position of the subject and the objects and their roles in the system. Reconsidering the 
processes of standardised banking culture and its (inter)national policy, this chapter seeks to 
reveal the actual ways in which monetary capital functions for the stabilisation and 
efficiency of the financial system, and thereby transforming the social relations. For the third 
theoretical concern, the role of the World Bankin association with borrowing countriesis 
reconsidered, along with some representative commercial banks of the financial crisis in 
Korea, in order to underscore the mediating function of the bank. Namely, the bank 
coordinates banks as a form of cognition; the bank is the universal measure, performing 
qualitative difference with symbolic influence in realigning the social relations. 
 
The Bank as a Mediator of Transformation in the Quantity-Quality Paradigm: Dialectic 
Measure of Quantity into Quality 
 
The transformative and operative function of financial capital can be more clearly 
understood by revisiting the old law of transformation of quantity into quality, as financial 
capital undergoes a fundamental change through quantitative accumulation. On being 
accumulated, monetary capital develops its own momentum, which is radically different in 
quality. To grasp the transforming character of the accumulated money of financial capital—
as the store of value affecting cognitive operations around the notion of the valuable, as well 
as economic behaviour in value realisationwe will revisit Marx‘s concept of money. 
Marx‘s theory states that the quantity-quality paradigm of capital is performed through the 
value transcoding function of accumulated money capital. Recapitulating the development of 
the concepts of the quality-quantity formulation by Kant, Hegel, and Marx, this chapter will 
focus on the function of mediation that financial capital performs which, if it does not 
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determine, creates the conditions for the possibility of cognition and action by reorganising 
social relations. It then describes the cultural implications of financial capital, inquiring into 
the existential conditions of the subject under a financial regime. 
Hegel‘s dialectic notion of quantity-quality-measure relations can be read alongside 
Marx‘s theoretical construction of the value form, by transposing the quality-quantity-
measure relationship onto the general human labour-abstract labour-general equivalent 
money in Marx‘s schema: 
 
In the first section [of Hegel‘s Science of Logic] on quality one finds terms and 
developments parallel to Marx‘s elaboration of the value-form, which is constituted in 
and constitutes the development of abstract labour (quality), and ultimately appears in 
the universal equivalent money (measure). In the second section Hegel‘s quantity is 
introduced as the suspension of quality […] where particular equivalents are 
inadequate because they are fractured forms of ‗general human labour,‘ an endless 
series of various commodity equivalents that deprives abstract labour of any unified 
appearance. Also in measure one has a ‗qualitative Quantum,‘ and interestingly, 
although Marx‘s notes are in German, this phrase is in English. ‗Measure is the 
qualitative quantum, in the first place as immediatea quantum, to which a 
determinate being or a quality is attached […] Measure, where quality and quantity are 
in one, is thus the completion of being‘. (Nelson, 1999: 177, emphasis in original) 
 
This is a significant passage, which needs to be articulated further in order to consider 
further the transformational mechanism of ―the leap‖ from abstract labour to general 
equivalent money. The theoretical conundrum here stems from taking Hegel‘s methodology 
as the presupposition of analysis, when it lacks the relational aspect of the three processes in 
the dialectic. Hegel‘s concept of ―measure‖ signifies the point of imagined unification by the 
thinking subject rather than by the dialectic transformation of thesis and anti-thesis in reality, 
within which an actual power relationship is constantly working. Therefore, Hegel‘s 
―measure,‖ which is positioned as the (provisional) completion of the dialectic, lacks a 
mediating link as it is fulfilled through the procedure of primary (quantity) and secondary 
(quality) development; it is synthesised for the ―completion of being‖ corresponding to the 
absolute, such as the ideal for Plato. As the schema is basically speculative, in part I of―Anti-
Dühring,‖ Frederick Engels criticises the Hegelian nodal line of measure relations, arguing 
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that in it quantitative change passes at certain points into qualitative transformation, but 
does not assume any relevant mediating working that formulates the qualitative leap.105 
According to Kant, cognition is perfect as to quantity, if it is universal, while as to 
quality, if it is distinct. Viewed from this angle, cognition will be logically perfect when it has, 
with regard to quantity, objective universality (universality of the concept or rule) and with 
regard to quality, objective distinctness (distinctness in the concept) (Kant, 1988: 43). When 
quantity is achieved as the universal position, it enters the sphere of epistemological 
operation, while quality has its distinction as cognition. However, the metamorphosing 
relationship between the two is not suggested; although this explanation is critical in 
revealing the process of cognition of quantity as objective universality.  
Although some theorists defend Hegel‘s assumption that ―quantity reveals qualitative 
meaning, or rather, a multiplicity of meanings within a finite determination,‖ it is not clear 
how quantity acquires momentum for ―multiplying‖ the signification of meanings (Haas, 
2000: 132). Quantity can be identified as the implicit quality in that ―for quality, quantity is 
not simply any quality, not just one among many; rather, it is the quantity of quality. Here 
the qualitative-quantitative concept means that quality is a quantity […]‖ (Haas, 2000: 132, 
emphasis in original). The qualitative difference between quantity and quality is here 
sutured. What is at stake, however, is the actual mechanism that makes a qualitative 
transformation, to which Marx tries to apply his theory of value. As Hegel and Kant, along 
with a number of other theorists, do not pay close attention to the aspects of value formation 
by which quantity-quality is recomposed, the relationship often assumes that the two are 
constant, rather than variable and inevitably fluctuating within the socio-economic field of 
powerand in acquisition of value. 
From the viewpoint of capital, the bank functions as a source of quantity. However, 
the source is not static. It ceaselessly mediates to produce value, transforming the 
relationship between the operator and the actor. The bank as mediator becomes a ―measure,‖ 
performing qualitative difference. While it accumulates capital, it also metamorphoses itself 
into a value-transcoding agent, for it has potential to act as a (re)organisational power. The 
accumulated capital operates its accumulated quantity as the condition of possible actions and 
cognition in producing and transferring legitimate value. Bank capital, thus, represents, as Marx 
puts it, the transformed social relationship with, on the one hand, the centralisation of money 
capital of the lenders and, on the other, the centralisation of the borrowers (Marx, 1981: 528). 
                                            
105 http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/ch10.htm. 
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By means of accumulation in terms of quantity, the double function of capital is established, 
since progressive accumulation expands ―spheres of interest‖ for both lender and borrower 
(Luxembourg, 2003: 424). The expansion, as Luxembourg argues, becomes a pretext for 
valorisation of the political as well as the economic in society. The ―centralisation of money 
capital‖ is, then, the point at which accumulated money-capital operates within its own self-
valorising logic. It is here that capital acquires the self-referential or self-validating 
mechanisms necessary for the reconstitution of social relations: these eventually aim at the 
reproduction of capital and the (re)production of the financial mode of social relationships. 
Ernest Mandel in this regard points out that monetary capital eventually functions as the 
―mediating link in the process of cognition,‖ setting up a qualitatively different social rationale 
that actors resort to in order to perform (Mandel, 1981: 29, emphasis in original). It is at this 
stage that bank capital transforms itself into a meaningful signifier as well as the signified, 
since its symbolic distinction devalorises and revalorises disparate values of society in 
financial terms. 
Bank capital eventually becomes the source of surplus value, irrespective of the 
physical mediation of labour power, and this grounds the fluid workings of the financial 
mode of production. ―Capital‖ at this stage ―appears as a mysterious and self-creating 
source of interest, of its own increase‖ (Marx, 1981: 516). As Marx also explains, ―in interest-
bearing capital, the capital relationship reaches its most superficial and fetishized form‖ 
(Marx, 1981: 515). Mandel, in this sense, suggests that the role of the bank and the banking 
system is not just to provide ―available money reserves‖ but also to transform the reserves 
into ―functional‖ capital: 
 
Through the capitalist banking system, all available money reserves (savings and non-
invested surplus-value + idle money capital resulting from non-investment of part of 
surplus-value realized during previous cycles) are transformed into functioning capital, 
in other words lent to capitalist firms which are actually operatingi.e. employing 
wage-labourbe it in the sphere of production or in that of circulation. In this way, 
capitalists are able to operate with much more capital than they own personally. 
Capital accumulation can take place at a much quicker pace than would be the case if 
each capitalist firm could practise enlarged reproduction only on the basis of the profits 
it had itself realized. (Mandel, 1981: 53–54) 
 
176 
 
Here, the new functional capital, stemming mainly from ―capital accumulation,‖ in the bank, 
does not just multiply itself as interest-bearing capital but also exchanges itself to be 
ceaselessly ―lent‖; this, thus, becomes the mode of activation as the doctrine of financial 
entanglement and contagion. The process of widespread ―expansion‖from lender to 
borrower as the form of financial intermediaryimplies a qualitatively different role of 
bank capital in the process of accumulation, limiting the positions of social subjects to those 
of the lenders (creditors) and borrowers (debtors). It can thus be assumed that bank capital, 
through its workings, fills the mediating link that Hegel‘s quantity-quality paradigm lacks. 
While multiplying money, bank capital transforms not just the character of capital as surplus 
value-bearing financial capital, but the social relationship as well, with the implication of 
qualitatively different criteria of performance.  
The rise and establishment of bank capital materialises value transformation for the 
exchange-value mechanism, while the money-reserve abstracts the individual difference of 
small capital as empirical or concrete qualities of subjects. This tendency toward abstraction, 
which Simmel calls the culture of anonymity in the money economy, is the essence of the 
capitalistic mode of production; this is because abstraction is a common characteristic 
mechanism of commodity, money, and money capital. As commodities and money are the 
embodiments of abstract human labour, money capital is the (im)material expression of a 
general abstraction of the human labour relationship. Ironically, in the regime of exchange-
value, equality is achieved based on the fact that the regime abstracts real inequality, as 
Marx cynically points out: 
 
Equality in the full sense between different kinds of labour can be achieved only if we 
abstract from their real inequality, if we reduce them to the characteristic they have in 
common, that of being the expenditure of human labour power, of human labour in the 
abstract. (Marx, 1990: 166)  
 
The abstraction is the function and effect of ―measure,‖ following Hegel, which leads to a 
―qualitative leap‖ toward establishing the exchange relationship. Thus Marx comments in 
the Paris Notebook that the abstract relationship is value itself. The qualification does not just 
remain in the economic but also grounds the exchange regime of formal standards as a 
social norm. The expansion of banking guarantees the pursuit of a stable macroeconomic 
environment (Brabant, 1998) as a regulatory frame of reference for the new financial order. 
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Here the general managers of capital flows reconfigure any participatory function as a 
financial ―market transaction‖ (Mohan, 2000: 92). 
The banking culture, as a regulatory activity and universal measure of mobilisation of 
individual money (for the reserve of money capital), thus functions as a ―mediating link in the 
process of cognition‖; based on this, Mandel suggests how quantitative accumulation acquires 
qualitative meaning in value-realisation. This theoretical concern is related to how a specific 
financial strategy becomes social cognition and action. It looks at how the economic process 
attains a position of socially necessary mediationas a custom-built process present in the 
everyday. 
 
The Politics of Mediation of Financial Capital: The Moral Economy and Performative Speech 
 
With its mediating role, the bank sets crucial entry points in the three main categories, as in 
the case of the US central bank: 
 
In the U.S. the central bank has three entry points: (1) it controls the amount of primary 
money available to the banking system; (2) it sets the discount rate; (3) it can exercise 
‗moral suasion.‘ (Taylor, 2000: 60) 
 
The central bank is, through the structure of the banking system, able to influence the terms 
on which monetisation of the pool of fluid capital proceeds (Taylor, 2000: 60). With regard to 
its second role, the central bank implements an interest rate policy with which it manages 
the general amount of capital in fluctuation with the economic situation. However, the third 
role, ―moral suasion,‖ does not just remain a recommendation. It is a ―preventive instrument‖ 
in the ethical dimension, as well as a ―benevolent compulsion, […] making others conform 
without enforcing rules directly‖ (Masciandaro, 2005: 46, emphasis added). Although moral 
suasion can be carried out through bilateral or multilateral discussion, its fundamental aim 
is ―to influence expectations through public statements or speeches by Board Members.‖ The 
second function of moral suasion is ―to persuade financial intermediaries to modify their 
behaviour when it is deemed to be prejudicial to the sound development of markets‖ 
(Masciandaro, 2005: 46, emphases added). Although the refined mode of management does 
not seem to directly force the implementation of central bank policy, it should be noted that 
moral suasion through performative utterances and speeches of the financial regulator, or 
178 
 
financial narrator, is asymptomatic as well as practical sign of a financial moral economy. It 
signifies that the bank, as the new meta-frame of value transference in economic and cultural 
valorisation, takes the moral leadership. It then works to effectively modify cognition and 
the actions of the participants. The political and cultural implications of performative speech 
in the formation of a new financial reality were explicated in detail in the previous chapters. 
Using such enhanced and effective methods of control, which create a climate of 
capital management, the bank reformulates the social relationship as a credit relationship. 
The effect of the centralisation of money in banks is the emergence of credit relations as the 
dominant mode of activation of financial capitalismthe central bank manages capital flows 
as a form of loan to commercial banks and sub-intermediaries as well as individuals, turning 
social relations into a network of lenders and borrowers. With the interest policy 
accompanying the loan system, the bank‘s influence becomes all-pervasive. The criteria 
implemented are, then, not just preventive but also conditional, where the exchange-value 
regime accompanies and appropriates the political apparatuses, such as governments, for 
effective activation. The imposition of conditions on the borrowing party is based on credit 
supervision and surveillancethese are the politics of mediation operated by the bank. 
When financial unrest was initially sensed in Korea in early 1997, the Korean 
government had originally decided not to accept any aid from the IMF or the World Bank. 
However, under strong pressure from the U.S. and Japan, Korea could not but accept the 
conditions of the international financial apparatuses. The conditions were entailed with 
loan-making by the institutions, and were ―rigorous requirements‖ that set out ―the bank‘s 
expectations.‖ The conditions involved ―prior actions‖ and ―performance criteria‖ (Woods, 
2006: 70). The conditions were even more conspicuous with the structural adjustment loan. 
It is important to note that the introduction of structural adjustment lending by the 
World Bank and the IMF in the 1980s was devised to address any ―endogenous‖ economic 
crises in developing countries, ―downplaying the exogenous factors and structural 
constraints emanating from the position of developing economies within the global 
economy‖ (Tshuma, 1999: 77). As opposed to the ―project-based loans‖ that were normally 
invested in construction programs or infrastructure projects, the adjustment programs have 
qualitatively different aims. They are designed to create a policy environment conducive to 
growth and development; these aims eventually ground conditions attached to adjustment 
loans that require the retrenchment and downsizing of the state (Tshuma, 1999: 77). From 
this perspective, Tshuma diagnoses that the 1997 Asian financial crisis had its roots in the 
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―[World] Bank and the Washington consensus vindicating its development model including 
its legal framework‖ (Tshuma, 1999: 84). 
The new conditions that came with the structural adjustment loans from the World 
Bank and the IMF should be read as a transformational leverage function for global financial 
capitalism. They were a result of capital accumulation and thus of centralisation of value-
forming attributes, in that the conditions, among other things, demanded a far-reaching 
liberalisation program that affected society as a whole. This in turn led to a further 
valorisation of the expanding value regime. The intervention and imposition of conditions 
by the international financial apparatuses was a new mode of activation for the purpose of 
subsuming a weak link into the financial regime, inscribing any financial problem as a local 
and ―endogenous‖ one and necessitating global performative criteria. Therefore the 
restructuring program, which was strongly supported through the intervention by 
performative speeches that spoke about the necessity of changes at the time of the financial 
crisis, focused upon adjustment of the localregardless of international capital flows. It 
ignored hot money such as hedge funds, thereby transforming the relationship with the 
borrowing country into one of debt politics. 
The framework for an international solution to a local government debt problem has 
been changed in to a market-based system. The Brady plan, which will be more closely 
investigated in the following concluding chapter, represents this transformation; in this plan, 
international commercial and investment banks backed by the U.S. government become the 
crucial mediators in international debt politics. When Korea was hit by the liquidity crisis in 
1997, the plan resurfaced as a legitimate framework for the situation, as it had been 
implemented during the Latin American financial crises in the 1980s. In early 1998 in New 
York, with the mediation of the IMF, thirteen major international banks agreed to extend $24 
billion worth of short-term loans to Korean private banks. Under the plan, ―Seoul will 
guarantee the new loans which will be publicly traded.‖ The deal included three key points: 
 
1. Bad loans on which Korean banks might have defaulted were replaced by new 
bonds that can be publicly traded and sold by the original Japanese, German, and U.S. 
banks. Thus, the banks that made the original bad loans will not retain the bonds 
issued to replace those loans. 
2. A bad private debt is replaced by a new government-guaranteed debt.  
3. The deal was made under heavy pressure from the IMF and the U.S. Treasury. 
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(Jochnick and Preston, 2006: 116) 
 
Under the conditions, the Korean government is liable for the debt of private banks and any 
bad private loan that might surface due to poor judgment or mismanagement by the 
banksit is itself the risk taker. While endorsing a virtually risk-free loan condition for the 
international banks, the deal tacitly approved an ―illegitimate successor loan,‖ that would be 
prompted by any ―misconduct‖ by the lenders. This is the most serious point Jochnick and 
Preston raise, that ―a government guarantee of an illegitimate successor loan does not make 
the loan any less illegitimate. Furthermore, it strengthens the illegitimacy if international 
financial pressure has forced the government to accept responsibility for a private debt‖ 
(Jochnick and Preston, 2006: 117). 
Consent to the loan conditions is the premise for the local subject to participate in the 
new regime of economic performance. Only by agreeing to restrictions as the conditions for 
new economic performance, can the object eventually be activated to perform as the new 
economic subject, retaining a relative and equivalent value that is to be legitimated under 
the new financial imperial regime. In this sense, the subjectivity the local subject finally 
attains is, in essence, limited subjectivityfor the conditionality restricts full access to the 
dominant system. By taking the loans, the subject allows bailout to re-enter the system. The 
subject is ceaselessly propagandized in the new financial regime; whenever the limited 
subject performs to his full economic ability, insofar as the subject takes its liabilities as a 
form of life.  
The structural adjustment loan and its conditions for a country in financial difficulty 
are seen to be ―healthy‖ for the financial system. They are a prescription, which 
fundamentally aims to revalorise the entire system by appropriating the local into the 
dominant financial chain. Mandel‘s analysis still applies to this point: 
 
The effects of the crash, for the system as a whole, are healthy, however nasty they may 
be for individual capitalist. General devalorization of capital is not accompanied by a 
proportional reduction in the mass of surplus-value produced. Or (which amounts to 
the same) an identical mass of surplus-value can now valorize a smaller total amount of 
capital. Hence the decline in the rate of profit can be stopped and even reversed. Large 
scale reconstitution of the reserve army of labour, occurring during the crisis and the 
depression, makes possible a vigorous increase in the rate of surplus-value, not only 
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through speed-ups but even through a cut in real wages, which in turn leads to a 
further rise in the rate of profit. Raw material prices generally fall more than the prices 
of finished goods, so part of constant capital becomes cheaper. The rise in the organic 
composition of capital is thereby slowed down, again pushing up the average rate of 
profit on industrial capital. (Mandel, 50-51) 
 
Mandel‘s analysis of a crisis in the capitalistic system gives an account of the valorisation 
mechanism. Even though the theory focuses on the industrial mode of production, the 
devalorisation-valorisation fluctuation is still effective in the financial system, for any 
financial crisis on a local level makes room for intervention toward the reconstitution of a 
surplus-value producing system. Even with a global-scale crisis, such as the ongoing ―credit 
crunch,‖ the bank becomes more influential by means of systematic involvement with the 
public sector. The systematic contradiction of the financial mode of production, because of 
entanglement and contagion from excessive lending and speculation, is, unlike the 
mainstream views emphasising the narrative of crisis, the process of financial self-
valorisation of the contradiction. It is the point of transition to a new mode of production.  
Marx succinctly grasps this irony of transformation, saying that the universal 
mechanism becomes ―the abolition of the capitalist mode of production within the capitalist 
mode of production itself, and hence a self-abolishing contradiction, which presents itself 
prima facie as a point of transition to a new form of production‖ (Marx, 1981: 569).Drastic 
measures, such as a government intervention, to guarantee commercial banks, should be 
thus considered an important step towards transforming financial entanglement into an 
even more ubiquitous structure, in which all taxpayers are eventually interpellated as the 
performers of financial reconstitutions, as we observed in Chapter 2. The functions of the 
bank (as the legitimate mediator in transforming social relations), is to transcode 
heterogeneous values into commensurable financial exchange, but this needs to be 
reconsidered in conjunction with the credit system. Through this system local information 
and circumstances are interpreted and articulated in the global system. 
 
The Cultural Roles and Functions of Credit System: Credit Rating and the Representation of 
Data 
 
In the capitalistic mode of production, exchange relations presuppose a medium through 
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which a product is eventually transformed into a commodity. The mediator, unlike in the 
barter system, performs a double function: measuring a product‘s value and catalysing its 
engaging role as the universal value system. A value of a product under the industrial mode 
of production is, according to Marx‘s analysis, the sum of the amount of invested labour and 
time.106 It is, however, the mediator as the bearer of social promises who materialises the 
value of the invested means of production. Today, it is the money-form as monetary capital 
that performs a double function as ―the legitimate standard of value‖ (Hilferding, 1981: 33). 
As Hilferding explains, following Marx, ―the object which is thus authorized by the common 
action of commodities to express the value ismoney‖ (Hilferding, 1981: 32). The aspect 
common to the double function of the mediator (as money-form) is that the individual 
character of a subject is transformed into an object, with which the regime of exchange-value 
is operated; as Hilferding also mentions, ―[t]he value of an article is a social relationship and 
is always represented in terms of another article regardless of the differences in their 
respective use value‖ (Hilferding, 1981: 31). 
With regard to the value politics money performs, Marx diagnoses that ―money is in 
fact the very form in which the distinctions between commodities as different use-values are 
obliterated, and hence also the distinctions between industrial capitals, which consist of 
these commodities and the conditions of their production; it is the form in which valueand 
hence capitalexists as autonomous exchange-value‖ (Marx, 1981: 517). Through the 
process of transformation of valuewith the intervention of the mediatorthe capitalist system 
lays the foundation for valorisation. This is because ―all commodities thus acquire a 
standardized social position through their transformation into money‖ (Hilferding, 1981: 34). 
Marx in this sense underscores that competition and credit are the two main instruments in 
centralising the capitalistic system, as the credit system becomes the main engine for the 
centralization of accumulated money: 
 
The battle of competition is fought by the cheapening of commodities. The cheapness 
of commodities depends, all other circumstances remaining the same, on the 
productivity of labour, and this depends in turn on the scale of production. Therefore 
the larger capitals beat the smaller. It will further be remembered that, with the 
                                            
106 However, as Marx puts it, the value is mystified since the correlation between surplus value and 
labour time is fluid, or ―‗immaterial.‖ It is immaterial because it is unclear how much additional value 
in the form of means of production is required in the various lines of industry for the utilisation of 
additional labour. 
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development of the capitalist mode of production, there is an increase in the minimum 
amount of individual capital necessary to carry on a business under its normal 
conditions. The smaller capital, therefore, crowd into spheres of production which 
large-scale industry, has taken control of only sporadically or incompletely. Here 
competition rages in direct proportion to the number, and in inverse proportion to the 
magnitude, of the rival capitals. It always ends in the ruin of many small capitalists, 
whose capitals partly pass into the hands of their conquerors, and partly vanish 
completely. Apart from this, an altogether new force comes into existence with the 
development of capitalist production: the credit system. In its first stages, this system 
furtively creeps in as the humble assistant of accumulation, drawing into the hands of 
individual or associated capitalists by invisible threads the money resources, which lie 
scattered in larger or smaller amounts over the surface of society; but it soon becomes a 
new and terrible weapon in the battle of competition and is finally transformed into an 
enormous social mechanism for the centralization of capital. (Marx, 1981: 777-778)  
 
This transformational role of money is part of a standardising process for risk management 
and prediction for economic stability; but only if ―it is taken as logically anterior to its own 
production process‖ with ―the misrepresentation and objectification of the relations of 
production‖ (Hilferding, 1981: 516, emphasis added). With the transformational 
performance of the money-mediator, the capitalistic exchange relationship formulates a 
system of value ―to valorize its own value independent of [material] reproduction‖ 
(Hilferding, 1981: 516). What is at stake is that the monetary economy appropriates the 
relationship and imposes its own abstract value; this then leads to further valorisation 
through the misrepresented objectification that justifies the relations of production. 
The system of value, therefore, does not just remain a system of efficiency in the 
economic dimension. Instead it operates as a mechanism of valorisation through which the 
normativity of society is ceaselessly restructured around the efficiency of the economic. The 
mode is ultimately political, as it inscribes social intentions, with which the legitimacy of the 
system is internalised. The system of valueor ―regime of value‖as John Frow argues, 
―constitutes ‗a broad set of agreements concerning what is desirable, what a reasonable 
―exchange of sacrifices‖ comprises, and who is permitted to exercise what kind of effective 
demand in what circumstances‘; this regulation is always political in its mediation of 
discrepant interests‖ (Frow, 1998: 60). For effective involvement with the object, the system 
184 
 
of value, in which the mechanism of exchange-value operates, works with an 
epistemological set of values; as Frow points out, ―the regime of value‖ is ―a semiotic 
institution generating evaluative regularities under certain conditions of use, and in which 
particular empirical audiences or communities may be more or less fully imbricated‖ (Frow, 
1998: 60, emphasis added). Frow‘s analysis can be reinterpreted in order to explain the 
cultural performativity of the economic, through which the economic subsumes and 
regenerates competing factors beyond the mediation of the material. 
The emergence and establishment of the credit system is regarded as one of the core 
features of financial capitalism; it enables ―the multiplication and growth of mutual 
advances‖ (Marx, 1981: 528). Marx points to the ―dual character‖ of the credit system, which 
eventually aims at creating a new mode of production based on the expansion of credit; this 
would be impossible on the basis of metallic money. Marx insists that ―[t]he credit system 
has a dual character immanent in it: on the one hand it develops the motive of capitalist 
production, enrichment by the exploitation of others‘ labour, into the purest and most 
colossal system of gambling and swindling, and restricts ever more the already small 
number of the exploiters of social wealth; on the other hand however it constitutes the form 
of transition towards a new mode of production‖ (Marx, 1981: 572). The new financial mode 
of production, however, radically reconfigures the relationships between members of society 
and the system itself. Hilferding clarifies the change as moving from a trust relationship in 
which the system seems to have direct contact with actors to one where all actors become 
players to participate in the regime: 
 
In credit transactions the material, business relationship is always accompanied by a 
personal relationship, which appears as a direct relationship between members of 
society in contrast to the material social relationship which characterize other economic 
categories such as money; namely, what is commonly called ‗trust.‘ In this sense a fully 
developed credit system is the antithesis of capitalism, and represents organization and 
control as opposed to anarchy. It has its source in socialism, but has been adapted to 
capitalist society; it is a fraudulent kind of socialism, modified to suit the needs of 
capitalism. It socializes other people‘s money for use by the few. At the outset it 
suddenly opens up for the knights of credit prodigious vistas: the barriers to capitalist 
productionprivate propertyseem to have fallen, and the entire productive power of 
society appears to be placed at the disposal of the individual. The prospect intoxicates 
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him, and in turn he intoxicates and swindles others. (Hilferding, 1981: 180) 
 
Hilferding‘s analysis reveals that the credit system redefines the social position of its 
members according to economic performance, while allowing those members new room for 
engaging with the system. It is a new mode of activating the system, in that every member 
gains ―trust‖ in the process of economic optimisation, by contrast to ―anarchy,‖ or the 
uncertainty of the market. As the credit system is operated under the condition of a player‘s 
direct contact and participation, it effectively conceals the intervention of ―institutional 
agents‖ that ―control the access to credit,‖ as Germain argues: 
 
[…] the key question of finance is gaining access to credit […] the idea of credit 
represents a social invention in which fungible assets are exchanged for future 
promises to pay. Credit here is a resource which people, firms, and governments have 
access to at the discretion of others, and at a cost established by others: it is both a 
material resource and a set of social practices associated with realising it. In other 
words credit is more than a social convention, it is also an actual network of institutions 
whose business is precisely to provide access to the value represented by this social 
convention. As a material resource, credit can exist in several forms: as cash, bank 
balances, lines of credit, or as an enforced right (e.g., to tax or to compel the purchase of 
future promises to pay). In this sense credit either arises out of economic activity in the 
form of savings or profits, or it can be created by public and private monetary 
authorities through the manipulation of the banking system, what is sometimes called 
fictitious credit. Credit however, must also be mobilized or realized if it is to have any 
effect upon economic actors, and therefore we must also consider it as a set of social 
practices through which a particular kind of resource passes. In this sense credit is a 
closely knit yet intensely competitive network of institutional agents who control the 
access of others to the resources which they either own themselves or have access to. 
The social and political implications of credit thus concern who controls the access of 
others to credit, who is privileged by access to credit, and who reaps the competitive 
advantage which access to adequate credit imparts. (Germain, 1997: 17)  
 
In financial capitalism, credit ratings companies, such as Moody‘s and S & P, have emerged. 
These companies perform their roles as ―institutional agents‖ for the purpose of evaluating 
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others‘ credit. The evaluation process by such agencies becomes an inevitable part of 
financial capitalism, as ―the international organization of credit is fully embedded within the 
larger wealth-creating dynamics of the world-economy‖ (Germain, 1997: 20). As Germain 
succinctly summarises, the task of the credit agency is closely associated with the wider 
context of the global monetary order, yet at the same time allowing ―decentralization to occur‖ 
(Germain, 1997: 104, emphasis added). Although the ―differentiation‖ process is based on 
increasing room for performativity of participants, it is a tightly supervised process that will 
―strengthen the dynamics‖ for the new order: 
 
While the globalization of monetary agents has allowed decentralization to occur, 
decentralization has in turn itself strengthened the dynamics which are directing 
monetary agents to continue globalizing their activities in line with the growing 
integration and international responsiveness of markets. The notion of ‗decentralized 
globalization‘ thus indicates precisely how the structure of monetary order is marked 
by diverse sources of credit knit together through global networks of monetary agents 
active across a range of financial practices. (Germain, 1997: 104) 
 
A credit evaluating agent, like money as a mediator in the exchange relation, mediates an 
object, but does so with the refined method of ―diverse sources of credit‖; this seems to give 
the object room for autonomy in terms of its own performance. But the performance cannot 
be separated from ―the growing integration and international responsiveness of the market.‖ 
Therefore, the ―decentralized globalization‖ of financial capitalism can be seen as another 
form of, following Fredric Jameson, the politics of oppressive diversity. Differentiation 
presupposes de-differentiation and vice versa: 
 
Every universalizing approach, whether the phenomenological or the semiotic, will 
from the dialectical point of view be found to conceal its own contradictions and 
repress its own historicity by strategically framing its perspective so as to omit the 
negative, absence, contradiction, repression, the non-dit, or the impensé. (Jameson, 1989: 
110) 
 
This tendency of differentiation, under the logic of financial universalisation, has been 
radically strengthened with the dismantling of the Bretton Woods fixed-exchange rate 
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regime. This heralded a new sophistication of the capitalist system and strengthened the 
evaluating power of credit agencies, which could better face the unstable climate of financial 
capitalism. As Germain considers, ―[i]f the pre-1914 gold standard is more accurately 
understood as a London-centred global system, then the Bretton Woods fixed-exchange rate 
standard can be more accurately understood as a New York-centred global credit system. Its 
monetary order can be identified by outlining its principal sources of credit, the form which 
that credit took the dominant channels of international clearance and information exchange, 
the capital recycling mechanism, and the state of great power rivalry‖ (Germain, 1997: 78). 
The collapse of Bretton Woods stimulated newly-emerging financial centers around the 
world, within which local information and circumstance was interpreted and articulated 
into the global system. Thus, the transition from a fixed-rate standard to a variable-rate one 
comes from the need for active engagement with the locality. This is to evaluate 
performativity and manage risk, in Jameson‘s term, transcoding various factors into the 
economic.  
Therefore, in taking into account the actual operational mode of transcoding, Nigel 
Thrift‘s comments about financial centres is worth reconsidering. In particular, he points to 
their role of ―discursive representation‖: ―International financial centres are centres of 
representation. They are […] centres of discursive authority, able to describe what constitutes 
‗news‘ and how that ‗news‘ is interpreted‖ (cited in De Goede, 2005: 334). Here, the newness 
―represents‖ the newly rated ―economic‖ position of an object, inevitably accompanying, to 
use Frow‘s term once again, the ―exchange of sacrifice‖ of various other factors. Such 
representation is a ―discursive utterance,‖ which signifies practices of cognition and action 
in establishing the object‘s distance from the core value and making the object reconfigure its 
position voluntarily. In this sense, the role of the credit ratings agency, which performs a 
central role in the ―financial center,‖ is fundamentally cultural, as it tries to redefine the 
―otherness‖ of the object through economic performativity. Terms such as ―moral hazard‖ 
or ―Asian value,‖ used by IMF officials at the time of financial crisis in Korea, locate the 
object in a chain of economic performativity, and also represent the cultural identity of 
Otherness through the interpretive codes of the economic. In this regard, De Goede also 
underscores ―finance as a discursive domain made possible through performative practices, 
which have to be articulated and rearticulated on a daily basis. In discursive theory, a 
performative is that which enacts or brings about what it names […] Understanding finance 
as a performative practice suggests that processes of knowledge importance do not exist in 
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addition to, or of secondary importance to, ‗real‘ material financial structures, but are 
precisely the way in which „finance‟ materializes‖ (De Goede, 2005: 7, emphasis in original). 
What is at stake for credit ratings companies is that their reports on economic 
performativity function, at the microeconomic as well as macroeconomic level, as a frame of 
reference to which other players resort and through which financial flows (re)channel. The 
credit ratings agency becomes a main determinant in financial capitalism, with its discursive 
performativity of observation and representation. The credit system is a cultural politics of 
the economic, in which ―the processes of knowledge [making]‖ are not ―of secondary‖ 
importance, but in fact primarily materialise ―the financial structures.‖ With regard to the 
credit agency‘s role, associated with creating the referent in a valorisation of economic 
evaluation under financial capitalism, Moody‘s case exemplifies the credit ratings agency as 
the financial narrative apparatus. He shows it functioning as the operational mode of value-
valorization and predication in the Korean financial crisis. 
 
The Case of Credit Agency and the Representation and Predication of Value 
 
Before the financial crisis of 1997, the Asian economy had enjoyed a boom that attracted 
massive foreign investment. South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia achieved 8–12% 
GDP growth throughout the 1980s and 1990s. For instance, from 1993 to 1996, net capital 
flows to Thailand doubled to about $20 billion; flows to emerging Asia had, in contrast, 
hiked from less than $10 billion to almost $80 billion in 1996.In 1997, however, with the 
symptoms of the crisis now felt, capital outflows amounted to about $14 billion (Kaminsky, 
2003: 61). Before the crisis, with the real estate market and the stock market both ―hot,‖ and 
with the recent manufacturing expansion, massive amounts of foreign capital flowed into 
the region. The sources of capital were mostly European, American, and Japanese 
commercial banks. 
Economists have pointed out that a ―large increase in the stock of short-term foreign 
debt‖ and a ―heavily managed exchange rate‖ (Kaminsky, 2003: 63) worsened the situation. 
While Thailand and Malaysia suffered from the latter, Korea‘s financial crisis was rooted in 
short-term foreign debt. As of 1997, the amount of foreign debt owed by Korea was $119.6 
billion, out of which short-term loans amounted to $65.6 billion, more than 50% of the total. 
Japanese commercial banks were the main lenders of these short-term loans, to the amount 
of $23.7 billion. As Korea‘s dollar reserves amounted to only $30 billion at the time, the 
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Korean government could not deal with the Japanese refusal to rollover the short-term loan, 
which had been negotiated and accepted previously. In this light, one analyst asserts that the 
sudden demand from Japanese banks to repay their loans was the direct cause of the Korean 
financial crisis, since their demand eventually triggered ―herd behavior.‖107 
However, the sudden outflows were triggered by credit ratings for those countries, as 
were the initial massive investments. The South Korean credit rate was, for instance, above 
A level,as estimated by the three major credit ratings agencies, Moody‘s, S&P, and Fitch (A1, 
AA-, AA- respectively). The grades were the so-called official barometers of capital inflows 
as they signified economic stability for investment. The ratings went unchanged even during 
the initial phases of the crisis, but soon plummeted as the IMF aid-package loomed. In 
December 1997, the three agencies simultaneously downgraded the country‘s credit rating 
more than seven grades (Moody‘s: Ba1, S&P: B+, Fitch: B-), even though they had not sensed 
or forecasted the symptoms of the crisis, strongly recommending continued investment in 
the country. S&P and Fitch dropped their ratings by ten and thirteen grades respectively. 
The readjusted ratings had a decisive impact on capital outflows. In particular, the 
intervention of the leading credit company, Moody‘s, was critical in describing and 
representing the necessity of restructuring the object. 
With regard to the impending change, interestingly, on the 7th July 2004, the Blue 
House, the presidential office in Korea, posted an article entitled ―Effects of the U.S.-Korea 
Relationship upon Korean Economy‖ on its official website. The report, in Korean, was 
prepared by the state-owned economic advisory bureau, the Korean Institute for 
International Economic Policy. The release of the description was, however, widely regarded 
as an exceptional case, since the document included politically sensitive contents that would 
typically have been classified and kept off-the-record. Throughout the report, the KIIEP 
above all strongly suggested that any deterioration in the U.S.-Korea relationship would be a 
severe blow to the Korean economy, since the economy was heavily depend on exports to 
the U.S. The report then suggested that any actions that might harm the U.S.-Korea 
relationship could have grave consequences; leading to an exodus of foreign capital that saw 
a huge impact the nation‘s credit rating and internal economy.  
What is more symptomatic was the report‘s outlook on the movements of the financial 
main players, namely the U.S. government and Wall Street, which, according to the report, 
―have wide room‖ for influencing international financial markets. The dense and 
                                            
107 Lee Jong-Wook, ―A Way to Avoid a ‗Financial Shock,‘‖ Dong-A daily Newspaper, 5 March, 2007. 
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communication network of the financial inner circle, the report argued, could directly or 
indirectly influence the financial climate in Korea. Even though this perspective was 
criticised by many journalists and business managers, who insisted that strengthening 
economic fundamentals should take priority over external factors,108 the report undeniably 
revealed the impasse Korea was facing. When the Blue House released the report, Korea was 
inflamed with demonstrations against the dispatch of Korean military forces to Iraq to 
cooperate with U.S. forces. As such, for the Korean government, revealing the document to 
the public was potentially an effective move, since the Korean people had become fully 
aware of the impact of the ―credit grade‖ of the nation after the financial crisis. Reminding 
its people of U.S. influence on crucial financial factors would contribute to more or less 
suppressing anti-U.S. sentiment. However, what should not be overlooked here is that any 
important social or political issues pitting the local against the centre were ceaselessly 
transcoded in terms of economic performativitycollectively labeled the national credit 
rating. 
The increasing tendency to transcode social or political value into economic value was 
also clearly witnessed in Moody‘s approach to the country‘s credit rating. The ratings firm 
had been known for taking an extremely conservative stance vis-à-vis Korea. Although the 
firm‘s impartiality in evaluating was widely doubted, Moody‘s was one of the major 
authorities in the credit ratings field. The credit rating by the firm functions as a reference; if, 
for example, it grades a country as ―negative‖ (below ―Ba1‖ rating), any US financial 
organisation that has invested public funds into the downgraded country will automatically 
sell the bonds.109 It is so powerful that international capital flows cannot but recourse to its 
ratings report as the source of economic operativity and performativity. After the financial 
crisis, the firm has intervened in various issues. On the 8th January 2001, the Korean 
Ministry for the Economy announced that Moody‘s had expressed ―growing concerns over 
‗candle demonstrations spreading anti-Americanism‘ and ‗North Korea nuclear matter.‘‖110 
The two factors Moody‘s was concerned with were not directly linked to the economy. Such 
interferences in domestic and international affairs were and have been justified for the 
purpose of evaluating the economic performativity of that country.111 
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109 Park Tae-Kyun, Dong-A Daily Newspaper Monthly Magazine, April 1999. 
110 Park Yong-Keun, Chosun Daily Newspaper, 8 January, 2001. 
111 Moody‘s interference performs a double function, establishing a critical point of ―articulation of 
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Moody‘s has regularly delivered ―utterances‖ through which, following Lyotard‘s 
analysis once again, context control is constituted, to elucidate ―the rules of game‖as we 
observed in the previous chapter (Lyotard, 1984: 47). Context control through utterances or 
discursive formations is analogous to the process of manufacturing rumors in financial 
markets, as Hilferding has suggested. Moody‘s evaluative strategies expose how economic 
performativity in financial capitalism is activated through reconfiguring various factors, 
while at the same time reinterpreting otherness in accordance with economic performativity. 
For a concrete explanation of the cultural performativity of the economic we should be 
reminded ourselves here of Lyotard‘s observation of the ‗performativity‘ associated with the 
formation of legitimation and normativity. ―The true goal of the [capitalistic] system,‖ he 
argues, ―is the optimization of the global relationship between input and output – in other 
words, performativity‖ (Lyotard, 1984: 11). In postindustrial societies, according to 
Lyotard‘s diagnosis, the normativity of laws is replaced by the performativity of procedure. 
The perfomativity is a kind of ―context control‖ in which performance improvement is won 
at the expense of the partner or partners constituting that context. Through the process 
perfomativity acquires ―legislation‖ (Lyotard, 1984: 46–47). To elucidate the ‗rules of game‘ 
of performance, Lyotard takes an example of the relationship between ―an utterance‖ and 
―the operativity of information.‖The performativity of an utterance, be it denotative or 
prescriptive, increases proportionally to the amount of information about its referent one 
has at one‘s disposal. Thus the growth of power, and its self-legitimation, now take the route 
                                                                                                                                       
causal explanation‖ as well as ―closure of system,‖ thereby― isolating a system from external causal 
influence‖ following Ricoeur‘s analysis (Ricoeur, 1984: 135). This interference can be then considered 
an ―action as being‖ in constructing the cognition and action to follow. Explicating the relationship 
between interference and narrative condition and articulation, Ricoeur makes the convincing 
argument that ―[w]e are now ready for the decisive step, the articulation of causal explanation on the 
basis of what we originally understand action as being. The phenomenon of ‗interference,‘ which we 
anticipated in speaking of producing and bringing about, or of setting aside and preventing, requires 
such articulation, in the sense that it conjoins that ability to do something of which an agent has an 
immediate understanding, with the internal conditional relations of a system.‖ 
Closure of the system, just as opening it in a new realm through narrative interference, conditions 
further valorization in the system, considering that the interference is itself an active involvement 
ushering cognition and action to come. In this sense the interference is action, ―the action of putting a 
system in motion‖ (Ricoeur, 1984: 136). Therefore, ―[t]he metaphysical consequences of this concept of 
interference are important and indirectly concern history, inasmuch as it relates action,‖ (Ricoeur, 
1984: 136) in association with extrapolation of causal relations. ―If we doubt our freedom to do 
something, it is because we extrapolate to the whole world the regular sequence we have observed. 
We forget that causal relations are relative to the fragments of the history of a world that has the 
characteristics of a closed system. But the capacity to put systems in motion by producing their initial 
states is a condition for their closure. Action is therefore implied in the discovery of causal relations‖ 
(Ricoeur, 1984: 136–137). 
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of data storage and accessibility, and the operativity of information. The relationship 
between science and technology is reversed. The complexity of the argumentation becomes 
relevant, especially because it necessitates greater sophistication in the means obtaining 
proof, and that in turn benefits performativity (Lyotard, 1984: 47). 
In the concluding chapter, I will investigate the cultural problem of distance in the 
creation of economic subjectivity, through a rereading of Simmel‘s notion of distance in 
economic value formation, and also by extending my analysis of the existential conditions of 
the object on the coordinates of the value-field of the subject. I will correlate the notion of 
distance in narrative operation with the process of formal and real subsumptionmainly by 
delving into the notion of distance in the context of the cultural question of narrative field 
and financial operation, and by revisiting Marx‘s analysis of formal and real subsumption. 
Modulating the object, for real subsumption at an international level, financial capital not 
only dominates but also allows the object direct contact with the fluctuations of the 
systemby producing the subjective effect for the object. It is the effect of power, as 
Foucault points out, that produces the dominant reality. It does this as the condition of 
rationalization, from which the recognition of power is discursively formulated. Finance 
capital codifies, and the condition of power produces, a new reality; at the same time, the 
bearers of the new reality make the actors participate in the process of recognition of power 
with heuristic force.  
If this is the process of constitution of a new reality, we see that it overlaps with the 
truth claims of the financial narrators in the name of financial reconstruction. Yet the more 
the subject is involved in the discursive process the more she is actually subjecting herself to 
power, even if the subject identifies herself as bearing and creating the new values.112 This is 
the point at which the object eventually aims. For in order to overcome the distance the 
narrator sets for the object (identifying the radical imposition of new reality), he identifies 
the field of objectification, i.e. the narrative field, as the source of cognition and action in 
search of main value. As the process of subjection (subjectivation) is also a process of 
creating the economic subject, it motivates the object to voluntary performance, thus 
generating the subject effect. However, the performativity of the object is always restricted. 
As the chapter asserts, it is this restrictedness itself that is the condition of subjectivity for the 
object. With regard to the financial subject and restrictedness, the chapter will examine the 
                                            
112 According to Ricoeur, a ―truth claim‖ is the fundamental ―referential function of discourse‖ 
(Ricoeur, 1984: x). 
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Brady Plan and its conditionalities.  
Main narrative consistently conceals the conditions of limited subjectivity and asserts 
itself as the only performative ground, with no option of turning back. Through this 
restriction the object is self-disciplined. Restrictedness in the financial world order surfaces 
as a conditionality of capital flow, in the form of debts or loans. Although the object 
participates in the market, it has to recognise and thus internalise conditionality as the 
condition of participation. The Brady Plan is cited as a clear prototype of how the financial 
regime is established in the local, under conditionality by means of the newly emerging 
subjective force of the bank. This involves, but limits, the activation of the local object, in 
which process the existential conditions of the object in the financial reality are scrutinised. 
In this regard, the next chapter finally delves into the cultural problem of distance in the 
making of the new subjectivity, and examines the restrictedness of that subjectivity; against 
this the narrative operation persistently contains the real conditions of subjectivation. The 
cultural formation of subjectivity in financial capitalism will be examined in relation to the 
existential conditions of the subject, thereby explaining the cultural problem of distance in 
narrative operation as the discursive move of financial cultural politics. This is implemented 
in order to subsume the local into the newly emerging dominant system. 
From the perspective of the cultural problem of distance in the creation of financial 
subjectivity, the crucial processes are analysed in order to show how the object finally 
transforms into the performer of the system. This is done through the subject effect, namely 
locating the existential conditions of the subject under financial capitalism. The workings of 
narrative politics are the concrete activation of distancing and of overcoming the distance, 
through which the dominant value is represented and transferred, exploiting the uncertainty 
by means of coordinated narrative intervention. Here collective interpretations and 
utterances of the specific instance function as operativity and performativity, by informing 
the distance the object takes from the main subject. 
Reappraising narrative with regard to the social process of meaning construction, and 
to control the definition of market conditions, the concluding chapter focuses upon the 
problem of ―distance.‖ This is examined as the central epistemological and cultural issue in 
the formation of subjectivity under financial capitalism. The chapter first proposes that the 
encoding of new value over that of the local, under financial capitalism, is operated by the 
objectification effect. With this Georg Simmel tries to probe how the object can eventually 
recognise itself while it objectifies itself in conjunction with the formation of narrative field, 
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and with its cultural implications. The standardization process in the economic, in the 
subject-object relationship, presupposes an objectifying phase in which the universal 
exchange-value of the subject is measured against the normative and legitimate value of the 
object. The moment of objectification, for the purpose of framing the narrative field for the 
object, is crucial, given that it is the first moment of recognition and accommodation of the 
new value in the regime; Simmel tries to formulate this as the effect of ―overcoming the 
distance‖ in the subject-object relation, which is the creation of economic value under the 
monetary system. What an object acquires by overcoming distance is the subject effect. A 
financial crisis functions as a primal event that creates distance between the subjective and 
objective value, through which uncertainty of the objective value is located, redefined, and 
guidedfor the purpose of structuring a new problematic certainty of the subjective value. 
This new problematic certainty is structured through the narrative intervention of the main 
players, conditioning the context of performance of the object with its insinuation of the 
notion of the valuable. The creation of the heroic image of the investorbearing risk without 
fearis a product of the cultural politics of the regime. An object, in international loan 
politics, is interpellated as the subject-effect and the performer of the system, with the only 
limitation the internalisiation of the preposterous conditions imposed by the subject to 
participate in the new financial market. The Brady Plan, imposed in Korea, is examined as a 
specific case that reveals how the subjective value, that is, the dominant value, transforms 
the position of the object, producing a pseudo-subject effectthrough which the local object 
identifies itself as the bearer of new value.   
While investigating such concrete aspects of real subsumption as the inscription of 
financial reality, the chapter inquires how a new type of capital has emerged and become the 
effective method of dominationboth at the national and international level. This integrates 
local participants as cultural figures of the investor, bearing the latent value of the financial 
system. ―The significance of money is,‖ as Georg Simmel puts it, ―only to express the value 
relations between other objects‖ (Simmel, 1990: 147). To realise surplus value through 
exchange, money-capital appropriates the relation itself as the circuit producing surplus value, 
overlooking the existential conditions of the participants it mediates. With the widespread 
evidence of the finance economy superseding industrial capital, money secures its own place 
as ―the autonomous manifestation of the exchange relation‖ (Simmel, 1990: 119). Here, the 
crucial processes of creating and overcoming distance in the money economy, through 
which the object finally transforms into the participant through the subject effect, is 
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associated with the politics of representation of the crisis. The workings of narrative politics 
are the concrete activation of distancing, through which dominant value is represented and 
transferred, exploiting uncertainty by means of coordinated narrative intervention. Here, 
collective interpretations and utterances of the specific instance function as operativity and 
performativity by redesigning the temporary and contingent relations around the crisis as 
stable and universal relations. The mechanism of value-transference, backed by the principle 
of financial contagion, inevitably accompanies the narrative procedure. This is in order to 
sustain the newly valorised flows as meaningful cognition and action, in actualisation of the 
dominant value. The making of symbolic value in actualisation and realisation of the 
dominant value, through narrative politics, is subsequently and conclusively the function 
and effect of economic distancing for real subsumption, which Marx once hinted at as the 
cultural effect of the economic. While suggesting how financial systematic appropriation 
works, namely through real subsumption in which subjective value is codified to a local 
object, the concluding chapter also asserts that the financial value regime is the second stage 
of imperialism. This is on account of its mobilisation of economic value with narrative 
intervention, supporting the symbolic and legitimate value of the system as the only frame 
for creating surplus valueregardless of the different material contexts of localities. To find 
the link between financial capital and the narrative mechanism, it is important to 
understand the cultural performativity of financial capital in terms of its functions of 
mediation and cognition in creating individual, social, and epistemic relations in financial 
capitalismall of which eventually contribute to constructing the narrative field in which 
the roles of narrator and narratee are ceaselessly reconditioned and reconsolidated. 
     At stake here is a reconsideration of how economic value is formed through the 
interaction of the subject and the object. I will use the analysis of Simmel, who observes that 
economic value is the form of the objectification of subject value. Formulating a value is a 
process of overcoming the economic distance between the subject and the object through an 
exchange relation. Under the universal monetary system, economic value is set by the 
―renunciation of the non-monetary uses of monetary material‖ (Simmel, 2004: 152). For 
Simmel, money is the autonomous medium through which objects acquire exchangeability 
or commensurability in financial terms. Here, ―renunciation of the non-monetary uses‖ of 
the object is a core process, one that is incorporated into the dominant value of the financial 
regime and, thus, identifies the value of the subject. Simmel‘s analysis of the value-creating 
process, involving the subject and the object, can be applied to interpretations of financial 
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narrative operation in the crisis. In this vein, I have demonstrated that the aim of the Bank of 
Korea, as an object in the exchange relation, was to identify the economic value of the subject, 
the main narrator, and thereby to overcome distance. Accentuating its own systemic defects 
in the process of recognition of subject value, the object renounces manifold instances of the 
crisis and thus its own fundamentals. It thus eventually represents itself through the value-
signifier of the subject. The politics of representation, as a signifying practice, are, in this case, 
effectively established: the economic distance is overcome through the formation of new 
financial value, in identification with the main narrative by the object. As a result, the local 
economic system becomes fully commensurable to the financial exchange regime, after 
renouncing the narrative struggle to make its own discourse. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
Distance, Value and Crisis: The Cultural Problem of Distance in the Formation of 
Economic Subjectivity and Real Subsumption 
 
 
 
―The IMF trauma:‖ more than fifteen years after the forceful implementation of IMF 
emergency lending and the subsequent restructuring of Korean society, a deep scar has been 
left on the psyche of the Korean people. It has left, in the terms used by Walter Mignolo, an 
imperial wound.113 How could a financial institution affect local people, who seemingly had 
nothing to do with the international financial climate? Why have the people, mostly those 
who were outside the banking and financial sectors, had to endure such intense pain? What 
was the cultural and economic impact of the financial crisis on the process of reconstituting 
the financial structure? What were the effects of macroeconomic rebuilding, in particular 
those related to construction of the sensible and the valuable in actualisation and realisation 
of the dominant value? What kinds of political and cultural devices were implemented in 
supporting and exercising contradictory economic policies as legitimate conditions or 
contexts of performance, in return for the lending? What was the cultural rationale for the 
economic in the international financial exchange? How did the financial centres subsume 
local values and transform them, in order to valorise and regenerate the dominant value? 
This project began with these urgent and varied questions. Although the inquiries are 
closely related to the particularity of the local, namely the Korean financial crisis, they can 
shed light on specific cultural aspectsas well as on the economic subsumption mechanism 
of the financial systemthrough which universality is constantly redefined and 
reconfigured to consolidate its legitimacy.  
Under the theoretical concerns, we observed the cultural logic of finance in terms of 
representation of information and reconfiguration of temporalitythe two organising 
principles of narrative operation. By analysing the relationship between culture and finance 
from the perspective of the cultural logic of financial narrative, we suggested that narrative 
                                            
113 Walter Mignolo, ―The Prospect of Harmony and the Decolonial View of the World‖ 
(http://waltermignolo.com/the-prospect-of-harmony-and-the-decolonial-view-of-the-world/) 
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was the device of activation and the frame of value transference under financial capitalism. 
Exploring the possibilities of the cultural theory of value, this project delved into questions 
of value and examined the actual process of value formation associated with operativity and 
performativity of narrative. We saw this as the cognitive operation and political action 
constitutive of financial narrative politics, working for value transference in the discourse of 
financial crisis, which was, as this thesis asserted, systematically operated throughout the 
Korean financial crisis. We revisited the value theory and narrative analyses of Simmel, 
Marx, Ricoeur, and Genette, in order to articulate the economic theory of value in the 
cultural politics of narrative. Following Ricoeur, we saw this as a mechanism of value 
production and transference that is correlated with the financial doctrine of entanglement 
and contagion. Through narrative, in which utterances and statements on a primal event 
perform as collective operativity of information, a value is constructed and transferred to 
inform and motivate actors. Narrative structure, from which the nexuses of intentionalities 
of the financial system are transmitted, is thus suggested as a meta-frame of cultural 
valorisation. It valorises economic value for the (re)production of dominant financial value; 
without this, any ―shock doctrine‖ or economic prescription cannot be valorised or 
legitimated. Under the theoretical concerns, this thesis substantiated finance as a narrative 
apparatus working beyond economic entities, examining various performative statements 
and speeches by the main financial narrators of the IMF, the World Bank, and the U.S. 
government, which effectively presented unprecedented economic shock therapy as a 
legitimate process for restructuring the Korean economy. In this regard, narrative 
intervention was appraised as the preliminary cognitive operation and political action that 
justifies and legitimates the imposition of contradictory economic policies onto the crisis-
affected country. With the narrative operation as a preliminary cultural cognitive operation, 
and political actions sustaining new financial arrangements by imposing a structure of 
meaning-making in production and transference of dominant values, financial narrators 
extrapolate economic policies. These have a force of necessity, and call for the radical 
imposition of macroeconomic transformation. 
With the guiding structure of operativity and performativity as the cognitive operation 
of the discourse of financial crisis, narrative operation constantly represents the financial 
master code as the ontological and epistemological conditions of conduct. Narrative opens a 
channel of cognition of value, and regulates the context of performance, while providing a 
frame of reference for actors. It allows for interpretation to be effectively implemented at a 
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time of uncertainty. As we have shown, creating a narrative of an event and an object is a 
distinctive feature of the financial mode of production, in which legitimate interpretations 
and forecasts of financial centres, credit rating firms and global financial institutions, all 
function as the defining factors channeling the flow of money. Narrative exploits uncertainty 
as a resource for performativity, and necessitates a new standard, thereby regulating and 
activating heterogeneous actors in the markets. A financial crisis is the crucial point of 
narrativity in the making of a legitimate guiding structure, exploiting uncertainty to manage 
riskand thus producing a narrative as a frame, or a socially symbolic device that 
modulates an invisible boundary. Within this any rational and productive behaviour is 
informed and performed. 
Focusing on the cultural problem of distance, this concluding chapter suggests that 
narrative, the field of cognition and action supporting the notion of the valuable in the 
economic, formulates the objectifying field on which the colliding values of the subject and 
object are distanced. It is here that that distance is measured, and overcome in producing 
and transferring the dominant value. The problem of distance in the formation of subjectivity 
and objectivity is crucial; it is the key concept illuminating the formation of economic 
subjectivity and the subsumption mechanism in finance. Subject-effect is produced for the 
object, by taking on the modalities of narrative enunciations of the narrator. The effect 
justifies the limitations in subjectivity that the object gains. The Korean financial crisis is an 
example of how the subsumption of the object can be exercised in making a new economic 
subjectivity. With interpretations transmitting the official view of the object, as well as its 
economic system, the object is guided to recognize its distance from the main subjective 
value under the new reality.  
The new reality is, thus, the product of articulation; it is embedded by the 
representation politics that problematises the new economic order. As such, the politics of 
representation is, according to Abolfia, regarded as interpretive politics, through which the 
financial institutions ―frame their action, assessing how others would interpret it, and 
crafting the policy directive so that it would be interpreted as they intended‖ (Abolfia, 2005: 
207). Interpretive politics, under financial capitalism, is ―the social process of meaning 
construction‖ that will ―control the definition of market conditions‖ (Abolfia, 2005: 227). 
This hermeneutical move intends, above all, to redefine the identity of the object as the new 
subject of dominant value, distancing the object in the new economic value regime through 
effective ―meaning construction‖ for ―the definition of (changed) market conditions.‖ 
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According to Ricoeur ―meaning effect‖ is the ―basic phenomenon of semantic innovation‖ 
(Ricoeur, 1984: preface, ix). Ricoeur also articulates the construction of meaning as the 
process of opening a new level: innovationgiven that the ―innovation is produced entirely 
on the level of discourse, that is, the level of acts of language equal to or greater than the 
sentence‖ (Ricoeur, 1984: preface, ix). The innovation is a schema, in which new sense of 
order is created through narrative operation. 
Under the new value system, the formation of the new economic value is closely 
associated with subject-effect, allowing the object the imagined position of the subject. The 
subject- effect is a concrete aspect of subjectivation. Georg Simmel‘s notion of distance can be 
reilluminated here, in order to propose a realignment process of the subject and the object in 
the formulation of new economic value. The effect, namely the cultural as well as economic 
subsumption of the object, is a new mode of activation in financial imperialism. I will 
examine the situation during the Korean financial crisis, and look at the cultural politics of 
finance capital that produced the subject-effect through the subjectivation process. The 
Brady Plan, which was imposed by the U.S. administration in 1990 to resolve Mexico‘s 
financial crisis, will then be examined as the concrete strategy of finance capital in 
overcoming the subject-object distance through international loan conditions. The plan, as 
briefly observed in the previous chapter, is reevaluated as the critical moment in creating a 
financial reality grounded by a new architecture. It affected the Korean financial crisis by 
allowing private commercial and investment banks to encroach on the public sector. By 
politicizing private financial forces in the financial crisis, the plan annuls local autonomy. 
The political economy of the plan and its system of contagion is, thus, reconsidered, in order 
to focus its cultural influence on individual human existential conditions. Here the subject 
effect constantly works through a financial redefinition of the realities, employing 
performative narrative speeches and utterances to make objective value conform to the 
subjective value. 
 
The Problem of Distance in Economic Value-Formation 
 
Expounding the process of economic value-formation, Georg Simmel emphasises the notion 
of distance. In his analysis, locating the distance between the subject and the object produces 
―the objectifying effect,‖ with which recognition of the object takes shape in the realm of the 
economic value (Simmel, 2004: 75). Although Simmel‘s analysis focuses on the subject 
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desiring the object in proportion to its utility and scarcity, his theory can be approached 
from the point of view of the object as an interactive agent, rather than the desired thing, 
which thus interlinks in the formation of economic value. The objectifying procedure, which 
this thesis articulates as narrative process, is inevitable in the process of economic valuation, 
for in the act of establishing a distance the object itself presupposes the value regime. 
Meanwhile, it identifies the existence of the subject and its mediating roles between the 
subject and the object in the objectified field. Thus, establishing distance is a critical 
operation in positioning the object in the coordinates of the value regime. By having its 
distance designated or uttered, the object is informed and acquires its position in the field. 
However, the value of the object is not immediately gained; it is embodied only by 
overcoming the distance as the bearer of the new value, which has to be exchangeable in the 
dominant value regime. As a result, the object is eventually activated as the performer of the 
regime.114 
The economic value regime, as the field of exchange, is, however, an ―exchange of 
sacrifices‖ because ―the general form of exchange‖ is ―a surrender of something in order to 
gain something‖ (Simmel, 2004: 87). For the object, the exchange functions as an 
epistemological as well as ontological break with its intrinsic value, to gain, among diverse 
competing values, the economic value commensurable to the dominant value system. As 
such, ―a value can become practically effective only by being equivalent to other values, i.e. 
by being exchangeable‖ in the market (Simmel, 2004: 92). Therefore, as Simmel puts it ―the 
purpose of establishing a distance is that it should be finally overcome‖ through the 
exchange relationship, to create an economic subject by transforming the object (Simmel, 
2004: 75). In this formulation, although Simmel does not pay full attention to the 
                                            
114 From the cultural perspective, Ricoeur also emphasises the notion of ―distance‖ as a fundamental 
conceptual category through which ―figuring the predicative assimilation‖ is undertaken for 
―schematizing the synthetic operation‖ (Ricoeur, 1984: x). Therefore distancing practice through the 
signifying narrative operation is the initiation process of the system for ―inventing imaginary or 
formal ‗solutions‘ to unresolvable social contradictions.‖ This is ―tolerant closure,‖ as Jameson puts it 
(Jameson, 1989: 79). Ricoeur explicates the function of distance with regard to the ―synthetic 
operation,‖ in which ―change of distance‖ provides ―intelligible signification‖ in ―schematizing the 
syntheticoperation‖: ―It is this change of distance in logical space that is the work of the productive 
imagination. This consists of schematizing the synthetic operation, of figuring the predicative 
assimilation from whence results the semantic innovation. The productive imagination at work in the 
metaphorical process is thus our competence for producing new logical species by predicative 
assimilation, in spite of the resistance of our current categorization of language. The plot of a 
narrative is comparable to this predicative assimilation. It ―grasps together‖ and integrates into one 
whole and complete story multiple and scattered events, thereby schematizing the intelligible 
signification attached to the narrative taken as a whole‖ (Ricoeur, 1984: x). 
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transformation of the subjectivity of the object, economic value is concretised when the 
subjective value is objectified through the interaction of the objectwhich consents to enter 
the economic value regime. Here, what is overcome for the object is its cognitive and 
material conditions of existentiality, toward the new value. A value itself is a form of 
secondary abstraction toward concrete reality, through which diverse interpretations and 
evaluations are interlinked and filtered under the influence of power. The possibility of 
realisation of various values, except the economic, is sublimated, since the capitalistic 
exchange-relation only tolerates economic value that is exchangeable in the market. Only 
this value will form further surplus economic value. As suggested in Chapter 3, this is the 
teleology of the economic exchange relationship, which Simmel suggests is the intention of 
the relationship, presupposing a causal connection between the elements. Thus we have a 
―teleological chain‖ on which the inner condition of the system is founded: 
 
The factual and logical possibility of the teleological chain depends upon the causal 
relation, but the interest of this causal chain, its psychological possibility, arises from 
the pursuit of an end. (Simmel, 2004: 208) 
 
Through the chain of causal connections, the teleology creates an ―inner bond‖ (Simmel, 
2004: 175). This inner bond is the product of ―the interaction of exchange‖ from which ―a 
mental unity of [economic] values‖ is created (Simmel, 2004: 198). The establishment of 
teleology through an exchange relationship is the formula for the relationship between the 
subject and the object. Through the process, the object identifies itself as the (pseudo) subject, 
sacrificing other values. While for Simmel money is the abstract representation of the 
universal relationship, it is, we might say, finance as universal rationale (as well as practice) 
that inscribes the teleology herelaying a foundation for the causal relation.  
To examine the subject-effect as an aspect of the ―inner bond‖ of the system, the build-
up of capitalistic teleology might be, first of all, the effect of real subsumption, in Marx‘s terms. 
According to Marx, exchange incorporates each object through the universal and legitimate 
medium, money, while bracketing ―the differences between spheres of production.‖ This is 
where each individual object is located, for ―[e]xchange does not create the differences 
between spheres of production but it does bring the different spheres into a relation, thus 
converting them into more or less interdependent branches of the collective production of a 
whole society‖ (Marx, 1990: 472). The establishment of a capitalistic exchange relationship is, 
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on the one hand, intended to serve as a foundation for ―formal subsumption of labour under 
capital‖ through capitalistic means and conditions. However, ―the formal subsumption,‖ as 
Marx continues, ―is then replaced by a real subsumption‖ with which ways of life are 
gradually integrated and extended until it encompasses social relationships as a whole. 
Though Marx‘s account of real subsumption is not fully explained in his analysis, the notion 
can be understood as the intensification of domination, which encroaches on the cognition 
and actions of the actor, and which is enforced as the teleology of the existence through 
narrative information. By means of real subsumption, the object is set to desire the 
subjectivity of the subject. This desire infiltrates the mentality of the object, filling the cracks 
in the system. In this sense, real subsumption, according to Hardt and Negri, is the practice 
of active subjective forces working over the object, ―to establish over what was no longer 
controllable in disciplinary terms‖: 
 
The passage from the formal subsumption to the real must be explained through the 
practices of active subjective forces. In other words, disciplinarity pushed to its extreme, 
imposed by the global Taylorization of labour processes, cannot actually determine the 
need for a new form of command except through the expression of active social 
subjectivities. The globalization of market, far from being simply the horrible fruit of 
capitalist entrepreneurship, was actually the result of the desires and demands of 
Taylorist, Fordist, and disciplined labour power across the world. In this sense, the 
processes of the formal subsumption anticipated and carried through to maturity the 
real subsumption, not because the latter was the product of the former (as Marx himself 
seemed to believe), but because in the former were constructed conditions of liberation 
and struggle that only the latter could control. The movement of desiring subjectivities 
forced the development go forwardand proclaimed that there was no turning back. In 
response to these movements in both the dominant and the subordinated countries, a 
new form of control had to be posed in order to establish command over what was no 
longer controllable in disciplinary terms. (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 255–256)  
 
While formal subsumption proposes stabilisation through a ceaseless process of 
differentiations in the dominant mode of production (using technically revolutionised 
phases, such as Taylorism and Fordism), real subsumption extends to social relations 
beyond the economic mode of production, underpinning such relations as not just 
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conditions of economic (re)production but conditions of a world view. The object depends 
on this view to recreate itself by constantly identifying itself as the subject, or as the 
performer in the system. The imposition and construction of the conditions of production 
and reproduction is, thus, a new form of control in the cultural dimension, as it even 
valorizes the existential human condition. 
 
The Economic Value Forming Process: Relative Form and Equivalent Form 
 
Here, it is important that we rethink Marx‘s analysis of the reformulation of valuefrom 
use-value to exchange-valuein association with the conditions of formal and real 
subsumption. When Marx considers exchange-value as ―mutually replaceable or of identical 
magnitude‖ (Marx, 1990: 127), he focuses on the transformation into exchange-value, which 
entails a fundamental change in the use-value. For Marx, the ―value-forming substance‖ of 
the use-value is labour, given that ―[w]hat exclusively determines the magnitude of the [use] 
value of any article is therefore the amount of labour socially necessary, or the labour-time 
socially necessary for its production‖ (Marx, 1990: 129). While labour in the use-value is the 
actual expression of private labour, labour in the exchange-value is abstractedit is 
expressed as exchange-value, in which ―all commodities are merely definite quantities of 
congealed labour-time‖ (Marx, 1990: 130, emphasis in original). Thus, ―[exchange] values are 
the objective expressions of homogenous labour‖ (Marx, 1990: 134). 
By entering the exchange relationship, the difference between, for instance, the labour 
invested in making the coat and the labour in the table is equated. The spatial and temporal 
differences between the two concrete labours are bracketed. Emphasising ―congealed 
labour-time‖ and ―homogenous labour,‖ Marx reveals that the two labours are transformed 
into relative form and equivalent form. The relative form of value mirrors a commodity and 
another commodity, articulating the value of a commodity in the commodity relation. As 
Marx suggests,―[t]he relative value-form of a commodity, the linen for example, expresses 
its value-existence as something wholly different from its substance and properties, as the 
quality of being comparable with a coat for example; this expression itself therefore indicates 
that it conceals a social relation‖ (Marx, 1990: 149). The relative form of value in commodity 
exchange, therefore, presupposes that ―something wholly different‖ exists in the value-
existence of the object, establishing a new social relation that is created on the cancellation of 
the former social relation. Recognising the relative form of value in the value regime, the 
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object takes its expression as the form of equivalent value, with which it enters into the 
exchange relationship. As Marx discusses, in the stage of acquiring equivalent value via 
relative value, the use-value is qualitatively differentiated. ―The first peculiarity which 
strikes us when we reflect on the equivalent form is this, that use-value becomes the form of 
appearance of its opposite, [exchange] value‖ (Marx, 1990: 150). As private and concrete 
labour, embodied in use-value, become abstract and social labour, the object eventually 
gains equal value under the regime of exchange-value. The overcoming of the distance 
between the subject and the object is completed through stages of transformation of the 
economic value-forms, through the relative and equivalent form; the former form signifies 
the recognition of the distance, while the latter form implicates the formation of the new 
economic value of the object. This gives access to the system, as it does with the subject. By 
reconfiguring the object as the bearer of economic value, the dominant subject identifies the 
object as the actual function and effect of the system. ―All ideology‖ Althusser states, ―hails or 
interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects, by functioning of the category of the 
subject‖ (Althusser, 1971: 173). 
In relation to the formation of economic value, Marx, however, does not fully explain 
the transformation of the epistemological condition of the object, which influences 
ontological condition as well. When the object experiences a fundamental change in 
existential formas the new bearer of the exchange-value formthe change does not 
remain at the level of the production of the economic per se. What the object experiences on 
an epistemological level is a new conditionality of knowledge, as it has to transcode 
information and knowledge in terms of the economic. The new transcoding process is 
intended to establish a new set of representations of the world, in which the economic 
becomes the agency of the knowledge processwe analysed this as narrative knowledge in 
Chapter 6. For example, one common characteristic that reveals the changes after the Korean 
financial crisis is the expansion of concerns about the economic in the formation of society. 
According to a survey conducted ten years after the crisis, the most distinctive feature of the 
change can be summarised as a shift in interest and awareness, from the political to the 
economic. For the 3,600 people who participated in the survey, it was evident that what has 
changed most seriously is their recognition of money: money as the ultimate signifier of the 
society and everyday life.115 While the proportion of those with concerns about domestic 
politics shrank to 10% from 30%, the interest in money and money management, as related 
                                            
115 Segye Daily Newspaper, 25 November, 2007 
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to assets and stocks, visibly increased more than threefold. This new response to the 
economic as the dominant factor in society can be seen as the newly formulated structure of 
feeling, with which the effect of the system is expressed and embodied. It becomes the 
internal form of life in which value and meaning are newly perceived. 
 
Financial Crisis and the Distancing of the Object 
 
On the 23rd of August, 2001, Korea repaid $140 million to the IMF. With the final repayment, 
Korea returned the ―relief‖ loan amount of $19.5 billion to the IMF and other creditor 
institutions. On the surface, the financial crisis seemed to be at an end after just three years. 
However, the financial crisis in Korea is still ongoing, as most people have experiencing the 
necessity of overcoming the distance in the new financial reality. 
Although more than ten years have passed, for Mr Kim Se-Chang, who had been 
working for the Kia motor company, the sudden ―disaster‖ of the Korean financial crisis 
comes to mind as clearly as if it happened yesterday. Mr Kim immediately lost his job as the 
liquidity crisis of the company worsened. However, the most profound change for him has 
been the change in mentality. The change, according to Mr Kim, was the product of shock 
and anxiety after witnessing the sudden collapse of the company, as well as the humiliation 
of the country under the newly-imposed financial reality, since the unexpected formation of 
the objectifying field became the new criteria of performance. The inner psychological 
transformation occurred in an act of internalising and identifying the inevitable necessity, 
amounting to taking up the subjective value. This change triggered a new epistemology, 
realising the new economic regime. Mr Kim soon decided to enhance his ―efficiency,‖ or 
commensurability to the new value system, in order to survive in new and harsh reality. The 
relentless self-demand for efficiency does not just originate from entrepreneurial virtue, but 
is also the product of the existential anxiety he has had to undergo since the financial crisis.  
Thus Mr Kim‘s decision to transform himself into the bearer of efficiency. Fitting into 
the new financial reality can be seen as a process of acquiring equivalent value form, given 
that ―efficiency‖ is the general principle the object always mirrors in the regime of financial 
exchange. Despite the fact, Mr Kim adds, that he started as self-employed, creating a small 
interior design business, and the company gained a reputation in his local area after years of 
hardship, he still doesn‘t feel any sense of security. Though his new venture is beginning to 
settle down, he always reminds himself that he should be prepared to have to find another 
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job if an unpredictable crisis comes up. What he learned from the crisis is that, as he 
cynically admits, ―there is no one to protect me in this harsh reality except my economic 
ability to survive.‖116 At this stage, what Mr Kim feels is that he is transformed into an 
equivalent form in entering the exchange relationship. In the exchange, there is nothing to 
secure him except his value-forming attribute, namely, efficiency. The case of Mr Kim 
exemplifies how the international financial crisis affected a majority of people in Korea, 
distancing the object to encode a new reality. The sudden financial crisis, which radically 
severed the already-established local economic reality, based on ―permanent workplace‖ 
and ―full-employment,‖ embeds an individual in a totally new context. Here the individual 
has to reconfigure himself in order to survive, transforming himself in to the economic 
subject. An object has to objectify itself, while constantly changing itself as the relative and 
equivalent value-form in the new exchange relationship. 
This radical imposition of a new economic reality is actually the orthodox therapy the 
U.S.-dominated financial forces sought to implement. Since the 1970s, as Naomi Klein 
suggests, a financial crisis in peripheral and semi-peripheral countries has been seen as the 
most appropriate time to prescribe shock therapy. In her analysis, the ―shock therapy‖ that 
has been imposed as the legitimate prescription for an economic crisis, following Milton 
Friedman, is the metaphor of torture. It fundamentally aims to ―provoke the level of 
disorientation‖ on which the unwanted economic therapy [free-market neoliberalism] is 
imposed with the least friction (Klein, 2007: 459). ―Confusion, disorientation, [and] surprise‖ 
are, Klein emphasises, the break for taking out a clean sheet to inscribe a new ideology, 
revealing the patterns of effects that the market-oriented neo-liberalists have pursued. The 
sense of being lost, clearly seen in the case of Mr Kim, is a symptom of radical distancing, 
through which the object is severed from the traditional, to which he or she has been 
accustomed. These are the most favorable conditions, and thus the best opportunity, to 
prescribe the so-called legitimate therapy. The object, suffering from a sense of being lost, 
has to resort to the new authoritative prescription made by the international financial 
apparatuses, since, as Chapter 5 observed, such a prescription aims to transform the 
uncertainty of financial crisis into problematic certainty for revalorising the system. This is 
implemented through its explanatory effect. The object is exchanged for sacrifice, along with 
which the object has to, first of all, reconfigure its own identity to become the performer of 
the dominant value regime. In the formation of economic value, the process of renunciation 
                                            
116 “No one can protect me,‖ Weekly Hankyoreh 21, 27 December, 2006. 
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of inherent values by the object is, thus, necessitated as the inevitable existential condition to 
acquire economic value. It is a moment of ―breaking,‖ at which the traditional values rooted 
in locality are shattered, while the ―legitimate‖ prescription of international financial capital 
is embedded as the new rationale. This transforms the object into something exchangeable in 
order to activate the system on a local and international level. By exploiting the sense of 
being lost, disorientation, narrative intervention, as Chapter 4 suggested, supports the 
necessitation of financialisation of the everyday. This accompanies the bubble mechanism 
with its transactional orientation as the legitimate process in realisation of the dominant 
value. The collective information produced by financial narrators transcodes the 
epistemological dissonance experienced by the object into the consonance of the subjective 
value; and this becomes a source of cognition and action for actors. 
 
Financial Crisis as the Contingency of a New Imperial Drive 
 
In this sense, as opposed to the widely accepted notion, in a capitalistic system a crisis can be 
―healthy‖ for the system, as Ernest Mandel puts it. The crisis can be a severe setback for 
those who are directly affected but, generally speaking, the ―partial problem‖ also provides 
momentum for ―possible vigorous increase in the rate of surplus-value,‖ producing ―large 
scale reconfiguration of the reserve army,‖ which also contributes to increased surplus-value: 
 
The effect of the crash, for the system as a whole, are healthy, however nasty they may 
be for the individual capitalist. General devalorization of capital is not accompanied by 
a proportional reduction in the mass of surplus-value produced. Or (which amounts to 
the same) an identical mass of surplus value can now valorize a smaller total amount of 
capital. Hence the decline in the rate of profit can be stopped and even reversed. Large 
scale reconfiguration of the reserve army, occurring during the crisis and the 
depression, makes possible a vigorous increase in the rate of surplus-value, not only 
through speed-ups but even through a cut in real wages, which in turn leads to a 
further rise in the rate of profit. (Ernst Mandel, 1981: 51) 
 
Although Mandel points out aspects that are generally centered upon the crisis of 
accumulation and over-production, which are defects in the industrial mode of production, 
the analysis is still relevant to financial crises more generally. It hints that the mechanism of 
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the crisis is associated with the appropriation of the crisis. The most distinctive difference is 
that, while a crisis in the industrial mode of production presumes a real economy, producing 
and trading material and services, the financial mode of production of the virtual economy 
is dematerialised in the flow of liquid money capital. Such fluid capital blurs the traditional 
demarcation between worker and capitalist, allowing the former the position of investor. 
This produces the subject-effect for the object by systematically involving the object as the 
active performer of the system. However, the radical inclusion of the object in the system 
entails depoliticisation of its local contexts, homogenising the local economic system in 
accordance with the dominant one. ―Finance capital,‖ Mandel emphasises, ―finds most 
convenient, and derives the greatest profit from, a form of subjection which involves the loss 
of the political independence of the subjected countries and peoples‖ (Ernst Mandel, 1981:86, 
emphasis in original). In this sense, the establishment of financial capitalism in the local is a 
stage of highly advanced imperialism, as Lenin has examined: 
 
Imperialism is capitalism in that stage of development at which the dominance of 
monopolies and finance capital is established; in which the export of capital has 
acquired pronounced importance; in which the division of the world among the 
international trusts has begun; in which the division of all territories of the globe 
among the biggest capitalist powers has been completed. (Lenin, 1999: 92)  
 
Prognosticating that imperialism will be fully established by highly-mobilised finance 
capital, Lenin argues that ―the export of capital‖ from the core capitalist countries to semi-
peripheral and peripheral countries plays a decisive role in the establishment of the imperial 
world order under modern capitalism. ―Typical of the old capitalism, when free competition 
held undivided sway, was the exports of goods. Typical of the latest stage of capitalism, 
when monopolies rule, is the export of capital‖ (Lenin, 1992: 70, emphasis in original). Loan 
or debt was the prevalent form of capital export Lenin witnessed. ―The principal spheres of 
investment of British capital are the British colonies, which are very large also in America 
(for example, Canada), not to mention Asia, etc. In this case, enormous exports of capital are 
bound up most closely with vast colonies, of the importance of which for imperialism‖ 
(Lenin, 1992: 72).He outlines five characteristics of modern imperialism associated with 
finance capital: 
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Five features of modern imperialism: (1) the concentration of production and capital 
has developed to such a high stage that it has created monopolies which play a decisive 
role in economic life; (2) the merging of bank capital with industrial capital, and the 
creation, on the basis of this ‗finance capital,‘ of a financial oligarchy; (3) the export of 
capital as distinguished from the export of commodities acquires exceptional 
importance; (4) the formation of international monopolist capitalist associations which 
share the world among themselves, and (5) the territorial division of the whole world 
among the biggest capitalist powers is completed. (Lenin, 1992: 92) 
 
What Lenin brings out, following the analysis of Hilferding, is finance as the refined mode 
of imperial domination. During colonial expansion, the most commonly-used methods in 
the export of capital were debts in the name of subsidiaries. According to Hilferding, capital 
export to the colony triggers a wide range of transformations, forcing the local to take on the 
capitalist social relations. But the most effective homogenisation process, the export of 
capital to the colony, should be achieved ―at the level already attained in the most advanced 
country.‖ He goes on: 
 
The export of capital, especially since it has assumed the form of industrial and 
financial capital, has enormously accelerated the overthrow of all the old social 
relations, and the involvement of the whole world in capitalism. Capitalist 
development did not take place independently in each individual country, but instead 
capitalist relations of production and exploitation were imported along with capital 
from abroad, and indeed imported at the level already attained in the most advanced 
country. (Hilferding, 2006: 322-323) 
 
Hilferding underscores that capital is imported in local countries ―at the level already 
attained in the most advanced countries.‖ The sudden implant of a new economic force 
shakes and disorients the existing social relationships, to effectively transform the colony 
with the new economic and social conditions. Shock therapy is the contemporary version of 
capital export and import, disregarding the level of capitalistic development with the 
intention of sudden and radical distancing. In this sense, Hilferding is fully aware that ―the 
export of capital is a condition for the rapid expansion of capitalism. In social terms, this 
expansion is an essential condition for the perpetuation of capitalist society as a whole, 
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while economically it is a condition for maintaining, and at times increasing, the rate of 
profit. The policy of expansion unites all strata of the propertied classes in the service of 
finance capital‖ (Hilferding, 2006: 365). 
 
The Subject-Effect and the Subjectivation of the Object 
 
Here, it is necessary to consider how finance capital actually mobilises the object for real 
subsumption. Financial capital dominates, but it also allows direct contact with the 
fluctuations of the system, producing the subject effect for the object. It is the effect of power, 
as Foucault theorises, that produces the dominant reality as the condition of 
rationalisationfrom which recognition of power is discursively formulated. Finance capital 
codifies a new reality, as the condition of power produces, at the same time, the bearers of 
this new reality by making actors participate in a process of recognition of power. This is the 
process of constitution of the new reality, which overlaps with the truth claims that financial 
narrators perform in the name of financial reconstruction. This process is paradoxical and 
contradictoryit is the process of justifying ―the allodoxia‖ suggested in Chapter 5in that 
the more the subject is involved in the discursive process the more he subjects himself to 
power: the subject identifies himself as the subject bearing and creating the new values. This 
is the point at which the object eventually overcomes the distance, the radical imposition of 
new reality. Judith Butler explains that the process of subjection takes place in order to 
activate or form the subjectivity through the construction of new identity: 
 
Subjection is, literally, the making of a subject, the principle of regulation according to 
which a subject is formulated or produced. Such subjection is a kind of power that not 
only unilaterally acts on a given individual as a form of domination, but also activates 
or forms the subject. Hence, subjection is neither simply the domination of a subject nor 
its production, but designates a certain kind of restriction in production, a restriction 
without which the production of the subject cannot take place, a restriction through 
which that production takes place. (Judith Butler, 1997: 84)  
 
Butler indicates that as subjection stimulates the subject, it is neither merely domination nor 
its production. Though motivation produces voluntary performance of the subject, thus 
generating the subject-effect, performativity is, however, always restricted. What is at stake 
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here is that the restrictedness itself is the condition of subjectivity of the object. Through this 
restriction, the object can be self-disciplined. Restrictedness in the financial world order 
surfaces as a conditionality of capital flow, such as with regard to debts or loans. Although 
the object participates in the market, it has to recognise and internalize conditionality as the 
condition of participation. The Brady Plan is a clear example of how the financial regime is 
established in the local under conditionality by means of a newly emerging subjective value 
of the bank, involving but limiting the activation of the local object. 
 
The Brady Plan and Financial Imperialism: The Subject Effect and Risk Taking 
 
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the undeveloped and developing countries borrowed a lot 
of money from the U.S. and Western governments. The debts were normally refinanced by 
creditor countries‘ government loans. As successive loans incurred more interest, the 
amount of debt grew, exposing debtor countries as well as their creditors to more risk. The 
Brady Plan was intended to alter the pattern of loan lending, involving commercial banks as 
the new creditors of the loans. The plan was originally initiated to settle the Latin American 
financial crisis in the 1980s. Mexico was the first country to be offered loans under the plan. 
The financial crisis in Mexico in 1982 stemmed directly from financial problems in the public 
sector, particularly from a government balance deficit that had fallen short of foreign debt 
repayment. The difficulty led the country to announce a national moratorium. In 1989, the 
US Treasury secretary Nicholas Brady proposed ―debt-equity swaps‖-based loan lending. 
The new method was ―viewed with enthusiasm both by U.S. financiers and by U.S. officials. 
They were seen as a double advantage: both canceling a part of the debt, and thus reducing 
the burden, and attracting direct investment as a new source of funds‖ (Krugman, 1994: 698). 
Under the plan, the IMF and the World Bank mediated to allocate funds mobilised from 
commercial banks to debtor countries. The plan implied, first of all, the politicisation of 
commercial banks in global debt-politics, as their influence was decisive in local 
governments, in that the commercial banks became, for the first time, main creditors to a 
country. As the commercial banks became important agents in the political climate of these 
debt problems, local governments became, on the contrary, depoliticised under the pressure 
of the loans. Another important implication of the plan was the emergence of a 
representative role for the international financial apparatuses, such as the IMF and the 
World Bank, as the last resort for those experiencing financial problems. Securing the 
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interest of the first world commercial banks through the mediation of international financial 
apparatuses was the new financial strategy of the Washington consensus. By reducing the 
unpredictability of volatile local circumstances, the plan aimed to valorise the risk in the 
financial regime by guaranteeing that commercial banks would replace the debt of local 
governments with U.S. government-backed bonds. 
In 1994, when Mexico faced a second financial crisis due to liquidity problems, the 
Brady Plan was implemented as the framework for the debt package. Under the initiative, 
commercial banks were at the center of the international debt solution. More than 500 
commercial banks, mostly from America, Europe, and Japan, participated in negotiating the 
terms and conditions of ―the menu,‖ which would be applied as the condition for lending to 
the country. A total loan amount of $48.9 billion was arrived at by the banks. It was the 
moment of the emergence of commercial banks as the new subjects of economic and political 
force, which would thereafter prevail on debtor countries to implement conditions in which 
existing debts are replaced by prolonged (20-year) bonds. The banks can acquire bonds at far 
less risk than current debt, with the mediation of the U.S. treasury, as they are supposed to 
be secure under the plan. The menu option commercial banks have focused on is ―the 
diversity of banks‘ business interests‖ (Aizenman and Pinto, 2005: 489). This is basically a 
―market-based approach recognising the market value of impaired debt‖ (Aizenman and 
Pinto, 2005: 489). As Cohen suggests, the ―underlying design‖ of the plan is to ―minimize 
any serious risk of bank failures or financial-market instability‖: 
 
The resulting distribution of the burden of adjustment, [by the Plan] skewed so much 
in favor of commercial creditors, is no accidentquite the contrary, in fact. It is an 
inherent corollary of the prevailing strategy‘s underlying design, which has always 
tacitly accorded highest priority to the interests of private lenders: specifically, to 
minimizing any serious risk of bank failures or financial-market instability. (Cohen, 
1999: 239) 
 
The empowering of commercial banks in lending to developing countries is closely 
associated with the investment boom in emerging markets in the 1990s. The Oxfam Poverty 
Report indicates that ―the signing of the first Brady deal [in 1989] coincided with the start of 
the boom in private capital flows to developing countries, with the countries previously at 
the centre of the debt crisis figuring prominently among the newly favored ‗emerging 
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markets.‘ By 1993, Latin America was receiving the equivalent of 3% of regional income in 
private capital flows, reversing the outflows of the previous decade, prompting most 
commentators and Northern governments to draw a line under the ‗debt crisis‘‖ (Watkins et 
al., 1995: 176). It goes on:―As of 1995, twelve countries in Latin America have now completed 
deals under the Brady Plan, covering some $190bn, or four-fifths of the debt stock owed in 
1989‖ (Watkins et al., 1995: 176). 
Since the ―successful contracting‖ of the 1995 Mexican financial crisis, the political 
influence of commercial banks has increased unprecedentedly in developing countries. 
Empowering the banks implies that in any local financial crisis they will have space to 
intervene in the local economy, transforming a public matter into a private one by redefining 
the political situation as economic. The workings of the plan symptomatically reveal how 
financial capitalism subsumes local systems, while depoliticising the international debt 
problem as a device of imposition of financial orderunder the sway of commercial banks. 
It is without doubt a device for financial rule, instituting the lending process as the focal 
point of the imposition of a new economic reality. With the emergence and establishment of 
the plan, a government debt package affected by the financial crisis becomes the channel of 
financial capital, through which the commercial banks and international financial 
apparatuses reinforce their command over the local system. In fact, right after the deal, huge 
amounts of commercial bank capital flooded Mexico. Gross capital flows toward Mexico 
rose tenfold from 1989 to 1993, from U.S. $3.2 billion to $32.6 billion. Some of those inflows 
reflected the repatriation of capital that had left in previous years. However, a large 
proportion was due to new portfolio investment (Brookings Institution, 1998: 155). As 
Brookings Institution emphasizes, ―the fundamental problem is that a large proportion of 
the foreign capital pouring into emerging market is speculative in nature, and entirely 
disconnected from the real economy. Much of the explosion in private capital flows 
generated through the sale of government bonds and through portfolio investment 
represents high-risk short-term speculative activity, and institutional investment by pension 
funds and money market managers. Contrary to the popular perception, such flows have 
less to do with opportunities for productive investment and employment creation than with 
the pursuit of the fast-buck in money market‖ (Brookings Institution, 1998: 177). 
As the framework of international solutions to local government debt problems 
changes the market-base system, Korea was also exposed in the climate of the crisis. When 
Korea was hit by the liquidity problem in 1997, the plan resurfaced as the legitimate 
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framework for dealing with the circumstances. In early 1998 in New York, with the 
mediation of the IMF, thirteen major international banks agreed to extend $24 billion worth 
of short-term loans to Korean private banks. Under the plan, Seoul had to guarantee the new 
loans (Jochnick & Preston, 2006). The deal included three key conditions: ―Bad loans on 
which Korean banks might have defaulted were replaced by new bonds that could be 
publicly traded and sold by the original Japanese, German, and U.S. banks. Thus, the banks 
that made the original bad loans would not retain the bonds issued to replace those loans; A 
bad private debt was being replaced by a new government-guaranteed debt; The deal was 
made under heavy pressure from the IMF and the US Treasury‖ (Jochnick & Preston, 2006: 
116). 
The conditions made the Korean government liable for the debt and the risk-taking 
itself, as the clauses clearly specify that the risk taker in any bad private loan, which might 
surface at any time due to possible poor judgment or mismanagement by the banks, should 
be the local government. While endorsing the virtually risk-free loan conditions for the 
international banks, the deal tacitly and overtly approved ―illegitimate successor loans‖ by 
the banks, given that ―if the lender was guilty of misconduct in the first instance, then its 
responsibility continues. Similarly, where publicly traded bonds are used to refinance an 
illegitimate debt, the buyers of such bonds should have known of the risk that these bonds 
would be declared illegitimate, and they accepted the risk. In other words, the illegitimacy 
carries forwardeven if the original loan has been formally paid off, its successor loan or 
bond is, in practice, the same illegitimate loan. And a bank that sells a bond for an 
illegitimate debt has the same responsibility as a dealer who knowingly sells a stolen car. 
That lead us to the following definitions of what we will call an ‗illegitimate successor loan‘‖ 
(Jochnick & Preston, 2006: 117). Under the scheme, the government guarantee of 
international private banks‘ loans cannot actually guarantee the prevention of toxic 
―illegitimate successor loans‖ becauseand in contrast with the coordinated narrative 
enunciations in legitimating the planby accepting responsibility for the private loan, the 
local government can ―strengthen the illegitimacy‖ of the risk. Jochnick and Preston warn of 
this situation: 
 
1. If an institution replaces, rolls over, or pays off an illegitimate debt with a new loan, 
then the new loan is an illegitimate successor loan. 
2. If a bond or new loan is issued for the sole or main purpose of paying off an 
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illegitimate debt, then this is an illegitimate successor loan and the creditor has taken 
the risk. 
3. A government guarantee of an illegitimate successor loan does not make the loan any 
less illegitimate. Furthermore, it strengthens the illegitimacy if international financial 
pressure has forced the government to accept responsibility for a private debt. 
(Jochnick & Preston, 2006: 117) 
 
Such an illegitimate successor loan might be a grave setback to a local government and its 
people. Here, the crucial necessity of containing the risk is embodied through narrative 
intervention, through which the object should be identified as the risk taker, since the 
narrative operation accentuates ―the problem was not with [western] capitalism but with the 
Asian countries and their bad policies.‖ Stiglitz tells us that: 
 
Banks in Western developed countries were lending to the large Korean firms, 
knowing full well how leveraged many Korean firms were. The bad loans were a 
result of bad judgment, not of any pressure from the United States or other Western 
governments, and were made in spite of the Western banks‘ allegedly good risk 
management tools. No wonder, then, that these big banks wanted to shift the scrutiny 
away from themselves. The IMF had good reason for supporting them, for the Fund 
itself shared in the culpability. Repeated IMF bailouts elsewhere had contributed to 
lack of due diligence on the part of the lenders… The East Asia crisis cast doubt on this 
new worldview unless it could be shown that the problem was not with capitalism, but with 
the Asian countries and their bad policies[…] By focusing on the weakness of the crisis 
countries, they not only shifted blame away from their own failuresboth the failures 
of policy and the failures in lendingbut they attempted to use the experience to push 
their agenda still further. (Stiglitz, 2002: 213, emphasis in original) 
 
Consenting to the loan conditions is the premise for the local object to participate in the new 
regime of economic performance. Only by taking restrictedness as the condition of new 
economic performance can the object eventually be activated to perform as the new 
economic subject, retaining a relative and equivalent form of value commensurable to the 
financial imperial regime. In this sense, the subjectivity the object finally gains is, in essence, 
limited subjectivity, given that the conditions restrict full access to the dominant system. By 
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taking the loans, the object is allowed ―bailout‖ in order to re-enter the system. The subject-
effect for the object in the new financial regime is ceaselessly propagandised whenever the 
object performs, keeping only its liability. Under the new loan program, Korea, Mexico, and 
Chile are all cited as role models by the financial apparatuses. The Brady Plan is thus a new 
financial strategy for subsuming the local object, in order to produce the subject-effect, 
transforming the object as the bearer of the new economic value. A local financial crisis in a 
contemporary financial system is a critical point in which to establish financial imperialism, 
even redefining the conditions of the object through radical distancing and subsequent 
overcoming. It is the new mode of activation of the financial regime, producing the subject-
effect for the object, while subjecting itself to the conditionality of the debt under the newly 
emerging commercial and investment banks. The real form of subsumption in financial 
capitalism is thus the subjectivation of object, which internalizes limited conditionality as a 
form of life and transforms itself in to a heroic investor without fear of taking risk. The 
formation of pseudo-subjectivity, through which the Korean financial crisis can be read as 
an actual instance of the subsumption mechanism of the financial systemin which the 
formation of the new economic subjectivity of the object is revealed as a concrete exemplar 
of subjection/subjectivation of the object in the new financial system. It enhanced the all-
subsuming imperial drive of financial capitalism. What narrative intervention and its 
politics symptomatically prove is the initiation and actualisation of real subsumption. 
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Abstract 
 
Wan Gi Lee 
 
This thesis suggests a cultural logic of financialisation in terms of (re)presentation of 
information and (re)configuration of temporality, both of which are critically undertaken 
and regulated by financial narrative. This narrative functions, following Bourdieu, as “the 
sign of wealth” in our times. It is time for cultural theorists and activists to approach finance 
as a set of epistemic cultural processes beyond the economic, which modulates 
epistemological and ontological contexts, affecting actors‘ cognition and behavior in value 
production and realisation. Financialisation is supported and maintained by narrative 
intervention in valorising the onto-phenomenological level of the economic. From this 
perspective, financialisation is suggested as a disinformation campaign, through which the 
cognitive dissonance of the financial mechanism is effectively contained, concealing its 
damaging effects and thus valorising the financial mechanism. It implements an 
intensification of the transactional orientation as the legitimate mode of value production 
and circulation. Sustaining and amplifying the transactional orientation of investment 
banking among the actors in the financial markets, the financial system conceals cognitive 
dissonance through its operativity of information. It works towards the construction of a 
new financial reality, stimulating belief and guiding actionwithout which financial 
integrity, credit relations, and transactional orientation could not be sustained. 
     Observing the contemporary culture-finance relationship from the perspective of value 
politics under financial capitalism, this thesis analyses specific aspects of homology between 
culture and finance from the perspective of the cultural logic of financial narrative. This is 
seen as a frame of value transference and a device of activation as well as of domination. 
Exploring the possibilities of a cultural theory of value, this project, first of all, focuses upon 
the question of value and the actual process of value formation associated with operativity 
and performativity of narrative. Narrative is analysed as the cognitive operation constitutive 
of financial narrative politics for value transference in the discourse of financial crisis, which 
has been, as this thesis upholds and examines, systematically operated throughout the 
Korean financial crisis. It mainly revisits the value theories and narrative analyses of Simmel, 
Marx, Ricoeur, Jameson, and Genette to articulate an economic theory of value in the 
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cultural politics of narrative. Following Ricoeur, it sees this as a mechanism of value 
transference, and it is here correlated with the financial doctrine of entanglement and 
contagion. Through a narrative, wherein utterances and statements around a primal event, 
or crisis, perform as the collective operativity of information, a value is constructed and 
transferred to inform and motivate actors. Narrative structure, from which the nexuses of 
intentionalities of the financial system are formulated and transmitted, is proposed as a 
meta-frame of cultural valorisation. It valorises economic value for the (re)production of 
dominant financial value, without which any unprecedented application of ‗methodology,‘ 
such as a ‗shock doctrine,‘ of economic prescription cannot be legitimised and extrapolated. 
This project begins with the argument in Chapter 2 that narrative exploits uncertainty 
as a resource for performativity, and thus necessitates a new standard, thereby regulating 
and activating heterogeneous actors in the markets. A financial crisis is the crucial point of 
narrativity in the constitution of a legitimate guiding structure, exploiting uncertainty in 
order to manage risk thus producing a narrative as a frame of self-reference. The narrative 
identifies the new main value by effectively performing the uncertainty of a financial crisis. 
In this regard, the chapter proposes that the necessity of negating (or guaranteeing) the 
fundamental contradiction, or ―the self-abolishing contradiction,‖ bolstered by the sheer size 
of the entanglement and contagion in finance capitalism, is authenticated and initiated by a 
preliminary cultural operation of a discursive approach to the crisis. The discourse is not a 
randomly disseminated rhetoric, but is presented as a narrative in which temporal 
reconfiguration and sequences of action are carefully guided to represent the main event as 
a source of cognition and action for contextual control; a certain sequence of events is 
thereby thematised and anticipated through the interpretation of the event in question, with 
clear intentions by the main financial narrator. Narrative opens a performative field of 
objectification in which the power relationship between the main narrator and the object, the 
narratee, is established and coordinated. The narrative emphasis in a collapse, for instance, 
one that is yet to come, grounds the operativity and performativity through which actors are 
informed and motivated, while implementing and legitimising the necessary official 
description. 
Articulating the intentions of the system, and its employment of capitalistically 
reconfigured temporality, as well as its representation of information into narrative, Chapter 
3 suggests that narrative is the objectifying field of value and value-transference, in which 
the textuality of everyday narrative is produced to direct actors as the ushering force of the 
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main value. Proposing value as a guiding force of cognition and action, the chapter closely 
inquires into the value-forming process, arguing that narrative process is an inevitable 
operation in necessitating the notion of the valuable. In this regard, narrative as the cultural 
valorisation of the economic is suggested, and it is detailed as the symbolic mechanism of 
representation of the financial system‘s intentions. Through this, heterogeneous elements are 
interpreted, organised, and finally evaluated.  
As Spivak points out, to answer the ―onto-phenomenological question‖ of value, value 
production in the economic sphere should necessarily be articulated as ―an adequate 
analogy to the psychoanalytic narrative‖ (Spivak, 1985: 82). The critical question is how to 
explain the way that economic value can acquire meaning in the individual mind, as well as 
in social relations, in valorising the actions and anticipations of actors. This is explained 
through detailed analysis of narrative operation and its impact in new economic modeling. 
The financial narrative expands the economic conditions into the conditions of psychological 
life, insinuating its modalities as a form of economic as well as cultural performance. If ―the 
question of value necessarily receives a textualized answer,‖ as Spivak argues, the question 
of how such a textualised response is actually necessitated and articulated in the formation 
of economic value needs to be urgently addressed. With this theoretical concern, I focus on 
narrative as the objectifying and subsuming mechanism through which a notion or 
consciousness of value accompanies the construction procedure of value. I revisit Simmel 
and Ricoeur’s theories, with regards to how economic value is represented in sequence, with 
a form of temporal reconfiguration in narrative operation.  
From the perspective of cultural performativity contributing to financialisation, the 
transactional orientation of investment banking is scrutinised in more detail in Chapter 4. It 
is viewed as a system of temporal articulation of human relationships, in which a series of 
transient combinations of human resources, experience, knowledge, and information is 
encoded and implemented for a transaction, which, thus, incorporates other forms of value 
production into its rhythm. Financial flows are the objective expressions of consecutive and 
collective temporal transactions in financial markets, on which each trader can project his or 
her subjective expressionmostly in conjunction with the temporal fluctuations. In this 
regard, financial flows are changing entities that ―must be expressed in terms of a time 
interval‖ (Knorr Cetina and Preda, 2004: 53), in which changes of volumes and positions of 
participants become eventually meaningful actions. Demonstrating the process of 
establishment of investment banking in commercial banking, non-financial corporations, 
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and individual actors through major financial shake-ups after the Korean financial crisis, the 
chapter shows how the code of investment banking becomes a symbolic as well as economic 
code of wealth, functioning as the sign of authority and communication in motivating the 
process of financialisation. 
Chapters 5 and 6 extend the analysis of narrative to the field of finance culture, 
arguing that narrative is a tool for the cultural valorisation of the economic. The two 
chapters explicate the two attributes of narrative operation respectively: reconfiguration of 
temporality and representation of information. Chapter 5 instantiates the concrete strategies 
of narrative intervention and representation as the specific mechanism of cultural as well as 
economic subsumption. This is implemented through narrative representation valorising the 
uncertainty. The chapter situates the IMF in the making of narrative junctures through the 
Korean financial crisis, whereby the intention of the system is represented as the forms of 
narrative accounts. What narrative aims at, I argue, is to bring about problematic certainty 
through uncertainty, by guiding purposeful actions that transform contingent meanings and 
relations into stable and practical relations. Corroborating the point that narrative operation 
problematises a crisis-in-the-making even before the event as the preliminary cognitive 
frame underscores that narrative is the structure of meaning-making of the event. It has a 
grounding of foreknowledge and ensuing performative procedures. As such the chapter 
suggests narrative as a device of consent for the object, through which the object overcomes 
epistemological and economic distance to the system of subject value. In this regard, the 
chapter specifically exemplifies performative narrative speeches and utterances provided by 
the official perspectives of the U.S. government and intelligence and the Korean government, 
which contribute to embedding shock-therapy as the legitimate process of restructuring the 
Korean economy. From this we can reveal the process of identification of subjective value 
from the object and its subjectivation in activation of the financial system. 
Seeing value as the guiding force of cognition and action as examined throughout 
Chapter 2, Chapter 6 inquires into narrative temporality by reinterpreting Genette, Marx 
and Simmel. This is in order to relate capitalistically-configured temporality with narrative 
time, in which, following Ricoeur, a circular transmitting of values is embedded; and a series 
of narrative performances thus takes place. Focusing on the ways in which the temporal 
operations of monetary capital are activated, I also articulate Gérard Genette‘s theory of 
narrative discourse, from which organisational and mediating features of timein 
conjunction with events and actionsare illuminated under the schematisation of narrative. 
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This chapter proposes a notion of narrative economy as the strategy of the cultural economy 
for guiding and legitimatising financial reality. From the perspective of description and 
representation of information, narrative economy employs specific methodssuch as 
narrative scattering and narrative juncturethereby supporting the performativity of a new 
financial structure and its temporality as the rhythm of life. For financial narrators, financial 
crisis is the crucial point from which the distortion of speed and transgression of order can 
take place. It works to subvert the ‗abnormal‘ temporality of crisis, and bestows on the 
system room for intervention, which allows it to revalorise the dominant rhythm. In this 
regard, a financial crisis is approached as a temporal disruption, against which the narrative 
temporal operation ceaselessly seeks to revalorise the rhythm for ―intelligible time of 
futurity‖ (Lash et al., 1998: 3). By scattering narrative information at the time of crisis, 
financial narrative makes narrative junctures, through which the narrative economy 
articulates and proliferates its core intention as the legitimate narrative process. The 
narrative economy presupposes narrative knowledge as an objectifying and operational 
field, with regard to which I examine Lyotard‘s observations as to the role of narrative in 
modern times. Actors participate in the weaving of narrative knowledge as a necessary 
condition of knowledge-production for narrative extension. This new way of activating 
legitimacy is suggested as the distinctive mechanism of the narrative economy. 
     Tracing the economic necessity of capital transformation, related to the emergence of 
the monetary system that enables the establishment of finance, Chapter 7 delves into the 
epistemology of monetary capital. Here I focus on the mediating and transformative 
function of monetary capital. Through an analysis of the development of capitalistic 
mediation and expansion, I suggest that the monetary form of capital is a form of cognition, 
associated with symbolic influences. The monetary form becomes an autonomous entity 
while being accumulated as financial capital. The banking culture as a legitimate regulatory 
activity and universal measure of mobilisation of individual money for the reserve of money 
capital, functions, according to Ernest Mandel, as a ―mediating link in the process of 
cognition‖ (Mandel, 1981: 29). It gives legitimate access to the system, beyond the economic 
procedure, that reshapes individual and social relationships. This theoretical concern is 
related to how a specific financial strategy becomes social cognition, with which the 
economic process even attains a position in the socially symbolic episteme regulating 
cognition and subsequent actions. It is thus deeply involved in the actualisation and 
realisation of the dominant value by transforming social relations. 
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Reappraising the narrative economy as a social process of meaning construction, 
which controls the definition of market conditions on behalf of the financial architect, my 
conclusion, Chapter 8, reconsiders the cultural problem of distance in the making of 
economic subject. This is seen as an epistemological and cultural issue in the formation of 
subjectivity and objectivity under financial capitalism. In conjunction with the formation of 
the narrative field, and with its cultural implications, the concluding chapter proposes that 
the encoding of new value in the local, under financial capitalism, is made operational by 
the objectification effect. In relation to this the chapter probes Georg Simmel analysis to 
reveal how the object can eventually recognise itself while it simultaneously objectifies itself. 
A financial crisis, it is argued, functions as a primal event in distancing and measuring the 
distance between subjective and objective value. From this the uncertainty of the objective 
value is redefined and guided in order to structure a new problematic certainty of subjective 
value through the narrative intervention of the main players. This conditions the context of 
performance of the object, with its implication of the notion of the valuable. The process of 
subjection (subjectivation) is suggested as a process of creating the economic subject, for it 
motivates the object to voluntary performance, thus generating the subject effect. However, 
the performativity of the object is always restricted. As the chapter asserts, it is this 
restrictedness itself that is the condition of subjectivity for the object. With regard to the 
financial subject and restrictedness, the chapter examines the Brady Plan and its 
conditionalities. The Brady Plan is analysed, in order to illuminate the formation of pseudo-
subjectivity, through which the Korean financial crisis can be read as an actual instance of 
the subsumption mechanism of the financial system. Here the formation of a new economic 
subjectivity of the object is revealed as a concrete example of subjection/subjectivation of the 
object. This takes place in the new, enhanced, yet all-subsuming imperial drive of 
contemporary financial capitalism. 
 
